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LABOR CONTRACT REJECTION IN BANKRUPTCY:
THE SUPREME COURT'S ATTACK ON LABOR IN
NLRB v. BILDISCOt
DAVID L. GREGORY *
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") is the major statutory vehicle
through which corporate debtors may be able to reorganize and, thus, avoid liquidation.'
Corporate debtors have increasingly resorted to the Code for this purpose. 2 One major
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' 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1976 & Stipp. IV 1981). In sum, Chapter 1 I of the Code provides for
debtor reorganization and, ideally, ultimate reemergence as a viable business entity. In contrast,
Chapter 7 of the Code provides for "straight" bankruptcy and liquidation of assets. In Chapter 7
proceedings, from the debtor's perspective, it is largely an academic question whether labor contract
rejection is sought or judicially approved. The debtor will not be revitalized in any event. However, in
the Chapter 11 reorganization, rejection of the labor contract is often the pivotal determinant as to
whether the business will be successfully reorganized. Therefore virtually all of the significant cases
regarding labor contract rejection occur in the context of Chapter 11 reorganization rather than in
Chapter 7 liquidation.
2 See supra note 1. This article deals only with rejection of labor contracts negotiated between
unions and employers in private sector labor relations. Further, this article will deal only with the
labor contract rejection initiatives of the employer. Labor unions may also file petitions in bank-
ruptcy. Highway & City, Freight Drivers, Dockmen & Helpers, Local Union No. 600 v, Gordon
Transp. Inc., 576 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978). However, the debtor union's interests are
markedly different from those of the debtor employer. The union wants to preserve future dues
payments. Labor contract rejection would be anathema; on the contrary, the debtor union would
want to preserve the collective bargaining agreement: " ... the union's strength lies in its ability to
continue serving its members, and maintaining the contract assures employment stability." Note,
Bankruptcy — A Labor Union is a Person who May File a Petition for Voluntary Bankruptcy Under
Section 4(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, 12 CREIGHTON L. Rr.v. 847, 857 (1979) ("The congressional
committee reports which preceded the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 reveal that both the House
and Senate interpreted the term unincorporated association as specifically intended to include a
labor union within the purview of the Act."); Note, Labor Union Bankruptcy, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 341,
362.
For discussion of rejection of individual employment contracts beyond the unionized employ-
ment environment, see Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Part II , 58 MINN. L. REV. 479,
484-92 (1974) (pre-1978 Code) [hereinafter cited as Countryman, Part II]. For discussion of rejection
of public sector labor contracts, see Note, Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE
L.J. 957 (1976).
Rejection of public sector labor contracts has suddenly become especially notorious and controv-
ersial. San Jose, one of the largest of California's 1,042 public school districts, filed a petition for
bankruptcy on June 30, 1983, making it the first public school district to file such a petition in
California since 1943. A California School District Goes Broke, NEWSWEEK, July 11, 1983, at 26, col. 3.
The district's decision to file for bankruptcy was made in the fare of a $14 million deficit for the
1982 - 83 year and an expected $12 million deficit For the 198'3-84 year, in addition to an order of a
federal mediator to pay the school district's employees over $3.5 million in back salaries. Id.; see also
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element in many reorganizations is the rejection of the debtor's current collective bargain-
ing agreements with its employees.° After satisfying judicial requirements, 4 section 365(a)°
of the Code permits bankruptcy courts to approve rejection of labor contracts by the
debtor-employer under certain circumstances. By sanctioning labor contract rejection,
the Bankruptcy Code is in fundamental conflict with the federal labor policies enunciated
in the National Labor Relations Act' ("NLRA") and in case law interpreting that statute.'
Federal labor law accords a near-sacrosanct status to the collective bargaining agree-
ment." The labor statutes provide complex rules with which the parties to the labor
contract must strictly comply prior to any possible contract termination or modification.°
Chase, Seventy of California Schools' Budget Crises Seen in San Jose District Bankruptcy Filing, Wall St. J.,
July 14, 1983, at 29, col. 2. In 1981, after an 11-day teacher strike, the San Jose School Board agreed
to a 22 percent pay raise over 3 years, despite the fact that the district was already suffering from
financial difficulties resulting, many claim, from Proposition 13 tax cuts. Id. at cols. 1-2; San Jose
Schools Can Cut Pay U.S. Bankruptcy Court Rules, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1983, at B8, col. 5 [hereinafter
cited as Schools Can Cut Pay]. When promised state funding failed to come through, the San Jose
School Board closed 14 schools, nullifying the newly negotiated contract and laying off over 500
teachers. A California School District Goes Broke, supra at 26, col. 3. Federal Bankruptcy Judge Seymour
Abrahams, who delivered the decision in the San Jose case, ruled that the district's action in
abrogating the teachers' contracts was proper, and also ruled that the teacher's wages be rolled back
to 1981-82 levels. Schools Can Cut Pay, supra at B8, cot. 5.
The fiscal problems currently experienced by the San Jose school system are neither unique to
that district or to the State of California. A California District Goes Broke, supra at 26, col. 3. The
100-school Oakland district has recently laid off 232 teachers, dismissed several of its nurses and
counselors, and cancelled a number of programs and courses. Id. These cutbacks have resulted in a
$300,000 surplus in the schools' budget but, according to Oakland Superintendent David Bowick,
the position of the district remains very precarious. "We expect a $12.8 million deficit, and unless the
state comes through with the funds we need, we'll be filing (for bankruptcy) along with San Jose."
Chase, supra, at 29, col. 2. Similar financial problems are reportedly being experienced in school
districts throughout the country, with Houston facing a $40 million deficit for the 1983-84 school
year and Boston needing $5.2 million to avoid teacher layoffs. A California School District Goes Broke,
supra at 26, col. S.
3
 NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984) [hereinafter cited as NLRB v. Bildisco].
• Id. at 1191.
5 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) provides that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract." There is no specific Code provision expressly characterizing or
defining labor contracts. However, collective bargaining agreements are considered to be executory
contracts and thus subject to section 365(a) of the Code. In his landmark article, Professor Country-
man posited the classic definition of the executory contract: "a contract under which the obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Countryman, Part I].
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1975).
▪ Despite "the position of the National Labor Relations Board that there is a direct conflict
between the Bankruptcy Act and the National Labor Relations Act," the court in Kevin Steel chose to
"view the matter in less apocalyptic terms" and purported to "reconcile" the two statutes. Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 1975)."We do not see
any irreconcilable conflict here between the Bankruptcy Act and the National Labor Relations Act."
Id. at 706.
" See infra notes 42-44.
• Section 8(d)(1-4) of the NLRA provides, in pertinent part:
(d)	 [W]here there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering employees in
an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no
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Specifically, the failure of either the employer" 0 or the union" to comply with section 8(d)
of the NLRA prior to effectuation of any contract alteration is an unfair labor practice.'
An unfair labor practice is a serious violation of federal labor law and renders the violator
subject to the broad remedial authority of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB')."
This article examines current" significant issues surrounding rejection of collective
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring
such termination or modification —
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the
event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is
proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a
new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after
such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any state
or territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the state or
territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that
time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice
is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
... the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss
or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a
fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and condi-
tions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.
10 Section 8(a) of the NLRA states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
. guaranteed in section 157 . . .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ...
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5) (1982).
" Section 8(b) enumerates analogous union unfair labor practices:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157.. .
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer .
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1) and (3) (1982).
' 2 See Allied Chemical Workers Union v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159, 185-86
(1971); NLRB v. Scam Instrument Corp., 394 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980
(190; CEPS Industries, Inc. and U.E. Local 1114, 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 456-58 (1966).
With the consent of all signatories, the contract can be lawfully modified in mid-term. Dunham-
Bush Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 175 (1982).
13 Section 10(c) of the NLRA sets forth the broad remedial authority of the Board, including the
ability to issue cease and desist orders and to take other ''such affirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
14 The recent popular literature attests to the importance and timeliness of the controversy
surrounding labor contract rejection in bankruptcy. In the year ending September 30, 1983, 20,837
Chapter 11 petitions were filed. Browning, Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor Contracts, 70 A.B.A. J. 60
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Browning, Using Bankruptcy]. The increased tendency of some solvent
employers to file petitions for reorganization in the bankruptcy courts so they can repudiate existing
labor contracts has led many commentators to question whether such use of the Bankruptcy Code is
proper and consistent with the intent of the Congress. See, e.g., Lewin, Bankruptcy: A Plea Becomes a
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bargaining agreements 15
 under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 16 There are major
Strategy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at E9, col. 1 (quoting New York University Law Professor
Lawrence King: "I would hope that the kinds of cases we are seeing now would not encourage
lawyers and business to use the bankruptcy law in ways for which it was not intended"); Chapter 11:
No Way to Bargain, Bus. Wk., Oct. 10, 1983, at 132, col. I ("If bankruptcy can be used solely as an
escape hatch from high labor costs, where does that leave the extensive body of federal labor law");
Greenberger, Firms Using Bankruptcy to Fight Labor, Wall St. J., March 30, 1983, at 29, col, 2
(questioning propriety of financially troubled companies using bankruptcy, or threat of it, to
abrogate costly tabor contracts).
The airline industry is one of the hardest hit by the recent surge of bankruptcy filings. See
Airlines in Turmoil: Labor Woes, Price Wars, and Bankruptcy Threats Rock the Industry, Bus. Wk., Oct. 10,
1983, at 3, col. 2 (air carrier unions file motion alleging that management's bankruptcy filing was for
an "'improper purpose,' to abrogate existing contractual obligations, not to improve the debtors'
ability to pay existing debts"; Continental Air Lays Off 1,500, 15% of Employees, Wall St. J., Jan, 26,
1982, at 8, col. 1 (outlining Continental's management plan to cut expenses by laying off employees
and negotiating concessions). "I f nothing else Continental's bankruptcy petition highlights the loss of
power that the restructuring of the industry means for airline unions." Airlines in Turmoil, supra, at
102, col. 2. On September 24, 1983, Continental, the nation's eighth largest air carrier filed in
Chapter 11, immediately rejected all labor contracts, and temporarily laid off all 12,000 employees.
Two days later, it recalled 4,200 employees at less than half their former pay. Frank Borman,
Chairman of the Board of Eastern Airlines, threatened that unless employees agreed to a 15% pay
cut, Eastern "would either go out of' business entirely or have to reorganize under the bankruptcy
laws - as Continental is doing." Id. at 101, col. '2.
Other industries affected by the recent increase in bankruptcy filings include the asbestos
manufacturing industry, with three of its largest manufacturers currently involved in Chapter 11
proceedings. See Lewin, Bankruptcy as Shield in Job Claims, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1983, at E 10, col. 1;
Winter, Bankruptcies Create Asbestos Case Turmoil, 68 A.B.A.J. 1361 (1982); Manville May Drive Congress
to Action, Bus. Wk., Sept. 13, 1982, at 34, col. 3. See also Lewin, Judge Suggests a Fund for Manville
Claimants, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at DI, col. 1 (federal district judge proposed that a sinking fund
be created to pay the future claims against Manville by those persons already exposed to asbestos but
who have not yet shown signs of any related illness); Lewin, Lawyer Aiding Manville Thrives on
Bankruptcies, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at DI, col. 4 (noting the high degree of financial success
experienced by the bankruptcy attorney handling the Chapter 11 petition of the Manville Corpora-
tion, in addition to other large companies).
Also faced with serious financial difficulties, Wilson Foods Corporation, the nation's largest pork
manufacturer and fifth largest meat packer, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the federal
bankruptcy law, repudiating its labor contracts covering 6,000 of its 9,000 employees and reducing
wages by 40%-50%. See Sorenson, Chapter 11 by Wilson Foods Raids Workers' Lives, Tests Law, Wall St. J.,
May 23, 1983, § 2, at 29, col. 10. At the time of filing Wilson had an estimated net worth of at least
$67 million. Id. Three days later, Wilson negotiated a new $80 million line of credit with Citibank. Id.
at 67.
Employees of commercial industries are not the only ones to have had their existing contracts
repudiated by bankrupt management. Teachers and other employees of the San Jose School District
in California are currently challenging the bankruptcy petition filed by that district in June of 1983.
See supra note 2.
Faced with a choice between making concessions in existing agreements or having their contracts
completely nullified, many labor unions have agreed to pay cuts and other compromises when their
employer has threatened bankruptcy. See Greenhouse,. The Corporate Assault on Wages, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 9, 1983, § 3, at 1, col. 2. According to the Greenhouse article, "[13]y threatening plant closings
and insolvency and by using new weapons such as going into bankruptcy court to reorganize,
management has succeeded in driving union wage increases to their lowest level in years." lei.
IS
 Throughout both this article and the pertinent cases, the terms labor agreement, labor
contract, and collective bargaining agreement will be used interchangeably. They are functionally
synonymous.
16
 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code) applies to cases filed on and after October 1,
1979. The new Code is found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1979). The Code supplants the former
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differences between the respective pertinent provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the
NLRA. Whether, and to what extent, if any, these fundamental tensions can be reconciled
and harmonized will be an important policy concern throughout this article.
This article will begin by presenting an intensive analysis of the bankruptcy and labor
statutes. The Bankruptcy Code will be juxtaposed to the special status historically ac-
corded to collective bargaining agreements by federal labor policies, and bolstered by
labor law case construction. The article attempts to discern the intent of Congress
regarding which statute should he given priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Next, the
article focuses on the various standards governing judicially approved rejection of labor
contracts under the Bankruptcy Code. The federal circuit courts of appeals that have
considered the issue have articulated different tests. Lower federal courts have applied
these differing appellate court standards in myriad fashion, engendering further confu-
sion. Particular attention will be devoted to the recent United States Supreme Court
decision NLRB v. Bildisco," which clarified the standards to be employed by the courts in
deciding whether to authorize debtors to reject labor contracts. The article then examines
some important ancillary issues which are related to labor contract rejection in bank-
ruptcy, such as the continuing duty to bargain, the union's right to strike, and other
jurisdictional conflicts between the bankruptcy courts and the NLRB. Finally, the article
submits that these crucial developments are the predictable and ineluctable consequences
of an important related line of Supreme Court decisions' 8 largely exempting managerial
prerogatives from the constraints of federal labor law. judicial expedition of labor
contract rejection in bankruptcy is but the most recent manifestation of a contemporary
jurisprudence diametrically opposed to historic federal labor law policies. Ominously, this
latest exaltation of entrepreneurial expediency over employees' rights will be purchased
at the ultimate expense of any hope of maintaining even rough equilibrium between labor
and management.
I. FUNDAMENTAL. POLICY TENSIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL. LABOR LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. The National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act
The National Labor Relations Act 18 is the most encompassing federal labor law
statute. The NLRA best exemplifies the salient legislative concerns underlying federal
labor policies. Federal labor legislation was originally necessitated by employer domina-
Bankruptcy Act (the Act), li U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976) (repealed 1978). While there are many
similarities between the Code and the former Act, there are also important distinctions. For example,
the new Code's section 365 includes an extensive list of exceptions to the trustee's ability to reject,
assume, or assign executory contracts. However, most important for purposes of this article, the
statutory provisions regarding the rejection of labor contracts are the same in the 1978 code (§ 365)
as in the prior Bankruptcy Act (§ 313). Unless otherwise noted, references will be to the 1978 Code.
17
 104 U.S. 1188 (1984).
' 8 See generally First Nat'l Maintenance, Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-80 (1981) (discussion
of line of cases).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Unless otherwise indicated, references to the NLRA include the
Taft-FIartley Act amendments of 1947 as well as the original National Labor Relations Act, popularly
referred to as the Wagner Act, enacted in 1935. In 1947, the NLRA was significantly amended by the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), also popularly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982). The second significant amendment to the core federal labor statute
occurred in 1959, with the Landrum-Griffin amendments, the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA). In this article, these three statutes will be generically referred to as the
NLRA, unless otherwise indicated.
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Lion of the working environment. Congress expressly addressed the deleterious ramifica-
tions of this untenable bargaining and economic inequity in the opening paragraphs of
the NLRA. 2° To rectify the labor relations imbalance attributable to corporate dominance,
Congress recognized and protected employee rights to engage in viable collective bargain-
ing.
The NLRA was designed to rectify this inequality of bargaining power by encourag-
ing meaningful collective bargaining and by protecting employee free choice regarding
collective action. 21 These concerns were also stressed by the Supreme Court in upholding
the constitutionality of the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.'" In that
landmark case, the Court stated, "Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the
most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor
disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of
instances."2:1 Statutory encouragement and protection of the collective bargaining process
2° Section 1 of the NLRA states, in pertinent part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
2 ' Section 1 of the NLRA expressly articulates the federal labor policy endorsing collective
bargaining.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate those obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C.	 151 (1982).
Similar policy considerations were earlier enunciated in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which
broadly prohibited federal courts from enjoining labor disputes:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmen-
tal authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of
ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should.
be
 free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choos-
ing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment and that he shall be free
from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections . . .
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
22
 301 U.S. I (1937). Subsequent decisions likewise focus upon the importance of collective
bargaining as an indispensable ingredient toward labor peace. See also Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96,
103 (1954); Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97, 103 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. North Ark.
Elec. Corp., Inc., •45 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co„ 196 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir.
1952).
2' NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 42 (1937).
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and the labor contract, therefore, was the first step toward effecting at least some rough
parity between labor and management 2 4
Several key provisions of the NLRA specifically address these concerns. For example,
section 7 of the NLRA guarantees the rights of employees to unionize, to bargain
collectively, and to engage in other concerted action. 25 Section 8(d) of the NLRA further
explicates the mutual obligation of the employer and the union to bargain collectively in
good faith.26 This section also requires strict adherence to a complex sequence to modify
or terminate an unexpired collective bargaining agreement.'" A union or employer which
attempts to terminate or modify a contract without complying with section 8(d) commits
an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA." The debtor is subject to the federal
labor laws and expressly considered a "person" within the meaning of the NLRA."
The Railway Labor Act ("RLA" ) 3O was enacted in 1926, and therefore predates the
NLRA. Many of the pertinent RLA provisions served as a model for later parallel NLRA
sections. 31 RLA provisions" regarding labor contract termination are as comprehensive
24
 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court described how •helpless labor was in
dealing with management before enactment of the NLRA:
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were or-
ganized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in
dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the
maintenance of himself and his family; that if the employer refused to pay him the
wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless able to leave the employ and resist
arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on an equality with their employer. 301 U.S. at 33.
25 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
2' . . . to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if re-
quested by either party.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
27 See supra note 9.
See supra notes 10 and l'1.
29 Section 2(1) of the NLRA specifically provides that, when used in the labor act, "the term
`person' includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corpora-
tions, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
30 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
3 ' Compare RLA, 45 U.S.G. § 152 (1982) with NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 and 158 (1982).
" Regarding contract termination or modification, section 6 of the RLA provides:
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written
notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the
representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon
within ten clays after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty
days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change has
been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the
Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proferred its
services, rates of pay, rules or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier
until the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this act, by
the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten clays has elapsed after termination of
conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.
45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
The Supreme Court has expressly ruled that section 2 of the RLA gives legal and binding effect
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and strict as those of the NLRA. 33 The RLA pertains to collective bargaining agreements
in the rail 34 and air industries. 35
The national labor policy expressed in these two statutes, therefore, strongly en-
dorses collective bargaining and statutorily protects labor contracts from unilateral termi-
nation or modification. The procedures which must be followed to effect change or to
repudiate labor agreements are comprehensively and painstakingly enumerated. In addi-
tion, these explicit statutory provisions have been strictly interpreted by courts who have
addressed their scope. Beginning with J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB , 36 the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that the collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary commercial
contract." In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 38 the Court endorsed judicial development of
a federal common law to govern labor law and litigation pertaining to enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
had been specially designed to govern litigation brought over violations of this unique
form of contract, the collective bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court has explained that unlike the ordinary contract, the labor
contract rests on collective consensus and compromise, rather than on individual, volun-
tary action.39 As one commentator has stated, perhaps the most significant distinction is
to collective bargaining agreements within the purview of the RLA; these labor contracts can be
changed only in accord with RLA's strict and comprehensive statutory scheme. Detroit & Toledo
Shore Line Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 156 (1969).
33 See supra note 9.
" The term "carrier" includes any express company, sleeping-car company, carrier by
railroad, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, and any company which is directly or
indirectly owned or controlled by or under common control with any carrier by railroad
and which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service (other than
trucking service) in connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation,
transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported
by railroad, and any receiver, trustee, or other individual or body, judicial or otherwise,
when in the possession of the business of any such "carrier."
45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
" "All of the provisions of title I of this Act, except the provisions of section 3 thereof are
extended to and shall cover every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce .
. . ." 45 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
The RLA thus applies to all employees of railway carriers under the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and all employees of air carriers. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181 (1976). Per 1 I U.S.C.
§ 103(g) (1978), § 1167 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code applies only to railroad employees.
." 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (Court analogized collective bargaining agreement to a comprehensive
trade agreement).
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547-50 (1964); United States Steelwor-
kers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
Prior to the Wiley decision, commentators had thoroughly distinguished the labor contract as a
peculiar species of the generic contract. The collective bargaining agreement both transcends and is
quite distinct from the ordinary contract. See Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of
Contract, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 829, 832 (1948) ("There is no indication that the collective bargaining
agreement originated as a contract. It borrowed the form of contract, however, and as its use spread
it became more and more related to contract."); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice
Through the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1952) (''The collective agreement differs as
much from the common contract as httmpty dumpty from a common egg.").
" 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
" The Supreme Court has explained:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-gov-
ernment. When most parties enter into contractual relationship, they do so voluntarily,
in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to
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that the collective bargaining agreement concerns workers' jobs and employment status
while the commercial contract deals with manufactured goods and real property.° The
agreement is a living document that grounds the labor-management relationship, and
provides the basis for an entire integrated system of industrial self-government. 4 ' The
labor contract. therefore, has achieved an exalted and arguably unique contractual status.
It has been described as a generalized code to govern the whole employment relationship
and as a new common law, the common law of a particular industry or of a particular
1)12101. 42 To abrogate contract terms unilaterally without complying with the statutory
provisions of the NI..RA 43
 or RLA' 14 is among the gravest of all labor law statutory
violations:" Not only is the contract breached, but the illegal unilateral change fundamen-
tally and perhaps irrevocably damages the entire labor-management relationship. The
parties are left without a workable code of industrial governance. These rigid labor law
provisions, narrowly circumscribing labor contract modification and termination, how-
ever, are inconsistent with the more Iluid, malleable standards of pertinent bankruptcy
law. The next section of this article will consider these bankruptcy principles.
B. Bankruptcy Statutes Regarding Contract Rejection
Bankruptcy law has a fundamentally different policy perspective than labor law. As
discussed earlier, federal labor policy is primarily concerned with industrial peace
through labor contracts achieved by the collective bargaining process. 46 In contrast,
bankruptcy law is designed to preserve the funds of the debtor for distribution to
creditors and to ensure the debtor a new stail:F 7
dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The choice is
generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship Rather it is
between having that relationship governed by an agreed upon rule of law or leaving
each and every in subject to a temporary resolution depentlent solely upon the
relative strength, at any given imonent, of the contending forces.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.. 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
1" Note, Bankruptcy and the Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 51 NOTRE DAME Lin-. 819,
826 (1076) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rejection of Agreements].
.41
 See, e.g., Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 CoLum. L. REV. 829,
832 (1918); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1490-93 (1959); Cox,
Rights Under A Labor Agreement, 60 HARv. L. REV. 601, 610-12 (1956): Cox, The Legal Nature of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1,2 (1958); Shulman. Reason, Contract, and Lam in
Labor Relations, 68 HARy. L. Rev, 999, 1002 (1955) ( -Collective bargaining is today, as Brandeis
pointed out, the means of establishing industrial democracy as the essential condition of political
democracy, the means of providing for the workers' lives in industry the sense of worth, of freedom,
and of participation that democratic government promises them as citizens. -); Summers, Collective
Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 534 (1969); Note, Corporate Reorganizations and
the Rights of Labor. 53 HARY. L. Rev. 1360, 1363-61 (1910).
-12 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579
(1960).
. 13 See supra note 9.
-11 See supra note 32.
See supra notes It) and 11.
-I" S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
-it Comment. Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. Rev. 477 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Collective Bargaining]; see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 14..R. REP. No. 595j; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON TnE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF
-roc UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., lit Sess. pt. 1, 71 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
ComMISSION Rfrotcr]. See also Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (preservation of funds
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The bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over all proceedings under the Code." The
for distribution to creditors and a fresh start to the debtor are the underlying goals in bankruptcy
law). See generally Costa, Bankruptcy: The Legal Whipping Boy, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 52 (1974); Note,
Resolution of Rejected Collective Bargaining Agreement Claims in Bankruptcy: Which Forum is Appropriate?,
48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 75 (1081).
4K 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471 (a-13) confers original, exclusive jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court over
all Title 11 cases, and original jurisdiction in all civil cases related to Title 11 matters, notwithstanding
any congressional conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on any other court. This article will not directly
deal with the controversy surrounding the constitutionality of the 1978 Code. The Supreme Court
has held that the 1978 Code violates the command of Article III of the Constitution that the judicial
power of the United States must be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy Article Ill life tenure
and protection against salary diminution during term of office. Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipeline Company, 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges. Id.
at 61. "In sum, Art. III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over
all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws. The establishment of such courts does
not fall within any of the historically recognized situations in which the general principle of indepen-
dent adjudication commanded by Art. III does not apply." Id. at 76. For commentary on the
Marathon case, see, e.g., Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: Confusion Surrounds Legislative
Courts, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 207 (1983); King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1983). See also Krattenmaker, Article III
and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297 (1981);
Note, Bankruptcy — United States Bankruptcy Courts and the Need for Article HI Status, 31 KANSAS 1,. REV.
492 (1983); Note, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.: The Scope of Article I
Court Jurisdiction: Abstract Principles or Practical Considerations? ,10 OHIO N. U.L. REV. 361 (1983); Note,
Constitutional Law — Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts — Bankruptcy Reform Act's Broad Grant offurisdic-
tion Violates Article III, 60 U. DET. J. URI'S. L. 289 (1983). Anderson, Bankruptcy, 28 Lov. L. REV. 805
(1982); Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon.
1982 Sup. Cr. REV. 25: Benedictisjudges Split on Bankruptcy Rule Validity, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 21, 1983,
at 5, col. 1; Carlin & Banks, District Courts' Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Holds Alter Northern Pipeline,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 4, col. 1; Conley, Bankruptcy, 43 LA. L. REV. 327 (1982); Currie, Bankruptcy
Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441 (1983); Kaminer, Northern Pipeline
Ruling and the Reference Rule, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, cot. 2; Kristl, Limitations on Legislative Court
Judicial Power: The Need for Balancing Competing-Interests — Northern Pipeline Construction Co, a.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 59 Ctn. KENT L. REv. 873 (1983); Levin & Mason, Where Do We Go From Here?
Bankruptcy Administration Post-Marathon, 87 Com, L.J. 353 (1982); Maley, Bankruptcy in Turmoil, 10
Lmo. 33 (Fall 1983); Parsons, The Broad Jurisdiction Granted to the Bankruptcy Courts by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 Is Invalidated, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 317 (1983); Redish, Legislative Court, Administrative
Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197; Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two
Perspectives, 1982 Sue. CT. REV. 1; Vihon, Delegation of Authority and the Model Rule: The Continuing
Saga of Northern Pipeline, 88 Com. L.J. 64 (1983); See also generally Young, Bankruptcy — Article I
Judges, 68 A.B.A. J. 1150 (1982); 1981 ,Supreme Court Term — Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: Salary
Clause Restrictions on Article I Courts, 96 HARv. L. REV. 257 (1982); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy:
Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983); Comment,
Constitutional Law — Article Ill: A Clear Test for the Constitutionality of Non-Article Ill Courts, 18 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 313 (1982).
Recognizing that judicial administration of the bankruptcy system could immediately grind to a
halt following a summary pronouncement of unconstitutionality, the Court repeatedly stayed its
judgment in Marathon Pipeline to give Congress "an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy
courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of
the bankruptcy laws." 458 U.S. at 88. Until a forthcoming legislative solution will rectify the present
constitutional difficulties, most courts have held that bankruptcy courts can continue to exercise all
jurisdiction originally conferred by the 1978 Code. See generally In re Cherry Pond Coal Co., 21
Bankr, 592 (S.D.W.Va. 1982); In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 21 Bankr. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In
re Otero Mills, Inc., 21 Bankr. 645 (D.N.M. 1982).
Congress faced a deadline of April 1, 1984 to amend the Bankruptcy Code to rectify the
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Marathon Pipeline problem of unconstitutionality, in that bankruptcy judges are not Article 111
judges. 458 U.S. at 61.
Unable to come to agreement by March 30, the House and Senate passed an emergency
thirty-day extension until midnight on April 30th. The extension has been repeatedly lengthened (to
May 26, to June 20), without forthcoming legislation. Without the extension, the appointments of all
bankruptcy judges would have expired. Since the Marathon Pipeline decision, the bankruptcy courts
have operated under interim provisions allowing bankruptcy judges to hear cases under the supervi-
sion of the federal district courts. If Congress is still unable to come to a legislative solution, the
judicial Conference of the United States has intimated that it has developed a still secret contingency
plan to keep the bankruptcy system functional. See Lamer, Bankruptcy Battle Put On Hold For One
Month, Vol. 6, 32 NAT'L L. j. 5 (Apr. 16, 1984); Linter, Deadlines Spurs Bankruptcy Moves, Vol. 6, 3 1
NAT'L L.J. 3, 26 (Apr. 9, 1984); N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1984, Business Section; N.Y. Times, Mar. 22,
1984, IA; Opening for Labor In Bankruptcy Crisis, 115 LAB. REL. REP. 231 (BNA News and Background
Information, Mar. 19, 1984).
As this article was going to press, the joint conferees of the House and Senate were still unable to
come to agreement on the bankruptcy legislation. For purposes of this article, the most significant
development was H.R. 5174, which passed the House on March 21, 1984. The House bill would have
legislatively overruled the Bildisco decision, and would have adopted the Second Circuit's strict REA
Express "last resort" test for labor contract rejection, and then only after good faith bargaining and
formal court approval for the petition for rejection. Id. The Senate has refused to agree to the House
bill. Pertinent provisions of H.R. 5174 provided:
... "collective bargaining agreement" means a collective bargaining agreement which is
covered by title 11 of the Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act.
(b) The trustee may reject or assume a collective bargaining agreement under this title only if
and after the court approves the rejection or assumption of such agreements.
(c) The court, only on the motion of the trustee, may approve the rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement under this title only after notice to all parties in interest
and a hearing.
(d)( 1) The trustee shall —
(A) meet and confer in good faith with the authorized representative of the employees who
are subject to a collective bargaining agreement; and
(B) provide such authorized representative with the relevant financial and other in-
formation.
(2) The trustee may file a motion for the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement under this title if —
(A) the trustee has proposed modifications in such agreement to such authorized
representative deemed necessary by the trustee for successful financial reorganization
of the debtor and preservation of the jobs covered by such agreement;
(B) the trustee has considered but rejected as inadequate for successful financial
reorganization of the debtor and preservation of the jobs covered by such agreement
alternative proposals for modifying such agreement made by such authorized rep-
resentatives; and
(C) a prompt hearing on rejection is necessary to successful financial reorganiza-
tion of the debtor.
(e) The court, upon motion of the trustee to reject a collective bargaining agreement, shall
hold an expedited hearing to determine whether such agreement may be rejected under this title, not
less than 7 days and not more than 14 days after the filing of such motion, or within
such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 14-day period fixes. Such
hearing shall be completed no later than 14 days after the commencement of such
hearing, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 14-day
period fixes.
(f) The financial information relevant to determining whether a collective bar-
gaining agreement may be rejected under this title shall be made available, under such
conditions and within such time as the court may speedy, to the authorized representa-
tive of the employees who are subject to such agreement.
(g) The court may not approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under this
title unless —
(1) the trustee has complied with subsection (d) of this section; and
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Code governs rejection of executory contracts," and provides for resolution and allow-
ance of claims attributable to contract rejection.' Although neither the 1978 Code nor the
(2) absent rejection of such agreement, the jobs covered by such agreement will be lost and any
financial reorganization of the debtor will fail.
(h) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit the trustee unilaterally to terminate
or alter any of the wages, hours, terms and conditions established by a collective bargaining
agreement. (emphasis added).
There is intensive lobbying by both organized labor and employer associations in Congress. If Bildisco
legislation is not immediately forthcoming, it is likely that no further congressional action will be
taken on this important element of the pending bankruptcy legislation until alter the summer recess
and perhaps not until after the fall election. Senator Packwood is leading efforts in the Senate to pass
satisfactory compromise legislation addressing Bildisco. However, he has been unable to get his
proposed amendment (of H.R. 5174) to a vote in the Senate. The Article III problem of the
bankruptcy courts can be addressed separately; politically, however, the entire legislation may hinge
on the ability of the joint conferees to agree on Bildisco provisions.
Regardless of any legislation, the Bildisco decision will remain a critically important indicator of
the radical distortion underway in contemporary labor law jurisprudence in favor of private own-
ership elites.
" 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). General contract rejection in bankruptcy has its origin in English
common law principles that the trustee could renounce title to and abandon burdensome property.
See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. Wabashwestern R. Co., 150 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1893); Sparhawk
s'. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 115 (1891); Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1891); 2 CoulEtt
ON BANKRUPTCY, 365.01 at 365-6 and 365-7 (15th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER); Country-
man, Part I, supra nore 5, at 440 ("Long before the English Bankruptcy Act contained any express
provisions on the subject, the courts had concluded that the assignee in bankruptcy taking title to the
bankrupt's property could elect to abandon, rather than retain, that which was worthless or onerous,
including leases and other executory contracts.").
The labor contract cannot he partially rejected. The debtor in possession cannot seek to sever
only unpalatable wage and benefit terms while preserving the balance of the contract. "Rejection ...
is an all-or-nothing proposition. The debtor in possession cannot ask for partial rejection of a
contract, nor can the court require that certain portions of an agreement be retained." Note, The
Labor
-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement. 80 MICH, L. 134,
152 (1981). See also, e.g., n re Italian Cook Oil Corp. 190 F.2d 994, 997 (3d Cir. 1951); In re David A.
Roscow, Inc., 9 BANKR. 190, 193 n.5 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Mabel: Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re M & S Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D. Del, 1954); 2
COLLIER 365.01 (2) at 365-11, supra.
One commentator has advocated partial rejection, "Onerous wage and monetary benefit provi-
sions could thus be altered without rejecting less burdensome provisions, such as seniority systems,
meal periods, and health and welfare benefits. These would remain in effect until the panics
negotiated a new contract." Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81
CoLust. L. REV. 391, 403 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Law's Effect]; see aLso Note, Labor-Rejection
of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter XI Arrangement Proceedings, 17 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REV.
192, 213 (1976).
5.° 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(8)(A-B) (1982) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (f'), (g), (h) and (i) of this section, if such objection
to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of
such claim as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such
amount, except to the extent that —
(8) if such claim is for damages resulting from the termination of an employment
contract, such claim exceeds —
(A) the compensation provided by such contract, without acceleration, for one
year following the earlier of —
(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which the employer directed the employee to terminate, or such
employee terminated, performance under such contract; phis
(B) the unpaid compensation due under such contract without acceleration, on the
earlier of such dates, . .
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prior Bankruptcy Act expressly defines the collective bargaining agreement as an execut-
ory contract, all of the courts" which have considered the issue regard labor agreements
as executory" contracts under the pertinent bankruptcy statute." Consequently, there is
no longer any dispute over the bankruptcy court's power to authorize labor contract
rejection. 54 The task of determining the appropriate tests for such rejection, however, has
been fraught with pragmatic and conceptual difficulties. Because rejection of the labor
contract may often be an integral part of bankruptcy proceedings, it is important to
conduct a critical analysis of the proper standards for such rejection and explication of the
policy ramifications of these difficult choices.
The Code provides two general alternatives for the commercial enterprise in finan-
cial distress. Chapter 7 is the primary mechanism for liquidation of assets and distribution
to creditors." Chapter 11 offers debtors the option of reorganization and possible avoid-
ance of liquidation, 58
 Although the labor contract can technically be rejected in both
Chapter 7 straight bankruptcy liquidations and Chapter 11 reorganizations," the vast
majority of cases dealing with labor contract rejection occur within the Chapter 11
reorganization context. Obviously, in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings it is largely
academic whether or not contracts are rejected because the business will not reemerge in
' 1 See NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct, 1188 (1984); In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d
890. 894 (11th Cir. 1983); Joint Local Executive Board, AFL- C10 v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210,
212-13 (9th Cir, 1980); Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d
Cir. 1975); Shopmen's Local Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975).
In addition to the Supreme Court and these federal courts of appeals, a host of bankruptcy court
decisions are in accord. For a compendium of further consonant cases, see Comment, Collective
Bargaining Agreements and the Bankruptcy Reform Act: What Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use in
Deciding Whether to Allow a Debtor to Reject a Collective Bargaining Agreement?, 51 U. CINN. L. REV. 862,
866 n.29 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, What Test?'
" The Code's legislative history states that an executory contract is one where "perfortnance
remains due to some extent on both sides." H. REF'. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 347 (1977); S.
REY. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 58 (1978). Whether Congress intended section 365(a) to apply to
collective bargaining agreements as well as ordinary commercial contracts is, however, another
matter. Regrettably, the legislative history of section 365 offers no direct clue as to whether Congress
even considered the issue. Circumstantial evidence supports the view that Congress intended to
permit the rejection of collective bargaining agreements, however. Bordewieck and Countryman,
The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANK. L.J. 293, 294 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Bordewieck and Countryman].
x Section 365(a) of the 1978 Code provides, in pertinent part: "Except as provided in sections
765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the
court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexplored lease of the debtor,"
(Section 313 of the Bankruptcy Act was the predecessor to section 365.) For excellent comprehensive
treatment of rejection of executory contracts in general, see Countryman, Part I, supra note 5, and
Part II, supra note 2; Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L.
Rev. 341 (1980); Nimrner, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the
Bargain, 54 Coto. LAw., 507 (1983); Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and
Reorganization, 31 U. Ctn. L. RES'. 467 (1964).
54 See Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 294 ("courts now routinely hold that a
collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract which may be rejected in a bankruptcy
proceeding").
w 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982).
w 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). "A reorganization, at least as a start, may be viewed as a form
of liquidation. The business entity, however, is sold to the creditors themselves rather than to third
parties." Note, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy, Entitlement and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 893
(1982).
57 Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Code apply to both Chapter 7 and 11 proceedings.
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any event. The Chapter 11 reorganization, however, has a different focus and purpose.
Ultimately, the aim of reorganization is to enable debtors to reduce or extend their debts
so that they can return to a viable condition of operation." If reorganization is successful,
all parties are in relatively better positions than they would be if it were a Chapter 7
liquidation. The debtor reemerges as a viable business entity, and the employees retain
their jobs. "A successful reorganization will generally give creditors a greater return on
their claims than would a straight bankruptcy." 59
 In the Chapter 11 reorganization
context, the rejection of the labor contract is sometimes the critical factor in determining
the ultimate success or failure of the reorganization effort. 66
After the employer files the petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 6 ' it oper-
ates under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. Normally, the court will permit the
debtor to continue its business operations subject to the court's continuing supervision.
The petitioning company is designated as the debtor in possession, 62
 and generally has
trustee's" powers." Among its many duties, the debtor in possession must file a list of
w Note, Law's Effect, supra note 49, at 392. Congress also specifically addressed the primary
purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization, as distinguished from Chapter 7 liquidation:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restruc-
ture a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with
jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of
business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for
which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.
Often, the return on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to compensate
those who have invested in the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and require
creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for
payment of their claims. If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be
returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to
liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. News
5787, 5963, 6179. See also Comment, What Test?, supra note 51, at 868.
b9 Note, Law's Effect, supra note 49, at 392. See also D. Stanley & M. Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem,
Process, Reform, 129-30 & 142-43 (1971).
e* For purposes of this article, therefore, most of the cases also occur within the Chapter 11
reorganization context.
61
 Both Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter II reorganization proceedings may be either volun-
tarily initiated by the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), or involuntarily by the creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 303
(1982). Chapter 7 proceedings can be converted to Chapter 11 reorganizations, and the reverse, by
the debtor or the court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 706, 1112 (1982).
62
 Section 1101(1) provides: " 'debtor in possession' means debtor except when a person that has
qualified under section 322 of this title is serving as a trustee in the case." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982).
els Section 1104 provides for appointment of a trustee. However, "the norm, under section 1104,
is to leave the debtor in possession unless a party in interest requests appointment of a trustee or
examiner. Upon such request, after notice and hearing the court shall appoint a trustee if one of two
conditions is found to exist: (I) fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement, or (2) a
trustee would be in the best interest of creditors, and equity security holders, and other interests,
regardless of number of holders of securities or the amount of assets or liabilities." Herzog and King,
COLLIER (pamphlet ed. 1983), supra note 49 at 463.
64 Section 1107(a) sets forth the rights, powers, and duties of the debtor in possession:
Subject to any limitations on a trustee under this chapter, and to such limitations or
conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other
than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall
perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2),
(3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case tinder this chapter.
I U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982).
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creditors." The debtor in possession is given a period in which it need not repay debts
incurred before it filed the petition. During this period, the debtor often works out a
repayment plan called a plan of reorganization with its creditors."
Regardless of whether proceedings are under Chapter 7 or 11, if all creditors' claims
cannot be satisfied, certain creditors are entitled to priority in - obtaining repayment under
the Code.67
 After these priority claims have been satisfied, unsecured claims which arose
before the filing of the petition are then addressed." Some claims under collective
bargaining agreements are entitled to certain priority status."
as Section 521(1) provides that the debtor shall "file a list of creditors, and unless the court
orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs."
11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1982).
" 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays all debt collection attempts. The purpose of the automatic stay is
summarized in the legislative history:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure action. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. The automatic stay also provides creditor
protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies
against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims
in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors ... .
House Report for the Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. Rep. 95 - 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. News, 5787, 6296, 6297.
" 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982).
" II U.S.C.	 726(a)(2) (1982).
69
 For an excellent synthesis of the priorities accorded labor contract claims, see Note, Law's
Effect, supra note 49, at 393 n.17:
For unions and collective bargaining agreements, the relevant priority rules are as
follows. All claims for services rendered before the ninety days prior to the filing of the
petition are general claims, for which the statute grants no priority. Claims for wages
(including vacation, sick leave, arid severance pay) earned within ninety days before the
petition was filed receive third priority. I I U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1978). Claims
for contributions to employee benefit plans arising from services rendered within 180
days before the petition are given fourth priority. § 507(a)(4), Finally, wages and
benefits earned during the reorganization period are considered administrative ex-
penses, which are given first priority. §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(a)(1). Wages and benefits
earned but unpaid are prorated: the amount earned before is appropriately divided
into third priority, fourth priority, and general claims.
Note, Law's Effect, supra note 49, at 393 n.17.
Although unsecured wage claims earned within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy do have third priority, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982), each individual em-
ployee's claim is limited to a maximum of only $2,000, § 507(a)(3)1B), and may be even further
constrained, § 507(a)(4)(B)(i), (ii).
The Ninth Circuit provided a fine synthesis of the priorities accorded types of labor contract
severance pay. In re Health Maintenance Foundation, 680 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982). The court of
appeals rejected the union's argument that the severance pay claims were entitled to the highest
priority as costs of administration under section 64(a)(1) of the former Act, now sections 503(b)(1)(A)
and 507(a)(1), which pertain to costs and expenses for services rendered after commencement of the
bankruptcy case. Id. at 621. (Normally, section 507(a)(3)(A) and (B) of the 1978 Code accords third
priority to "unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance and
sick leave pay earned by an individual within 90 days before the date of filing of the petition or the
date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs first; but only to the extent of $2,000
for each such individual.") 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)(A), (B) (Supp. I1 1978). The Ninth Circuit explained
why labor contract severance pay based on length of service was not entitled to administrative
expense priority status:
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In a Chapter 7 liquidation, all debts in the priority class must be satisfied in full before
any distribution can be made to the next lower priority class." General unsecured
creditors whose debts arose before the filing of the petition, therefore, are paid only after
all priority claimants have been paid!' In a Chapter 11 reorganization, first and second
priority claims are to be paid in cash on the effective date of the reorganization plan,"
Lower priority claims and unsecured general claims are subject to more complex alloca-
tion formulas," including possible outright cancellation." A contract which is rejected in
bankruptcy proceedings is treated as having been rejected the day before the petition was
filed. Consequently, all damages for breach of the contract are pre-petition unsecured
claims, accorded low priority and often not satisfied in full or even in part."
Given the specific provisions of the federal labor laws" regarding labor contract
termination, and the more fluid bankruptcy statutes" dealing with contract rejection, the
policy and pragmatic tensions between the two types of statutes are very clear. Labor law
has long prohibited unilateral contract modification absent compliance with section 8(d)."
In addition, both the NLRB and the courts have been prohibited from imposing substan-
There are two general types of severance pay: (1) pay at termination in lieu of
notice; and (2) pay at termination based on length of employment. The first type of
severance pay appears to be entitled to priority payment as a cost of administration. In
re Public Ledger, 161 F.2d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1947). The presumption is that the trustee
chose to terminate the employee without notice as part of administering the Chapter X]
reorganization, and the severance pay in lieu of notice is therefore considered a cost of
administration.
Three circuits have considered the second type of severance pay — that based on
length of employment — which is at issue here. The First and Third Circuits hold that
such severance pay is not entitled to priority as a cost of administration. In re Mammoth
Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 955 (1st Cir. 1976); In re Public Ledger, 161 F.2d at 774. The
Second Circuit holds that it is. Straus-Duqarquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3 Int. Bro. of
Elec. Workers, 386 F.2d 649, 651 (2nd Cir. 1967)......Because the amount of the
severance pay claims depends upon the length of employment, the consideration
supporting . [the employees] claims was the service performed for ... [the debtor]
over the entire period of ... employment. Since no part of their present claim arise [sic]
from services performed for the . [trustee], no portion ... may receive ... priority."
Health Maintenance, 680 F.2d at 621 (footnote omitted). See generally Comment, The Priority of a
Severance Pay Claim in Bankruptcy, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 722 (1980); Note, Employee Fringe Benefits in
Employer Bankruptcy, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 604 (1974).
" 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1982).
" 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1982).
72 11	 § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1982).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B) (1982).
14 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(F) (1982). " 11 U.S.C.	 365(g) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he rejection of any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a
breach of such contract or lease — ( 1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed
under this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 1 1, or 13 of this title,
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition . .
See 2 COLLIER 365.08, supra note 49.
Labor contract rejection is purchased at the expense of federal labor policy. "[F]ederal labor
policy is grossly flouted by the unilateral rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by an
unhappy employer. This is particularly true when a bankruptcy court permits the rejection to relate
back to the date of the filing and thus eliminate unfair labor practices committed by the debtor post
petition." Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 294.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
" 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
78 Allied Chemical Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 178-182 (1971).
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tive contract terms upon the parties. 75 Because the.bankruptcy courts have the authority
to sanction labor contract rejection by the debtor, however, these courts have, in effect,
the ability to permit the debtor to rewrite unilaterally the substantive terms of the
employment relationship." This judicial intrusion into the labor contract in favor of the
employer is anathema to established labor policy, and has created significant difficulties
for courts seeking to determine whether the labor or bankruptcy statute should take
priority in a given proceeding.
C. Discernment of Congressional Intent
Although the issue of statutory accommodation is of "preeminent significance"" to
the question of whether labor or bankruptcy provisions should be accorded greater
weight, there is little evidence in the history of either statute regarding the act's relation
ship to the policies expressed in the other statute. As one court has noted, the legislative
history can probably be read as supporting any desired result. 82
 The NLRA's position is
76
	
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union,
361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
80 When a bankruptcy court permits a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement duly
negotiated with the representative of its employees, it effectively regulates the substantive terms of
the employment relationship over the objections of one of the parties:
[T]he employee of a debtor that terminates a collective bargaining agreement with the
approval of the bankruptcy court will perceive correctly that the benefits of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement his union negotiated have been taken away by the bank-
ruptcy court.
Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 299.
g' Note, Bankruptcy Law-Labor Law-Rejection, Assumption, and Modification of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 311, 312.
1'2 Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 381 F. Supp 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). When a court is faced with a controversy created by an
apparent conflict between the language of two statutes, one method of resolution is an "attempt to
reconcile the statute in a manner which best effectuates the intent of Congress." In re Brada Miller
Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 896 (11th Cir. 1983). Despite frequent reliance by the courts on
legislative intent as a criterion for statutory interpretation, there remains considerable controversy
over whether such reliance is misplaced. See, e.g., Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 886 (1930) (claiming that "intended meaning" of a statute is in fact discoverable from records of
legislative proceedings leading up to adoption of statute); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J.
755 (1966) (questioning existence and discernability of legislative intent); Note, Intent, Clear Statement,
and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982)
(criticizing recent emphasis Supreme Court has placed upon finding of literal legislative intent by
lower courts); Note, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930) (arguing that existence of
genuine "legislative intent: is questionable and that even if such intent were present, that it could not
be revealed by examination of legislative proceedings").
One key factor in determining the intent of the legislature which enacted a statute is the specific
language chosen for the wording of the statute by that legislative body. See SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 48-68 (4th ed. 1973). Commentators in this area are careful to note,
. however, that "the statute itself in its entirety should not be interpreted solely by reference to its own
terms, but rather by reference to other laws of the state, particularly to those pertaining to the same
subject." E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 420 (1940). Crawford posits that "any
statute which requires construction shotild be construed in harmony with existing law. This is a basic
principle of construction." Id. at 421. Additional extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation include
"information about circumstances and events occurring on or after the time when a statute goes into
effect." SUTHERLAND, supra, at 228. In Boy's Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 250
(1970), the Supreme Court expressed a similar rationale: "Statutory interpretation requires more
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that the provisions of the labor statutes should prevail in the event of conflict with
bankruptcy statutes." Courts addressing labor contract rejection under section 313 of the
former Bankruptcy Act, however, consistently chose in favor of bankruptcy statutory
provisions and disregarded the seemingly clear language of the NLRA."
In view of the fact that the courts have given priority to the bankruptcy statute, the
current difficulty is in developing the appropriate standards for deciding whether to
authorize labor contract rejection under bankruptcy law." The 1978 Code, as was the case
with the prior Act, makes only one specific reference to the interrelationship of labor
contract rejection in the bankruptcy and labor statutes." Only when labor contracts are
within the purview of the Railway Labor Act is the bankruptcy court expressly required to
than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of
pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions."
For a thorough discussion of the issue of statutory interpretation, see generally CALABItEst, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA
TION OF STATUTES (1975); Bishen, The Law Finders: An Essay on Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1965); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI, L. REV. 533 (1983); Williams, Statutes as
Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common Law Cases, 50 Gco, WASH. L. REV. 554 (1982).
" Section 15 of the NLRA provides:
Wherever the application of the provisions of section 672 of title 11 conflicts with the
application of the provisions of this subchapter, this subchapter shall prevail: Provided,
that in any situation where the provisions of this subchapter cannot be validly enforced,
the provisions of such other Acts shall remain in full force and effect.
29 U.S.C. § 165 (1982).
The courts, however, dismiss this seemingly unequivocal statutory language as non-dispositive.
In In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the union unsuccessfully argued
that section 15 of the NLRA conferred preemptive jurisdiction on the Board. The court summarily
rejected the union's position. "The fact that the Union filed with the National Labor Relations Board
on March 18, 1959, a charge of unfair labor practice based upon the application for rejection of the
contract and refusal to bargain, is immaterial. The National Labor Relations Board, in my opinion,
has no jurisdiction here to interfere with the rejection of an executory contract . . . ." In re Klaber
Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. at 85.
" See Comment, What Test?, supra note 51, at 862. See also Note, Bankruptcy Law-Labor Law-
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements As Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 22 WAYNE L. Rev. 165,
171-172 (1975) thereinafter cited as Note, Bankruptcy Rejection] ("[E]very case involving a
bankruptcy/tabor conflict has used a literal reading of the Bankruptcy Act, and no decision has yet
found the NLRA to be controlling ... and the unbroken string of decision favoring bankruptcy law
supports the suggestion that there may be a permeating view elevating bankruptcy law above labor
law."). Several commentators, however, have forcefully argued that all labor contracts are sui generic
and therefore should be exempt from executory contract rejection under the bankruptcy laws. See
Note, Rejection of Agreements, supra note 40, at 826.
" Comment, What Test?, supra note 51, at 862.
Section 1167 of the 1982 Code provides:
Notwithstanding § 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee may change the
wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor established by a collective
bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et. seq.)
except in accordance with § 6 of such Act (45 U.S.C. 156).
11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982).
Although section 201 of the RLA specifically applied to air carriers, section 103(g) of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code provided that section 1167 of the Code would apply only to railroad reorganiza-
tions under subchapter IV of Chapter I1. Thus, bankruptcy courts have held that section 1167 is
confined to the labor contracts of' railroad employees. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216,
217-18 (N.D. Tex. 1982). While labor contracts of air carriers are otherwise subject to the RLA, via
section 103(g) of the Code, they are exempted from the section 1167 mandate of strict compliance
with the RLA labor contract modification and termination procedures prior to rejection. Id.
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comply with the contract termination provisions of the labor statute." Significantly,
neither the 1898 Act nor the 1978 Code addresses whether the bankruptcy court should
also defer to the provisions contained in section 8(d) of the NLRA regarding rejection of
those labor agreements outside the scope of the Railway Labor Act. Faced with these
inconsistent statutory provisions, and conspicuous congressional failure to clarify the
continuing statutory and policy dilemma with the passage of the 1978 Code, courts have
rather uniformly ruled in favor of the bankruptcy provisions." Considering the absence
of evidence of congressional intent in this area, one commentator has stated that the
legislative histories of both the Code and the NLRA suggest that Congress never even
contemplated the interrelationship of these two areas of the law. 99 This failure, together
with the fact that the Code gives the bankruptcy courts original jurisdiction in all matters
coming under the Code, indicates that Congress chose such courts as the proper forum
for resolving claims which arise following the rejection of a debtor's collective bargaining
agreement."
The courts have not been oblivious to the Supreme Court's classic caution that "a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit or intention of its makers."9' In earlier analagous cases, however, the
Supreme Court92 had read the Bankruptcy Act literally and ignored the policy of the
Labor Act which called for a different result. 93
 This literalist approach to statutory
interpretation, though it has been soundly criticized, 94 remains dominant.95 Virtually all
" 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982).
" See supra note 84.
89 Note, Resolution of Rejected Collective Bargaining Agreement Claims in Bankruptcy: Which Forum is
Appropriate?, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 75, 90 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Resolution]; see also Note,
What Test?, supra note 51, at 864-65; Note, Law's Effect, supra note 49, at 396 ("Congress had evidently
never considered this situation; it had overlooked the problem of businesses in reorganization when
it passed the NLRA, and collective bargaining agreements were in their infancy when Congress had
last overhauled the bankruptcy laws.'').
9° Note, Resolution, supra note 89 at 90.
91 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), quoted in In re Brada
Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2(1 890, 896 (11th Cir. 1983).
92 Electrical Industry Joint Board v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.24 698, 703 (2(1 Cir. 1975);
see United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33 (1959).
94 See Bishen, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. I. 3, 28
(1965); Note, Bankruptcy-Labor Law-Statutes-Collective Bargaining-§ 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act
Permits Rejection of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Only After Particularly Careful Scrutiny of
the Request in Light of' Policies Underlying the National Labor Relations Act, 45 CINN. L. REV. 281,
284-85 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Careful Scrutiny]; Note, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy,
42 S. CAL. L. REv. 477, 486-87 (1969) ("[D]aily experience teaches that language is filled with
inherent ambiguity. Modern linguistic analysis bears out our common experience. 'Co complicate
matters, the wording of a particular statute is often the product of formulation and revision by many
authors and very frequently is the result of a compromise or accident. Therefore, a proper inquiry
cannot begin and end with the words of the statute. The purpose of a given enactment frequently
requires a somewhat different interpretation of its terms than a literal interpretation would dic-
tate.").
95 I n earlier landmark labor law cases, the Supreme Court had expressly criticized the static "law
finder" approach, in favor of a more dynamic mode of statutory interpretation. Drawing from
landmark labor law cases, one commentator concisely summarized this evolution in the Court's
thinking regarding the preferable mode of statutory analysis. Note, Careful Scrutiny, supra note 94, at
285-86.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sinclair, argued that literal reading of statutory material yields
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courts which have considered the conflict between the bankruptcy and labor statutory
provisions regarding labor contract termination in bankruptcy have concluded that the
bankruptcy statutes control."
One commentator has suggested that the labor and bankruptcy statutes could be
reconciled by a sequential application of the two bodies of law." Under this approach,
whenever the NLRA and bankruptcy law collide, the NLRA would be applied first. This
would insure that proper sanctions were applied to an employer who had violated the
NLRA but sought refuge in bankruptcy law." This recommendation has yet to he
adopted by the courts.
Many courts have attributed special significance to Congress' continued conspicuous
failure to rectify these statutory dilemmas in the 1978 Code. For example, in In re Brada
Miller Freight System, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the
significance of Congress' failure to exempt other types of collective bargaining agree-
ments was strengthened by the recent overhaul of the bankruptcy law which left un-
changed the narrow exemption for railway labor agreements." Section 1167 of the 1978
Code exempted Railway Labor Act collective bargaining agreements from the operation
of section 365 of the Code, which governs executory contract rejection. Because Congress
made no such similar provision for labor contracts not within the purview of the RLA, its
silence indicated that no further exceptions should be made." }°
little when the nature of the subject matter to which an older statute was directed undergoes
dramatic qualitative change. Brennan suggested that: "The Court then should so exercise its judg-
ment as best to effect the most important purposes of each statute. It should not be bound by
inscrutable congressional silence to a wooden preference for one statute over the other." The Court
in Boy's Markets overruled Sinclair. expressly adopting the rationale of the Brennan dissent; "Statu-
tory interpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration
must be given to the total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent
provisions." Id.
" This result reflects an institutional judicial allegiance to the controlling entrepreneurial elites,
dictating the subordination of labor interests. "Even a cursory review of recent case law demonstrates
a strong, if understandable, pro-debtor bias . . ." Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at
319. "Mhe unbroken string of decisions favoring bankruptcy law supports the suggestion that there
may be a permeating view elevating conflict, maximum consistent effect should be given to both
statutes." See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S.
188, 198 (1939).
97 See infra note 98.
" Note, Bankruptcy Rejection, supra note 84, at 175. This enlightened view is consonant with the
axiom that if statutes are in potential conflict, maximum consistent effect should be given to both
statutes. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974): United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188,
19S (1939).
" Prior to enacting the 1978 Code, Congress, in 1976, had provided for municipal bankruptcy,
and provided for labor contract rejection by the municipality. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 90 Stat. 315.25
(1976). For pertinent legislative histories regarding municipal bankruptcy and labor contract rejec-
tion, see Note, Exetutory Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE Li. 957, 966 (1976).
11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (Sapp. 11 1978) deal with the adjustment of the debts of a municipality. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1975): S. REP. No. 94-458, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975):
H.R. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Unfortunately, none of the legislative history of
the 1978 Code articulates express standards for private or public sector labor contract rejection. The
House Report regarding municipal labor contract rejection only states, without explanation or
clarification, that "'renegotiation and formulation of a new contract would, of course, have to be in
accordance with applicable Federal, State, or Municipal law.'" Note, Executory Labor Contracts and
Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE LI 957, 966 (1976). This policy presumption favoring labor contract
rejection was unaltered by section 365 of the 1978 Code.
In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 896-97 (11th Cir. 1983).
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected union arguments that all labor contracts were exemp-
ted from section 365 rejection and that no valid distinction could be made between labor
agreements within and without the purview of the Railway Labor Act. The Braila Miller
court explained that the mere existence of the Railway Labor Act demonstrates the
unique status of labor relations in the railroad industry, a status frequently recognized by
both Congress and the courts.'" As the Second Circuit. Court of Appeals stated in
Shopntan's Local Union 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., "Congress knew how to remove
labor agreements from the scope of a general power to reject executory contracts."'''
Similar reasoning was expressed in In re Concrete Pipe Machinery Co,,'" where the court
noted that Congress was apparently aware of the underlying tension between the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the NLRA. The court stated that by enacting section 367 of the Code,
Congress chose to limit the labor contracts exempt front rejection by means of the
bankruptcy agreements to those contracts governed by the RLA. No similar provision, the
court continued, was made for bargaining agreements regulated by the NLRA. Conse-
quently, the Concrete Pipe court ruled that courts do not have the authority to override
such congressional policy by imposing more stringent requirements for the rejection of
executory contracts than Congress had already established under the Code. The Third
Circuit had earlier addressed the same issues in In re Bildisco where the court stated: "In
enacting Section 365, Congress provided no indication that collective bargaining agree-
ments were to be immune front rejection and thus unique among executory contracts.
Indeed, the few inferences of congressional intent that may be gleaned From the Code
and its legislative history are to the contrary."'"
In general, lower courts have attempted to refrain front judicial legislation, and have
worked from the inferences most logically available from the present statutes. For exam-
ple, in Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that courts should not hold
that a statute as technical as the Bankruptcy Act sought to exclude indirectly the courts'
power to reject labor contracts. 1 U 5 The court explained that if such a determination were
made, courts would, in effect, be ;unending the federal statute. According to the Court,
this power to remedy statutory "oversight, - even when two very important. statutes are
involved, rests with the legislature, not the courts.'
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code did not expressly address the very strict standards for
contract rejection enunciated three years earlier in 1975 by the Second Circuit,'" 7 constru-
ing section 313 of the former Bankruptcy Act. It is curious, therefore, why the alternative
argument, namely that Congress did intend that different standards apply, is not fre-
quently made. Congress was presumably fully aware of this express judicial construction
101 Id.
E° 2 Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975).
la' In re Concrete Pipe Machinery Co., 28 Bankr. 837, 840 (N.D. lowa 1983).
104 In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1982).
1 " Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., inc., 519 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1975):
see also In re Ateco Equipment Inc., 18 Bankr. 915, 917 (W.D. Penn. 1982) ("[T]his Court concludes
that Congress did not intend special treatment for collective bargaining agreements protected by the
N.L.R.A. There is no language in the Bankruptcy Code protecting collective bargaining agreements
such as this one from § 365. In the absence of such language, this Court will not take it upon itself to
legislate that result.").
106 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 705.
'°T Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2c1 Cir. 1975);
Bhd. of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2c1 Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1017 (1976).
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of the relevant statutory provision in 1975. It did not disagree with this judicial interpreta-
tion when it enacted the section 365 Code analog to the section 313 provision of the
former Act. Therefore, it is arguable that the earlier 1975 Second Circuit construction
should control disputes surrounding interpretation of the equivalent 1978 Code provi-
sion, in the face of continued knowing congressional silence.'" Yet, curiously, this argu-
ment has not been frequently advanced. Congressional silence is presumed, perhaps
erroneously, to subordinate labor interests to those of the debtor.
With the recent controversial Chapter 11 reorganizations in the airline industry'"
and the exacerbated labor tensions which resulted from those proceedings, congressional
hearings were initiated in the fall, 1983. 10 The hearings involved the possible amendment
of the bankruptcy law to make it more difficult for the employer to effect such radical
sudden restructuring of the employment and labor relations environments. The unions,
represented by Harvard Law School Professor Countryman, forcefully argued that the
courts have consistently misread the legislative intent from continued congressional
silence regarding the proper interrelationship of the bankruptcy and labor statutes, and
congressional representatives predicted dire consequences for future labor management
relations."' If a meaningful interpretation of Congress's scant Delphic pronouncements
is to be forthcoming, it is obvious that it will have to emanate from Congress itself. 1 ' 2 Until
then, courts will continue to manipulate the statutory contradictions to endorse bank-
ruptcy court rejection of non- RLA labor contracts without regard to NLRA section 8(d)
labor contract termination provisions. The article will now examine the positions of the
'" See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575. 580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt the interpretation when it .. .
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior taw.").
09 See supra note 14.
Representative William Clay, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor- Management Rela-
tions, recently commented on the increasingly significant role which bankruptcies are playing in
labor-management relations. According to Representative Clay,
[w]hat we see today is the potential undermining of both the bankruptcy law and the
National Labor Relations Act. No doubt there can be instances when release from a
collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy is appropriate. It is clear that both the
bankruptcy law and the collective bargaining law dictate that such a drastic step is
appropriate only under extreme circumstances. It is equally clear that use of bank-
ruptcy court toward a collective bargaining agreement compromises both labor law and
bankruptcy law. OF even greater concern is the potential damage that can be inflicted
on labor policy if this kind of abuse of the bankruptcy courts is systematically utilized.
We will soon be faced with a situation where the mere threat of filing for bankruptcy
undermines collective bargaining.
Statements on Bankruptcy and Collective Bargaining Before House Labor Subcommittee on Labor
-Management
Relations and Labor Standards, H.R. 5174 (1983) (opening statement of Rep. William Clay, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations).
Citing the recent bankruptcy filings by the Manville Corporation, Wilson Foods, and Continental
Airlines, Representative George Miller, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards has
stated that the federal bankruptcy laws are currently being used to undermine the labor statutes, a
use never intended by Congress. Id. (opening statement of Rep. George Miller, Chairman, Sub-
comm. On Labor Standards). Moreover. Representative Miller warns that if management continues
to resort to Chapter I i proceedings to abrogate labor agreements, "labor will undoubtedly invent
strategems of its own — wildcat strikes, boycotts and walkouts — to challenge management's
unilateral violations of collectively bargained agreements." Id. (opening statement of Rep. George
Miller, Chairman, Subcomm, On Labor Standards). Such a result, Representative Miller concludes, is
one "our economy can ill afford." Id. •
ILI Id,
12 See supra note 48 for a discussion of these legislative initiatives.
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various circuits regarding the most appropriate standards for labor contract rejection.
This analysis will also elucidate how different circuits have dealt with the problems posed
by the scant inferential evidence of congressional intent.
II. STANDARDS GOVERNING LABOR CONTRACT REJECTION IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Second Circuit's Strict Standards
1. Shop men's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc." 3
In Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit stated that the issue of what standards should
govern the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement was one of first impression." 4
The specific issue framed by the Second Circuit was whether section 313(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act allows rejection of a collective bargaining agreement as an executory
contract."' The court of appeals concluded that while the answer was affirmative," 6
several rigorous tests would have to be met as a precondition to court approval of the
employer's petition to reject the labor contracts."? In so ruling, the Second Circuit
rejected the NLRB's position that "authorizing the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in arrangement proceedings permits a company to accomplish indirectly
" 5 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
'" Prior to Kevin Steel, other courts had considered other issues of labor contract rejection in
bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762;'767 (3d Cir. 1947) (rejection not allowed
because of long adherence to its terms); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 362
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (labor contract rejection permitted only after thorough judicial scrutiny of respec-
tive equities); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (bankruptcy court had power
to reject contract under Chapter XI of the former Act).
One commentator perceptively noted that Public Ledger must be narrowly construed. Note,
Bankruptcy Law — Labor Law — Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements as Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy — Receiver's Authority to Unilaterally Assume or Adopt Collective Bargaining Agreement, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 1601, 1612 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Receiver's Authority].
The Public Ledger line of cases are often erroneously cited for the proposition that a
receiver can implicitly assume a debtor's collective bargaining agreement by conform-
ing to its terms. In actuality, these cases are limited to the protection of wage-related
benefits that have accrued or vested, but that are unpaid at the point in time when the
receivership terminates.... Clearly the court's holding was limited to the protection of
wage-related benefits which had accrued or vested during the period of the receiver's
conformance to the labor contract.
Id.
"5
 519 F.2d at 700. The analog to section 313(1) of the former Bankruptcy Act is now section
365(a) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. See supra note 16.
''" 519 F.2d at 700.
'" Most courts, to consider the special problems surrounding rejection of labor contracts in
bankruptcy, have employed stricter scrutiny than would be applied to nonlabor executory contracts.
The traditional "business judgment" test readily permitted rejection of nonlabor executory contracts
without a showing of burdensomeness. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pacific R.Y. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943). See also In re Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir.
1977). Most courts, however, have required at least a showing of burdensomeness before authorizing
labor contract rejection through bankruptcy. The business judgment test does not suffice. There-
fore, the labor contract cannot be.rejected merely because a more attractive arrangement is possible.
The employer-debtor must demonstrate at least a real loss or burden to the enterprise, absent
rejection. For examples of the "burdensome" requirement in earlier cases, see e.g. In re Jackson
Brewing Co., 567 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Haitian Cook Oil Corp. 190 F.2d 994, 946 (3d
Cir. 1951); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683
(1942).
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what it could not accomplish directly without violating the NLRA — namely, to unilater-
ally terminate a contract during its term." 19
 The Second Circuit's decision was consonant
with prior decisions that had construed collective bargaining agreements as executory
contracts. 19
 Congress had largely exempted collective bargaining agreements in the
railroad industry from rejection in bankruptcy,"° except in situations where there was
strict compliance with the Railway Labor Act.' 21
 Congress, however, provided no such
exemption for labor contracts not within the purview of the RLA. Consequently, the court
of appeals concluded that, due to this distinct omission, Congress did not intend to
exempt non-railroad labor contracts from bankruptcy law rejection provisions.'"
Having found that the labor contract could be rejected as an executory contract, the
Second Circuit then enunciated broad equity standards to he employed on a case-by-case
basis by courts in deciding whether to allow the rejection of labor contracts.'" The court
of appeals set forth a more rigorous test than that applied to non-labor executory contract
rejection petitions. The court stated that unlike the situation with non-labor contracts,
" Brief for Intervenor-Appellee (NLRB) at 14. The NLRB had earlier affirmed the decision of
its administrative law judge that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA
by refusing to sign a new contract between the union and the employer. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1974).
The employer refused to comply with the NLRB's make whole order for lost wages and benefits
suffered by unlawfully discharged employees and by the employer's refusal to sign the contract.
Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 700-01. The NLRB appealed to the Second Circuit to enforce its order. By
joint motion, the NLRB appeal was consolidated with the debtor's appeal from the district court's
reversal of the bankruptcy court's approval of the labor contract rejection. Id.
"9 Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Products Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143, 147-50 (W.D. Ark.
1968): In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E,D.N.Y. 1965); In re Klaber Bros.,
Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
rev'd in part, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947). See also supra notes 53-56..
12" Section 77(n) of the former Bankruptcy Act, 11	 § 205(n) provided: "No judge or
trustee acting under this title shall change the wages or working conditions of railroad employees
except in the manner prescribed in §§ 151 to 163 of Title 45 .. . ." Section 1167 of the 1978 Code,
replacing section 205(n) of the former Act, exempted all collective bargaining agreements subject to
the RLA. The former Act applied only to labor contracts covering railroad employees. However, in
sonic circumstances of railroad reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 1978 Code, bankruptcy
courts may order liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1174 (Supp. 11 1978). "This change gives railroad
employees the same stake in a successful reorganization that their peers in other industries have, and
there remains little reason to treat them differently in this context." Note, Law's Effect, supra note 49,
at 398-399 n. 65. In Bhd. or Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc. 523 F.2d 164, 168 - 69 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), vett. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976), the court of appeals held that the
facially strict requirements of the RLA apparently did not mandate labor contract rejection through
only the ponderous RLA procedures. See also supra notes 83 and 86.
" 1
 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982).
'" Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 702-703 ("The failure of Congress similarly to limit section 313(1) . ,
shows a clear intention to include labor contracts within its scope .... The reported cases directly on
point either hold or assume that the expansive language of § 313(1), or of analogous sections, reaches
collective bargaining agreements."). The Second Circuit concluded that labor contracts under the
RLA were distinctly different from non-RLA collective bargaining agreements, and that the RLA
was enacted to address specific and unique problems of a particular industry:
But certainly it would be wrong to assume that whatever Congress enacted with respect
to the labor relations of those employers covered by the Railway Labor Act should
automatically he applied to other employers. The distinct problems of the former
group and their importance to the national economy are well recognized (citation
omitted) and are highlighted by the differences between the Railway Labor Act and the
National Labor Relations Act ...
hi. at 705.
123 Id. at 707. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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rejection should not be based solely on whether it will improve the debtor's financial
status. 124 According to the court, because labor contracts and therefore, the NLRA were at
issue, an especially careful balancing of the equities test, which had been enunciated
earlier by a federal district court in In re Overseas National Airways, Inc., 15 should be
adopted. 126
Summarizing this test for rejection of labor contracts in bankruptcy, the court of
appeals concluded that a bankruptcy court should accord a collective bargaining agree-
ment meticulous scrutiny and conduct a careful balancing of the interests of the debtor
and the union.' 27 The Kevin Steel court emphasized that courts should move cautiously in
permitting the rejection of labor contracts. In Overseas National AirwaNs, 128 the district
court had listed several legitimate employee interests. 129 The court of appeals in Kevin
Steel was fully cognizant of the need to afford appropriate protections for these interests.
In Kevin Steel, the union also raised serious. questions, which the Second Circuit concluded
required careful consideration by the bankruptcy court in a comprehensive assessment of
all the equities."° Specifically, the court stated that particular scrutiny must he devoted to
any possible anti-union animus by the employer, the true financial situation and the root
causes of the difficulties of the company, and the more intangible employee interests at
stake."' The Second Circuit. held that after careful consideration of all the equities, the
labor contract rejection petition can be approved by the court." 2
2. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.' 33
In REA , 134 the Second Circuit substantially tightened the broad equities test it had set
forth one month earlier in Kevin Steel.' 35 The court clearly established that mere prepon-
derance of general equities in favor of the debtor would not suffice to authorize rejection
of the collective bargaining agreement."' Rather, in addition to a careful assessment of
the equities, the Second Circuit ruled that bankruptcy courts could authorize labor
124 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2(1 at 707. Such a narrow focus "totally ignores the policies of the Labor Act
and makes no attempt to accommodate to them." Id.
its In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
126 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707.
27 „rd.
' 28 238 C. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
[1]n relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement,
it may he depriving the employees affected of their seniority, welfare and pension
rights, as well as other valuable benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a
provable claim for money damages. That would leave the employees without compen-
sation for their losses at the same time enabling the debtor, at the expense of the
employees, to consummate what may he a more favorable plan of arrangement with its
other creditors.
Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. at 361-362.
1 " Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707.
131 Id .
2112 Id.
131 Mid. of RI, . Clerks v. REA. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), reh.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) [hereinafter cited as REA].
04 Id .
1 " Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). Although both Kevin Steel and REA were decided by
the Second Circuit, different judges were on the panels.
16
 REA, 523 F.2d at 169.
564	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:539
contract rejection only if there were no other viable alternative to total debtor collapse,
final loss of all jobs, and ultimate liquidation.' 37
The court of appeals stated that bankruptcy courts could authorize rejection of
collective bargaining agreements only when a careful weighing of all the facts and
equities, concludes "that an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining
agreement will thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse." 138 The
Second Circuit concluded that labor contract rejection should be authorized only where it
clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils. According to the REA court, it must appear
that the carrier will collapse and the employees will become unemployed unless the
agreement is rejected!" This "last resort" test obviously made it very difficult, although
not impossible, for the debtor to acquire court approval for labor contract abrogation.
In REA, the court of appeals apparently exempted the air and surface carrier
employer from the strictures of the RLA. In the court's view, rigid compliance with the
seemingly absolute facial statutory terms of the RLA"° would prove to be a "hollow
pyrrhic victory.""' The court asserted that strict compliance with the RLA provisions
would "defeat the purpose of the RLA itself, which is to avoid disruption of commerce by
insuring that the carrier will continue operations pending resolution of labor disputes.""z
Calcified adherence to the unwieldy, protracted procedures of the RLA, in the court's
view, would frustrate the efficacy necessary to save jobs. 143 For all of these reasons, the
Second Circuit relieved the air and surface carrier from the seemingly absolute mandate
of the RLA." 4 Ironically, therefore, rather than render labor contract rejection a virtual
i" Id. at 172.
i" Id. at 169.
1" Id. at 172. Because the district court had not considered the labor contract rejection issue
according to these standards, the case was remanded. Id. Ultimately, REA was adjudicated bankrupt
on November 6, 1975.
1" See, e.g., § 1 of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 broadly defines "carrier" to include "any
receiver, trustee, or other individual or body, judicial or otherwise, when in the possession of the
business of any such 'carrier.'" Section 2 of the RLA provides:
"No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its
employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agree-
ments or in § 156 of this title." 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). Section 6 of the RLA in turn provides for
maintenance of the status quo ante, even when the labor contract has expired. 45 U.S.C. § 156
(1982). Further, section 6 of the RLA requires a minimum of thirty days written notice of any
intended contract changes, requires conferences on any proposed changes, provides for submission
of disputes to the National Mediation Board, and reiterates that, pending exhaustion of section 6
procedures, "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier." 45 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1982). See also REA, 523 F.2d at 168. Concomitantly, section 205(n) of the former Act (in
effect when REA was decided) mandated that the court strictly adhere to RLA provisions in any
decision regarding rejection of a labor contract within ihe purview of the RLA. 11 U.S.C. § 205(n)
(1976).
141. REA, 523 F.2d at 169.
142 Id.
t" Id. ("[T]he end result could well be to preclude financial reorganization of the carrier and
thus lead to its demise.").
".1 REA was decided under the prior Bankruptcy Act. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216
(N.D. Texas, 1982) recently considered the interrelationship of the RLA and the 1978 Code
regarding rejection of collective bargaining agreements. The court concluded that rejection was not
absolutely precluded by the 1978 Code. Id. at 217-18. Section 1167 of the 1978 Code paralleled
section 77(n) of the Act. Section 1167 provides:
Notwithstanding § 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee may change the •
wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor established by a collective
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impossibility, the Second Circuit's "last. resort" test, in effect; gave the courts and the
parties some freedom from 1 he ponderous RLA requirements for labor contract termina-
tion. When applied to labor agreements beyond those within the purview of the RLA,
however, the Second Circuit's two-tier test in Kevin SteellREA 1 " made it undeniably more
difficult to reject labor contracts than under the former Kevin Steel general equities test
alone. 16 under the REA test, the debtor must prove that. liquidation would ensue, absent
labor contract abrogation.
3. The "New Entity" Theory And The Analogy to the Labor Law "Successor Employer"
In both Kevin Steel and REA , the Second Circuit regarded the debtor in possession as
a "new entity," separate and distinct from the employer prior to bankruptcy proceed-
ings."' The court of appeals analogised the debtor in possession to the successor em-
bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et, seq.)
except in accordance with § 6 of such Act (45 U.S.C. § 156).
11 U.S.C. § 116 (1982).
Both section 77(n) and section 1167 mandated compliance with the RLA section 6 contract
termination procedures only in the case of railway employees. Since employees here were those of an
air carrier, the court found 45 U.S.C. § 156 did not apply. Braniff, 25 Bankr. at 217.
One commentator pointed out that "§ 1167 of the Code in effect overrules REA Express by
exempting all collective bargaining agreements covered by the RLA, whereas the Bankruptcy Act
exempted only contracts covering railroad employees. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (Supp. III 1979) (replaced
11 U.S.C. § 205(r) (1976), The REA Express analysis is still useful because its rationale applies to all
types of collective bargaining agreements." Note, The Labor -Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 Mical. L. R EV . 134. 140 n.'35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict].
In fact, however, it is highly dubious whether section 1167 of the 1978 Code entirely overruled
REA Express. Despite the fact that the RLA covers both rail and air carrier employees, section 1167
continues to apply only to railroad employees: section 1167 does not extend to the labor contracts of
air carriers. This difference is attributable to the express operation of section 103(g) of the 1978
Code: "Stan:halite': I V of Chapter 11 of this title applies only in a case under such chapter concerning
a railroad," 11 U.S.C. § I 03(g). See supra note 86.
143 For a representative compendium of the law review commentary regarding the Kevin Steel
and REA cases, see Note, Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 144 at 137 n.20.
14  The leading treatise suggested that the REA test promulgated under the former Act was
imperiled with the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Court: "Although a mere showing that rejection
would improve the financial condition of the Debtor did not suffice under the Act, the result may be
different under the Code due to the failure of Congress to incorporate a requirement of burden-
sotneness into § 365." COLLIER, supra note 49, at 365-18. Many courts have thus refused to follow the
REA test. See In re Ateco Equipment Inc., 18 Bankr. 915, 916 (W.D. Pa. 1982). cf. In re David A.
Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190, 192 (1). Conn. 1981) ("Sixteen months experience under the Code
suggests that unless there is a clear prohibition to the contrary in specific instances, courts continue to
rely on pre-Code decisional law to resolve controversies under the Code .... I hold that pre-Code
case law in this circuit remains the authoritative precedent for resolving the issues before me."). The
Rosow Court also pointed out that the above quote [ram COW ER "does not exhaust that treatise's
reflections on the matter. Indeed, the comment is but one tentative approach to the problem.
Co F:It also sets forth t he pre-Code law in sonic detail and observes that 'there is little if any reason
to expect the courts to apply a less stringent standard to collective bargaining agreements under §
365. ''' Id. at 192 (citation omitted) (quoting CowEk, supra note 49, at 365-17).
147 In Kevin Steel, the Court of Appeals stated:
A debtor-in-possession under Chapter X1 or under Chapter X, a trustee under the
latter chapter, or a trustee in a straight bankruptcy proceeding is not the same entity as
the pre-bankruptcy company. A new entity is created with its own rights and duties,
subject to the supervision of the bankruptcy court.
Kevin Steel, 519 1 .2d at 704.
566	 BOSTON COLLEGE LA 14' REVIEW	 f Vol. 25:539
ployer of labor law doctrine."' Under this doctrine, while the successor employer is
bound to continue to negotiate with t he union in good faith,'" the successor employer is
Subsequently, the Second Circuit elucidated further: When REA, after going into Chapter XI
proceedings, was authorized to operate as the debtor in possession, it acted as a new juridical entity."
REA, 523 F.2d at 170.
•	 ' 4" The classic case expounding the successor employer labor law doctrine is NLRB v. Burns
nel Security Services, I nc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-91 (1972); see generally Note, The Bargaining Obligations
of Successor Employers, 88 MARV. 1,. REV. 759 (1975). In Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit stated that, "it
may be that the obligations of such a trustee or debtor are analogous to those of a successor
employer," Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704. Many bankruptcy courts also have since subscribed to the
successor employer doctrine and regarded the debtor in possession as a new entity, distinct and
separate from the pre-bankruptcy employer. See e.g., In re Unit Parts  Co., 10 Bankr. 970, 979 (W.D.
Okla. 1981).
The new entity or successorship doctrine is but one of several allied, but distinct, doctrines
utilized to define the nature and scope of bargaining obligations during and after corporate trans-
formations. Within the context of the duty to bargain surrounding labor contract rejection in
bankruptcy, this article and the pertinent cases focus exclusively on the new entity and successor
analogy.
"Single employer- arid "alter ego - theories are usually not employed. One commentator con-
cisely summarized the single employer, alter ego, and successor theories, and elucidated their
respect ive application:
In applying the first of these tests, to determine whether two or more nominally
separate business entities will be considered a single employer for bargaining purposes,
the NLRB and the courts apply a fcmr-factor analysis, measuring the extent of "interre-
lation of operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management, and
common ownership or financial control. Alternatively, the alter ego test seeks to impose
a bargaining obligation upon a newly created corporate entity when the corporate
change is motivated primarily by the employees anti-union bias. Finally, the successor-
ship doctrine measures the degree of employee continuity between the new and old
business, imposing a bargaining obligation upon the new entity when there is sufficient
evidence of the continued validity of the union's representative status after the business
change.
Note, Bargaining Obligations after Corporate Transforniation, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 624, 625 (1979).
"Such a trustee or debtor may be required, for example, to bargain collectively with the
representative of a majority of'its employees; if an agreement is then entered into with a union, § 8(d)
governs its termination: . Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704. "Although a debtor-in-possession such as REA
is not bound to assume the collective bargaining agreements of'its predecessor, it as a new employer
is obligated to bargain collectively with the representative of the employees hired by it." REA, 523
F.2d at 170. Accord, In re Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. of Indiana, 27 Bankr. 293, 297-98 (S.D.
Ind., 1983); In re Concrete Pipe Mach., 28 Bankr. 837. 840 (N.D. Iowa, 1983); in re Hoyt, 27 Bankr.
13, i (D. Oregon 1982) (approving labor contract rejection wherein debtor had no employees
subject to contract and no plans for employment as long as contract in effect); In re St. Croix Hotel
Corp., I8 Bankr, 375, 379 (D. V.I. 1982) ("Since the debtors do not now have any employees which
are covered by the bargaining agreement, there are no present employees who would be effected by
such rejection. Ilthe contract is rejected future prospective employees could determine whether they
wished to accept employment by the debtor without the benefit provided by the bargaining agree-
ment. If the debtors were to find that they were unable to employ qualified laborers without
providing such benefits, they could enter into such a bargaining agreement in the future."). In re Unit
Parts Co.. Ili Bankr. 970, 978-80 (W.D. Okla, 1981) (The debtor in possession was not obligated to
bargain with the union regarding employee hiring. The bankrupt employer had previously termi-
nated all employees. The debtor in possession successor was free to hire "new" employees without
regard to the predecessor's former employees, since it did not unlawfully discriminate regarding past
union membership.); Accord, In re Ryan Co., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. 64, 65 (D. Conn. 1978).
In Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit ruled that the trustee had
the duty to bargain the effects of its decision to terminate all employees. Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d
1138 (7th Cir. 1983). After filing the Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy petition on November 1,
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not bound by the terms of prior collective bargaining agreements. 15° Relying on the
successor employer labor law doctrine,''' the Second Circuit in REA, reasoned that the
debtor in possession must be granted "certain prerogatives" in both the operations and
labor relations of the reorganized business. Otherwise, in the court's view, the free flow of
capital and efforts to preserve a weak enterprise might fail.' Specifically, the court
suggested that if the debtor in possession is not relieved of prior labor contract terms, it
may not survive."' Thus, where the employees are represented, the court held that the
debtor in possession must only give reasonable notice of its proposed terms and negotiate
in good faith for a reasonable period of lime before putting the terms into effect.'sa
1979, Yorke reduced the work force from 150 to seven employees itt early 1980. Id. at 1140. On
February 4, 1980, the bankruptcy court appointed a trustee, due to allegations of fraud and
mismanagement. Id. The trustee then terminated all operations and discharged the seven remaining
employees, all union members, without giving the union prior notice nor affording the union
subsequent opportunity to bargain the effects of the closing decision. Id. at 1141. The Seventh
Circuit held that the trustee violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA: "a Trustee in Bankruptcy, like
any other employer, must abide by the labor laws, as long as they prescribe conduct consistent with
the duties imposed by the Bankruptcy Code," Id. at 1142.
Unfortunately, as a practical matter, post-rejection bargaining may be only a hollow, and largely
meaningless, pro forma exercise:
nost-rejection bargaining is no substitute for pre-rejection bargaining. For example, if
the debtor-in-possession has obtained rejection of the agreement on the ground that its
survival requires wages to be reduced by a certain percentage, as a realistic matter
effective bargaining on that matter has been preempted.
Brief for the NLRB, NLRB v, Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (filed May 6, 1983).
The union argued that good faith bargaining should be an absolute precondition to filing any
petition for court authorization of labor contract rejection:
[I]f a debtor in possession is freed from the collective bargaining agreement upon the
filing for bankruptcy or is permitted to obtain rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement without first negotiating, then there is no opportunity for the parties to even
attempt to devise a mutually agreeable concession contract which would at least main-
tain some of the basic benefits for the workers.
Brief For Petitioner Union, NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (filed May 9, 1983).
15° "Until the debtor here assumes the old agreement or makes a new one, it is not a 'party'
under § 8(d) to any labor agreement with the union Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704. "[The debtor in
possession} was not a party to and was not bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
entered into by REA as debtor .. ." REA, 523 F.2d at 170. Accord, In re Unit Parts Co. 10 Bankr. 970,
979 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
Some courts have also refused to enforce arbitration clauses of the labor contracts of employers
in bankruptcy. E.g., johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
151 See supra note 149. In Burns, the Court summarized the principal reasons why the successor
employer normally will not be bound to the terms of the predecessor employer's collective bargaining
agreements:
A potential etnployer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can
make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor fbrce, work location,
task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms
and conditions of employment contained in the old collective bargaining contract may
make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit die transfer of capital.
Burns, 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
' 52 REA, 523 F.2d at 170.
155 Id. at 171.
' 54 Id. at 171. General labor law principles and landmark labor cases normally impose an
obligation on the employer not to make a unilateral change in hours, wages, or conditions of
employment without first advising the union and providing the union an opportunity to bargain
regarding the proposed change. First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981).
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp, v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964); cf. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
737-48 (1962).
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Subsequently, in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corporation,' 5' the Second Circuit
narrowed the application of the successor employer analogy to the debtor in possession.'"
The court reasoned that because the debtor in possession is not a party's' to the existing
contract, section 8(d), the provision of the NLRA which normally governs the termination
of labor contracts, will not apply to the debtor in possession.'" Simply filing the initial
petition for bankruptcy alone, however, the court stated, will not abrogate the labor
contract. Until the court authorizes the specific petition for court approval of labor
contract rejection, the debtor in possession technically continues to be bound by the
contract.'" Prior unilateral modification or abrogation of the contract without court
approval, therefore, was an unfair labor practice.' Consequently, although freed of the
labor contract, the debtor remained obligated to bargain with the representative of the
employees after contract rejection.'''
'" 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976). aff'd per curiarn after remand, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
"6 Id. at 320.
1 ' 7 The court of appeals candidly admitted that it was necessarily indulging in transparent
manipulation of a legal fiction:
Of course, the statement that the debtor is not a "party," and the analogy to the
successor employer, cannot be taken literally since neither affirmance or rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement would be possible by one not a party to it. See
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 56 Mmx. L. RE:v. 479, 989 n.259
(1974).
Truck Drivers, 541 F.2d at 320. See also Note, Rejection of Agreements, supra note 40, at 829. For earlier
elucidation of this legal fiction, see NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir.
1942):
[Al debtor-in-possession is responsible for the unfair labor practices which occur
during a reorganization. Its status as an employer is no different ... than that of any
other employer .... And where managerial control and economic interests of the
debtor-in-possession and the reorganized company are the same, it could only be the
blindness of formalism that would suggest separately instituted proceedings against the
predecessor and the successor for the redress of their respective but continuous unfair
labor practice.
Id.
"" Truck Drivers, 541 F.2(1 at 320, citing Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704.
1 ' 9 "As long as rejection is not ordered, the contract continues in existence ... COLLIER, supra
note 49, at 365-422; see generally in re W.T. Grant Co., 620 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 983 (1980) ("only a formal rejection pursuant to § 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act . . . is
sufficient to disaffirm an executory contract."). See also In re Unishops, 553 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1977);
Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Hill,
317 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963); Con. Gas Elec. Light and Power Co. v. United Rys. and Elec. Co., 85
F.2d 799 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1936): In re Guardian Equipment Corp., 18 Bankr. 864
(S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr. 126 (D. Minn. 1981); In re Penn Fruit Co., 1 Bankr.
714 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Truck Drivers, 541 F.2d at 312: I.S.G. Extrusion Toolings, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 114
(1982) ("[Bjargaining agreements remain effective and binding, notwithstanding the appointment of
a debtor in possession. We have held that an employer is not relieved of its obligation to bargain over
the eff'ects of its decision to terminate operations merely because it has become a debtor-in-possession
under the Bankruptcy Act, even if it believes itself to be financially unable to meet the union's
bargaining demands." N. at 115): Burgmeyer Bros., Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1981); Jersey juniors, Inc.,
230 N.L.R.B. 329. 332 (1977).
Unilateral change without court approval is a clear contract breach, and the normal third
priority wage claims will be elevated to first priority as administrative expenses. in re Mammoth Mart,
Inc„ 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1976).
'"`' See Note, Labor -Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 144, at 141 n.13 for an excellent synopsis
defining the nature of the debtor's duty to bargain.
BI This reasoning of the successor employer analogy was reiterated in In re Unishops, Inc.,
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Several commentators have criticized the Second Circuit's new entity and successor
employer' 62 analogies to the debtor in possession.' According to two scholars, the
analogy is a facile, spurious legal fiction. 164 If the debtor in possession were a new entity,
where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
We again caution that the language in Shopmen's Local Union . . . 'a debtor-in-possession
under Chapter XI ... is not the same entity as the pre-bankruptcy company' should not
be extended as a generalization in cases other than these involving labor collective
bargaining agreements where the claim is that 8(d) ... precludes disaffirmance of the
labor agreement in a Chapter XI proceeding without taking the steps required under
section 8(a) of the Labor Act . . . .
In re tinishops, Inc. 543 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1976).
142 A trinity of Supreme Court labor law decisions embodies the successor employer doctrine.
See Howard Johnson Co, v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board I lotel Employees Nat'l Union, 417
U.S. 249, 256-64 (1974); NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-91
(1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964). In REA and Kevin Steel the
Second Circuit relied heavily on the Burns decision. See REA, 523 F.2d at 170; Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at
704. For extensive discussion of the successor employer cases, see generally Goldberg, The Labor Law
Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 735 (1969); Krupman and Kaplan, The Stock
Purchaser After Burns: Must He Buy the Union Contract> , 31 LAB. L.J. 328 (1980); Morris and Gaus,
Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. Rev.
1359 (1973); Nash, Successorship in Light of Burns, 7 GA. L. REV. 664 (1973); Slicker, A Reconsideration
of the Doctrine of Employer Successor — A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REv. 1051
(1973); Note ,The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975); Note, The
Impact of Howard Johnson on the Labor Obligations of the Successor Employer, 74 MICH. L. REV. 555
(1976); Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Employer: The Impact of Burns Security, 71 M left. L. REv.
571 (1973); Comment, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 617 (1973).
163 Countryman, Part II, supra note 2 at 489 n.215; Note, Law's Effect, supra note 49 at 404; Note,
Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 144 at 142-48; Note, Bankruptcy Rejection, supra note 84 at
172-73.
Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52 at 301. Bordewieck and Countryman note:
The "new entity" theory simply cannot withstand close scrutiny; one need only observe
that a "new entity," not a party to the contracts of its pre-petition predecessor, would
scarcely need bankruptcy court approval to reject one of those contracts. Indeed, since
there is no logical basis for confining the new entity theory to a case involving a
collective bargaining agreement, the theory suggests that upon the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition the debtor ceases to be a party to any contract. Such a conclusion is
plainly nothing but nonsense .... A weighty fiction is needed before one can conclude
that a chapter II debtor did not agree to be bound by the collective bargaining
agreement it now wishes to reject. Burns is simply inapplicable in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Indeed, were Burns applicable, a debtor viewed as a "successor" employer would
not be bound by the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement in the first place,
and thus would not need to seek court approval of the agreement's termination.
Id. at 301-07. See also Note, Bankruptcy Rejection, supra note 84, at 173, where the author stated that "it
is difficult to see how a debtor-in-possession can be truly distinct from its former self. Where there
have been no changes in management, except to introduce overall bankruptcy court supervision, any
analogy to successor employer situations seems tenuous."
The NLRB and some courts consistently rejected the new entity, successor analogy to the debtor
in possession, especially when the business continues to be operated in substantially the same fashion
as before the bankruptcy filing; in that case, the Board regarded the debtor in possession as the alter
ego, rather than as the successor, of the pre-bankruptcy employer. See NLRB v. Baldwin Locomo-
five Works, 128 F.2d 39, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1942) (where managerial control and economic interest of
debtor in possession and company are same then "in no legally significant sense . . . can debtor be
differentiated from debtor in possession so far as employer-employee relationship is concerned"); in
re Tucker Freight, 115 L.R.R.M. 2202, (W.D. Mich. 1983) (In the most recent bankruptcy court
decision rejecting the successor doctrine, the court enjoined the debtor employer from decreasing
the wage rates without union consent: "Tucker's pre-petition and post-petition is essentially the same
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under the statute, there would be no need for it to seek court approval to reject the
contract. Like the successor employer, the new entity debtor in possession simply would
not he hound by the prior contracts. In effect, the new entity was never a party to the
original contract. An iclditional distinction is that in successorship cases, the employees
will frequently be dealing with a far more viable new employer.' 65
 In the reorganization
cases, however, the employees' only "gain" is job preservation. This laissez faire,
minimalist perspective cynically transmogrifies employee aspirations into a bleak Malthu-
sian state, given the undeniable reality that a job is usually better than the specter of
unemployment.' 66
 Thus, rather than placate employees trapped in this survivalist mode,
labor contract rejection in reorganization, through facile use of the successorship analogy,
instead may serve to precipitate and exacerbate labor tension. One commentator sum-
marized and highlighted the irony of the misplaced successor analogy in the bankruptcy
context:
When a business is sold, the successor employer is frequently financially
stronger than its predecessor; and the union will seek to renegotiate its
contract to guarantee wages and benefits commensurate with the new man-
agement's economic position. New contracts following the sale of a business
may thus benefit the union and promote industrial peace. In reorganization
proceedings, however, it is the rejection of the debtor's collective bargaining
agreement that may cause labor unrest.'"
The Eleventh Circuit also expressed serious misgivings with the tenuous new entity
and successor analogy to the debtor in possession in In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc. 1 e"
business, apparently using the same plant, same work force, operating under the same working
conditions, using the same machinery and equipment and method of production, offering identical
services to the public, and has continued its operations during the transition period .... [T]he new
entity/successor employer theory enunciated in the Court decisions is not intended to provide
justification for a DI P's unilateral changes of union contracts, but rather to set forth a proposition
that unrelated entity to preexisting contracts will not be bound."); In re Price Chopper Supermarkets,
Inc., 19 Bankr. 462, 464 (S.D Cal. 1982) ( "This new entity theory has been criticized for it creates the
paradoxical situation that the debtor-in-possession is cast as a new employer, apparently not bound
by preexisting executory contracts and yet, it must make an appropriate showing to reject such
agreements, including satisfying the higher standard imposed when dealing with applications to
reject collective bargaining contracts."): Century Printing Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 659, 666-67 (1979),
enforced 661 F.2d 914 (3d Ch. 1981); Airport Limousine Service, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 935 (1977);
Jersey Juniors, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1977); Stateside Shipyard and Marina, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 516,
518 (1969). The Supreme Court definitively has recognized and rejected the analogy of the debtor in
possession to the new entity/successor doctrines. NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1197.
1 ".' REA, 523 F.2d at 170.
"6 Several courts have recently highlighted this dire truth, authorizing rejection of labor
contracts. See In re Concrete Pipe Machinery Co., 28 Bankr. 837, 838 (N.D. Iowa 1983) ("The Debtor
will not likely resume normal operations, thus not returning any unemployed workers to their jobs, if
the financially burdensome covenants of the collective bargaining agreement must be performed:),
In re Blue Ribbon Transportation Co., 30 Bankr. 783, 786 (D.R.1. 1983) ("Ulf the debtor in
possession is not permitted to reject the contract, the business will close within a matter of weeks, with
the resulting loss of jobs by the drivers currently employed. This factor is often given great weight in
favoring rejection of the contract."); In re Southern Electronics Co., Inc., 23 Bankr. 348, 362 (E:D.
Tenn. 1982); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 219.21 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("[I]n a reorganiza-
tion situation the very existence of jobs becomes a prime factor .... [.']here will be no jobs if the
agreement is not rejected It is basic principle that a job without seniority is better than no job at
all.'').
I" Note, Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 144, at 145.
'" In re Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 891-96 ( I 1th Cir. 1983).
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In Brada Miller, the court of appeals stated that other circuits had speciously resorted to
the analogy in order to avoid dealing directly with the obvious tension between section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 8(d) of the NLRA regarding contract termina-
tion.' 69 The Eleventh Circuit observed that although the new entity theory was a useful
analytical tool, its application in this context would cause trouble because of certain
"conceptual inconsistencies.” 1 " Thus, while the Eleventh Circuit admitted the viability of
the new juridical entity for some limited purposes."' the court refused to extend the
concept to find any distinction between the debtor in possession and the pre-bankruptcy'
employer regarding labor law obligations. 17" If the debtor in possession truly is not a party
to extant collective bargaining agreements, the court recognized, it would be illogical to
require the debtor in possession to petition and receive court approval prior to labor
contract. rejection.'" According to the court, the Code could just as readily have provided
that labor contracts are automatically abrogated upon filing the Chapter 1i petition for
reorganization,'" The court suited the unilateral termination without prior court ap-
proval, however, remains a clear employer unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA,"3 Further, the court observed that if the bankruptcy court refuses to
grant the petition to reject the labor contracts, the debtor in possession is bound by the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.'" The court pointed out, however, that the
proponents of the new entity concept had failed to articulate a legal theory which justifies
binding a "non-party" to the agreement."' Summarizing the fundamental conceptual
incongruities with the attenuated application of the new entity and successor doctrine
analogies, the court stated that the viability of the new entity theory rested on the
bankruptcy court's granting of the debtor in possession's motion to reject the collective
bargaining agreement. According to the court, the new entity theory was obviously
unworkable in contrary situations where the debtor in possession is compelled to comply
with the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement.'"
B. Subsequent Tests in Other Circuits
The Ninth Circuit closely followed the two-tier test for labor contract rejection set
forth by the Second Circuit in Kevin SteelIREA . In Local Joint Executive Board v. Hotel Circle
Inc., 170 the Ninth Circuit affirmed bankruptcy court authorization of labor contract
rejection in bankruptcy.'" Following the earlier Second Circuit rationale, the Ninth
Circuit found the labor contract to be an executory contract and therefore subject to
rejection tinder section 313(1) of the Act.'" The Hotel Circle court also found the successor
In Id.
 at 894.
170 id at 894-95.
171 id. at 895.
172 id.
"3 Id,
174 Id. at 895 11.15.
1 " Id. at 896.
776 14. at 895.
177 Id.
In Id.
19 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
"" Id. at 219. For a thorough, exhaustive discussion of the facts of the case, see generally Note,
Bankruptcy Law-Labor Law-Rejection, Assumption and Modification of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
1981 Attrz. ST. L.J. 311 n81); Note. Receiver's Authority, supra note 114.
" 1 Joint Executive Board, 613 F.2d at 213.
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analogy persuasive."' The Ninth Circuit, however, expressly declined to articulate any
general rule regarding the standard for labor contract rejection."' In the court's view, the
existence of myriad factual considerations dictated that each decision must necessarily be
made on a case-by-case basis." 4 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit appeared to retreat from
the strict two-tier, or last resort, test of the Second Circuit. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
opted for a general equities test, more consistent with Kevin Steel than with REA. 195 The
court held that the petitioner for rejection need not prove that business collapse and loss
of jobs is the inevitable consequence absent contract rejection)" The Ninth Circuit
endorsed the less stringent test allowing rejection for "labor agreements found to he
onerous and burdensome to the debtor's estate.""'
The receiver in Joint Executive Board had unilaterally accepted a proposed wage
increase and had further agreed to extend the life of the labor contract)" Subsequently,
the creditors' committee obtained court approval for rejection of the contract." 9 The
union then unsuccessfully argued that the receiver had unilateral authority to affirm the
contract and to bind the estate without court approval of the receiver's conduct)" The
Ninth Circuit required prior court approval for either rejection, or, in this case, adoption
of the labor contract by the receiver)" In so ruling, the court of appeals rejected 192 the
REA view that the debtor in possession could unilaterally assume the labor contract
"either expressly or conforming to its terms without disaffirmance." 1 " The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the prior cases relied on by the Second Circuit in REA which suggested that
the debtor in possession had the unilateral ability to affirm the labor contract without
prior court approval)" Instead, the Ninth Circuit looked to more recent decisions from
' 82 Id. at 214.
'8.3 Id.
1 e' Id, at 214 n.3.
"5 Id. at 216-17.
188 Id. at 214.
'" Id.
1"8 Id. at 212.
in id.
180 Id.
' 9 ' Id. at 215.
1" Id, at 217 n.5.
1s8
	 , 523 F.2d at 170.
' 94 Id. at 216-19 citing In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 767 (3d Cir. 1947); In re Wil-Low
Cafeterias, Inc. III F.2d 429, 431 (2c1 Cir. 1940).
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit was also applied in In re Concrete Pipe Machinery Co., 28
Bankr. 837, 841 (N.D. Iowa, 1983); In re Steelship Corp., 576 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1978); In re
Letterman, 29 Bankr. 351, 354 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
Recently, In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, Inc. 19 Bankr. 462, 466-67 (S.D. Cal. 1982) made
an important and significant pre-Bildisco observation regarding the difference in contract rejection
proceedings between Chapter 11 and Chapter 7. Prior court authorization for labor contract
rejection is required only in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. This decision held that the
trustee can unilaterally reject labor contracts without prior judicial authority in Chapter 7 straight
bankruptcy liquidation proceedings. Id.:
If Chapter 7 trustees had to present these numerous determinations to reject such
contracts to the courts, it would undoubtedly create a considerable administrative
burden. Congress apparently recognized this potential problem in enacting§ 365(d)(1),
which vests the decision regarding rejection of executory contracts solely in the Chapter
7 trustee, for a sixty-day period. (citations omitted). If the Chapter 7 trustee does not
indicate an intention to assume the contract during the sixty-day period, then the
contract is automatically deemed rejected.
Id. II U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) of the 1978 Code provides:
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the Fifth and Seventh' 95
 Circuits, the leading bankruptcy treatise,'" and its own prior
decision to synthesize what it deemed the better rule.'"
While Joint Executive Board did not significantly contribute to the judicial tests to be
utilized in deciding whether to reject labor contracts, the decision unequivocally held that
prior court authority is an essential prerequisite to rejection or adoption of the contract by
the receiver, trustee, or debtor in possession. This holding clarified an important prelimi-
nary issue in Chapter I1 proceedings. Regarding the actual evaluative standards, the
Ninth Circuit suggested a more liberal equities test and a retreat from the strict two-tier,
last resort standard espoused by the Second Circuit in REA.
The Third Circuit provided the next major decision to address the judicial standards
by which to evaluate a petition for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. In In
re Bildisco 1" the court expressly disavowed the strict tests of the REA decision.' 99 Instead,
the Third Circuit endorsed only the initial Kevin Steel standards, and thus accepted only
the first tier of the Second Circuit's two-tier test. The Third Circuit substantially
liberalized the standards for labor contract rejection. After reviewing both of the impor-
tant prior Second Circuit decisions, the Third Circuit concluded:
We are satisfied that Kevin Steel, isolated from its illegitimate progeny [REA],
In a case under Chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does riot assume or reject an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days after the order for
relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60 day period,
fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
Id.
For cases holding that express action by the debtor is required to assume or reject the contract,
see Mills v. Gilbert, 22 Bankr, 482, 487 (M.D. N.C. 1982) ("Where a contract has not been rejected as
an executory contract with the permission of the court and where the debtor in possession has
accepted the services of the employees under the terms of that contract, that contract remains in full
force and the debtor in possession is bound by all of its terms."). See also Brown v. Presbyterian
Ministers' Fund, 484 F.2d 998, 1005 (3d Cir. 1973); Consolidated Gas Electric Light Sc Power Co. v.
United Rys. 8c Electric Co., 85 F.2d 799, 802- 03 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1936); In re
Central Watch, Inc., 22 Bankr. 561, 564-65 (E.D. Wis. 1982); In re Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 8 Bankr.
271, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). "Until assumed or rejected, art executory contract or unexpired lease
remains in force and if neither assumed nor rejected, passes with other property of the debtor to the
reorganized corporation." Central Watch, 22 Bankr. at 564-65, citing Shoppers Paradise, 8 Bankr. at
278 - 79. The Central Watch court stated that "although 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and (d)(2) provide that a
debtor may, with the court's approval, assume or reject an executory contract at any time prior to
confirmation, the Code does not specifically address the effects of inaction. Nevertheless, courts have
generally held that executory contracts continue in force until expressly assumed or rejected." Central
Watch, 22 Bankr. at 564-65. Therefore, in Central Watch, a former executive's executory contract
remained enforceable after Chapter 11 reorganization.
1 °5 In re American Nat'l Trust, 426 F.2d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1970); Texas Importing Co. v.
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1966).
"8 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §§ 3.23(5), 70.43(5) (14th ed. 1976).
1 " Joint Executive Board, 613 F.2d at 216. The Court stated that:
. . . assumption or adoption of the contract can only be effected through an express
order of the bankruptcy Judge . The general rule that economy of administration
calls for close, strict, and active control by the court of all administrative expenditures
seems to lead to the conclusion that it is improper for a trustee to assume executory
contracts on his own responsibility . . . . WE is well settled bankruptcy law that on
important decisions, whatever their character, the trustee must get the court's approval
. . .
Id.
199 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (1984).
199 Id. at 81.
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provides the appropriate framework for an intelligent and equitable ap-
proach to the problem because it gives collective bargaining agreements a
measure of protection beyond that available under the business judgment test
without unduly advancing the interests served by the Labor Act over the
other interests of the employees and those of the debtor's other creditors. 20°
Consequently, the Third Circuit in Bildisco did not require the debtor in possession to
demonstrate that the ineluctable result of a failure to reject the labor contract would be
final business collapse and loss of jobs. The court rejected this more stringent test for two
reasons, First, the court asserted that it might be impossible to predict the success of a
reorganization until very late in the arrangement proceedings. Second, the court recog-
nized that even if' the agreement were rejected, the employees may not continue to have
jobs at all. The court stated that the more stringent test could actually work to the
detriment of the workers it ostensibly sought to protect. In the court's view, the excessive
evidentiary barrier to rejection of labor contracts erected in the REA Express Alan Wood
Steel formulation would make it likely that numerous businesses attempting to reorganize
will in fact be forced over the line into liquidation. The court stated that adherence to a
collective bargaining agreement together with a successful reorganization is clearly the
best of possible worlds. The court explained, however, that given potential for conflict
between these goals, it was preferable that jobs be preserved through the rejection of a
labor contract, rather than lost because of its acceptance."'
As a result, the Third Circuit embraced and expanded the broader, general equities
test, and identified a number of key criteria. The court stated:
We believe that the debtor-in-possession must first demonstrate that the
continuation of the collective bargaining agreement would be burdensome to
the estate; that once this threshold determination has been made the debtor-
in-possession must make a factual presentation sufficient to permit the bank-
ruptcy court to weigh the competing equities; that the polestar is to do equity
between claims which arise under the labor contract and other claims against
the debtor; that, in this, the court must consider the rights of covered em-
ployees as supported by the national labor policy as well as the possible
"sacrifices which other creditors are making" in the effort to bring about a
successful reorganization and that the court must make a reasoned determi-
nation that the rejection of the labor contract will assist the debtor-in-posses-
sion or the trustee to achieve a satisfactory reorganization." 2
The Bildisco elaboration of these most important considerations was fully consonant
with a careful scrutiny of the equities promulgated in Kevin Steel. The Third Circuit
clarified the inherent vagueness of the general equities standard, by explaining how the
tests should be applied and when rejection should be permitted." 03
 The equities test will
200 Id.
" 1 Id. The Court also noted:
We reject, however, the formulations of subsequent decisions pressed on us by the
union and the Board, which purport to follow the rule of Kevin Steel but instead replace
its "balancing of the equines" with a test predicating permission to reject on a showing
"that an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement will
thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse."
Id. (citations omitted).
"2
 Id. at 80.
"3 Id. Commentators endorsing Bildisco made a strikingly contradictory criticism of the REA
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necessarily turn on the particular facts of each case."' This Third Circuit test had not yet
been applied to the particular facts in Bildisco; therefore, the case was remanded to the
bankruptcy court.'" The bankruptcy court had originally granted permission to the
debtor in possession to reject the labor contract, 206 and this was affirmed by the district
court in a bench opinionY° 7 Significantly, neither of the lower courts articulated the
standards, if any, used to determine that labor contract rejection was proper in this
case.'zoe
Since January, 1980, the employer had not made its contractually mandated pension,
health, and vacation plan payments. On April 14, 1980, the employer filed a voluntary
petition for reorganization tinder Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Following the
filing, the employer continued to operate the business as the debtor in possession. lit May
1980, it refused to grant the wage raise called for under the labor contract. The union
then filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, alleging that "Bildisco had
refused to grant certain wage increases, to pay pension and welfare contributions, or to
turn over union dues, all in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. -"9 The
general counsel of the NLRB issued a complaint on July 31, 1980, alleging employer
violations of section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA." ) In December 1980, the
employer filed a motion with the bankruptcy court, seeking permission to reject the labor
contract. On January 15, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted permission to the debtor in
strict tests for rejection as simultaneously being both too pro-labor and yet insufficiently protective of
employee interests:
The REA Express test is still inherently inequitable because it is weighted so heavily in
favor of labor that it fails to account for the debtor's interest in remaining in business.
. . . The REA Express test does not provide for consideration of the employees'
interest in the continued existence of the business . , . . By erecting an excessive
evidentiary barrier to rejection of labor contracts, the test, if followed, would force
more companies into liquidation and fail to protect the employees' interest in preserv-
ing their jobs.
Note, What Test?, supra note 51, at 874.
Professor Countryman, however, excoriated the Third Circuit's reasoning. See Bordewieck and
Countryman, supra note 52, at 317. ("Mhe approach of-the Third Circuit . . . fails to consider
adequately the protections accorded to employees by federal labor law"); Pulliam, The Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section )65 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANK L.J. 1, 33(1984)
("Both components of Bildisco's analysis are flawed: the standard for rejection under section 365(a)
for overlooking the plain language of the statute and the reasoning of the pre -Kevin Steel authorities;
the section 8(d) issue for its question-begging reliance on the inapt successorship doctrine Taken
together, however, the two components of Bildisco are inconsistent and contradictory, thus com-
pounding and magnifying the defects in each part.").
204 Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 80.
zc)5 Id, at 85. The Third Circuit stated:
The bankruptcy court's bench opinion unfortunately was a woefully inadequate treat-
ment of a sophisticated subject. It is not clear whether the bankruptcy court chose one
of the two standards preferred by the parties or applied a synthesis of the two • ...
Because we have set forth in detail the appropriate precepts to apply to a hitherto
unsettled area of the law, and because we do not have the benefit of an adequate
explanation of the trial court's action, the preferable course is to remand the proceed-
ings For reconsideration in light of the precepts we announce today.
Id. at 81 - 82.
205 Id. at 75.
207 Id.
200
	 at 75 n.3.
205 1(1, at 75.
210 See SUPTa note 10.
576	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:539
possession to reject the labor contract, retroactive to the date immediately preceding the
April 14, 1980 petition.2" The general partner of Bildisco had testified the company
could save $100,000 in 1981 if freed from the labor contract. In early 1981, only three
bargaining unit employees remained with the company.
Notwithstanding the bankruptcy court's decision to permit the employer to reject the
labor contract, and the district court's affirmance of that order, on April 23, 1981, the
NLRB summarily found that the debtor in possession committed an unfair labor practice
by rejecting the collective bargaining agreement. The NLRB regarded the debtor in
possession as the alter ego of the pre-bankruptcy employer partnership.
The debtor in possession, the Board found, had gradually reduced the number of its
employees and had not replaced these unionized employees with newly hired, non-union
personnel. In addition, the Board determined that operations were not interrupted or
substantially changed and that remaining employees performed their jobs as they had
prior to the bankruptcy filing. Finally, the Board found that there was no corporate
merger or acquisition or transfer of capital, assets, management, or ownership. In sum-
mary, the Board concluded, the business operation remained substantially unchanged.
The Board ordered Bildisco to make all the delinquent contributions and payments plus
interest to its employees. In addition, the Board ordered the employer to honor the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, and to post appropriate notices. 212 The Board
then applied to the Third Circuit for enforcement of its order. Both the Board case and
the union appeal from the district court's earlier affirmance of the bankruptcy court's
rejection of the labor contract were consolidated. 213
The Third Circuit reiterated prior law holding that labor contracts were considered
executory contracts under the Code. 214 In addition, the court of appeals subscribed to the
new entity theory regarding the debtor in possession.215 A debtor in possession, the court
explained, while a new entity, is nevertheless an employer with a duty to bargain with the
union.216
 According to the court, the employees retained an untrammelled right to
strike 2 17 The Third Circuit's acceptance of the successor employer analogy to the debtor
2" Bildisco, 682 F,2d at 75; see 11 U.S.C.	 365(g)(1) (1982).
212
 Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 76.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 78.
2"
 Id. at 78-79.
2" Id. at 80.
217 Id. Accord In re Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. of Indiana, 27 Bankr. 293, 298 (S.D. Ind.
1983): In re Ateco Equipment Co. 18 Bankr. 915, 917 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Petrusch v. Teamsters, 667
F.2d 297, 298-300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982).
In Petrusch, the debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding was picketed by the union when the debtor
failed to make contractually mandated fringe benefit payments to the union's health, hospital,
pension, and retirement funds. Petrusch, 667 F.2d at 298-300. Since these payments were part of the
terms and conditions of employment, the union picketing over nonpayment was a nonenjoinable
labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Id,
Section 4 of the Norris - LaGuardia Act explicitly withdraws jurisdiction from all federal courts,
including bankruptcy courts, to issue injunctions against strikes "in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute . ." 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982). In turn, section 13(c) of that Act defines ''labor
disputes" as "[a]ny controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (Stipp, 111 1979).
The Supreme Court broadly construed "labor disputes." "The term 'labor dispute' should he
most broadly and liberally construed. The term 'labor dispute' comprehends disputes growing out of
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in possession was determinative of the unfair labor practice Board findings against the
employer, because the debtor in possession was not bound by the pre-bankruptcy em-
ployer's collective bargaining agreement. U port bankruptcy court approval, therefore, the
debtor in possession legitimately rejected the collective bargaining agreement retroactive
to the date of the pennon for Chapter 11 reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code.
Significantly, the debtor in possession could reject the contract without complying with
t he section 8(d) contract termination procedures of the N LRA 2 " and without committing
section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practices. 2 t 9
 The Third Circuit criticized
the NLRB for finding post-petition unfair labor practices arising from the court-author-
labor relations ... all such disputes seem to he clearly included." Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA,
457 U.S. 702, 715 (1082). See In re Crowe and Associates, 713 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1983). The
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the bankruptcy court from enjoining a peaceful, nonviolent union
strike to collect prebankruptcy petition pension payments. Although the peaceful union strike may
violate 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, prohibiting any "act to collect, assess, or
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case," nonviolent,
unlawful labor activity is nonetheless immunized from federal court injunction by the Norris
LaGuardia Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). See Telegraphers v. Chicago and N.W.R. Co., 362 U.S.
330, 344 (1960); Bhd. of Ry. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indian Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957).
Section 1079(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act allows injunctive relief where "unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed sinless restrained or have been committed and will be continued
unless restrained." 29 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982). In Crowe and Associates. , the Sixth Circuit summarized
why the peaceful strike could not he enjoined by the bankruptcy court:
The Union's nonviolent strike activity cannot be enjoined merely because it is violative
or the Bankruptcy Reform Act. We are unwilling to modify or abandon the declared
congressional purpose of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Neither are we willing to find that the Bankruptcy Reform Act supersedes or
provides an exception to those anti-injunction provisions.
Crowe and Associates, 713 F.2d at 214.
There is precedent for bankruptcy court injunctions of labor picketing that threatens the
property of the debtor. In re Tucker Freight Lines, 115 L.R.R.M. 2202 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (distin-
guishing Crowe and Associates, court enjoined debtor-employer front unilaterally reducing contract
rate): In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 201 (N.D. Ohio 1935) (bankruptcy
court can enjoin union picketing interference with removal of beer from bankrupt's facilities to
prevent spoilage); see generally Note, The Automatic Stay of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code versus the Norris-
LaGuardia Act: A Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, 61 Tex. L. REV. 321 (1982).
Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts have concluded, erroneously and rather summarily, that it is
proper For them to interfere with the normal operations of the NLRB and to issue labor injunction
notwithstanding the Norris-LaGuardia Act. "These actions suggest that bankruptcy courts are not
likely to consider fully the principles of labor law implicated by a petition to reject a collective
bargaining agreement." Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 330 & n.99. In Truck
Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976),aff'd per curiara, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978), the Second Circuit stated that "the power to permit rejection
of the agreement in particular circumstances does not confer an antecedent jurisdiction on the court
to enjoin picketing in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Truck Drivers, 541 F.2d 318.
Despite a largely untrammeled right to picket and to strike in protest of the labor contract
rejection, union resort to these traditionally powerful labor weapons may result in pyrrhic victories.
As one commentator has observed, "where the effect of the strike is to cause cessation of the
operation of the business, and this is generally the goal, the union may be reluctant to strike because
the employees are among the prime beneficiaries of the continued operation of the business. A
strike, consequently, may be an unsuitable bargaining lever for the union." Note, Collective Bargain-
ing, supra note 47, at 482.
The Third Circuit held that -because Bildisco as debtor-in-possession is not a party to the
agreement with Local 408, it had the ability to reject the agreement without following the procedures
outlined in § 8d." Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 83.
2 ' 9 id. at 84.
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ized rejection of the collective bargaining agreement."" The court of appeals denied the
Board's petition for enforcement of its order without prejudice, pending the bankruptcy
court's evaluation, on remand, of the petition to reject the labor contract in light of the
standards set forth by the Third Circuii. 221
In addition to its criticisms of the application of the entity and successor analogy to
the debtor in possession, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Brada Miller Freight System Inc."'"
contains the most recent court of appeals decision to address the issue of what standards
are appropriate for rejecting a collective bargaining agreement. Brada Freight involved
two collective bargaining agreements negotiated between the Teamsters Union and the
employer association which had effective terms from April 1, 1979 to March 31, 1982. 223
In 1978, Brada Miller had daily gross revenues of $180,000 and profitably operated 550
trucks per day from 29 terminals."' During 1979, a four month labor strike, together
with the automobile industry recession, severely debilitated company operations and
resulted in a net operating loss of $188,000 for 1979. 223 By the end of August, 1980, the
company operated only 125 units, compared to the 550 units of 1978. 2" During the
summer of 1980, the company unsuccessfully instituted business austerity measures
through layoffs and miler cost reductions."' On August I, 1980, the company filed for
reorganization through Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,, 2"
 and petitioned for court
approval of labor contract rejection. 229 During the proceedings, Brada Miller continued to
operate the company as the debtor in possession."
Subsequently, the union locals filed unfair labor practice charges against the em-
220
	 Court stated:
We suggest to the NLRB that, at least in matters within this judicial circuit, it cease
operating under such a fundamental misconception of the law. Indeed, we believe that
persisting in such a misconception — one that goes to the difference between the
prebankruptcy company which was the signatory to the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the succeeding debtor-in-possession — is so fundamental that this error in
and of itself is sufficient reason to refuse to enforce a summary judgment so predicated.
Id. at 83,
22i Id. at 85.
222 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983).
" 3
 Id. at 892.
224 hie
225 id,
220 hi.
"7 Id. Several courts perceptively examined whether managerial personnel have shared in the
austerity measures. See In re Blue Ribbon Transportation Co., 30 Bankr. 783, 788 (D. R.I. 1983) (The
court found that inordinate management salaries and benefits constituted a greater impediment to
successful reorganization than did the labor contract. As a precondition to permitting rejection of the
labor agreement, the court required that management first reduce management salaries Mom a total
of $93,600 to $70,000 per year), and then reduce the seven company cars for the use of executives
and their families to one car, restricted solely to company business.): In re U.S. Truck Co., 24 Bankr.
853, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1982): Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 894. But see In re Commercial Motor
Freight, Inc. of Indiana, 27 Bankr. 293, 297 (S.D. Ind. 1983) ("while the action of Commercial Motor
Freight's directors in awarding themselves significant salary increases and other benefits was highly
improvident under the circumstances, the court is not of the opinion that such evinces bad faith ..
the monetary amount involved is de minimis as compared to the total labor costs required by the
contracts.'').
220
 Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 892.
2" Id.
220 Id.
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ployer for rejection of the labor contracts. At the same time, the NLRB sought to enjoin"'
the alleged employer unfair labor practices pending a bearing."' The debtor in posses-
sion then petitioned the bankruptcy courts to stay all NLRB proceedings as unduly
interfering with business operations and the company's attempt to reorganize success-
fu l l y . 233
Although the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's stay of the NLRB pro-
ceedings,' 3-1 the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's authorization of labor contract
231 29	 § 160(j) of the NLRA provides:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b)
charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to
petition any United States district court within any district wherein the unfair labor
practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.
Id.
The bankruptcy court is not obligated to consider NLRB unfair labor practice charges either as
conclusive evidence of the debtor's bad faith or as establishing reasonable cause that an unfair labor
practice had been committed. Rather, the bankruptcy court has independent jurisdiction to decide
whether and "how conduct that forms the basis of an unfair labor practices complaint affects the
equities . . . ." In re Handy Andy, Inc., 112 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2658 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
232 Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 892.
233 id .
234 Id. at 893 nn. 4 and 5. The Eleventh Circuit stated:
The bankruptcy court also decided that (1) it has powers coextensive with the NLRB to
adjudicate unfair labor practices and that the Company was guilty of an unfair labor
practice; (2) it is empowered to enjoin the administrative processes of the NLRB; and
(3) it is empowered to enjoin, and accordingly enjoined, the Company's employees
from interfering with the Company's business.
The district court reversed the remainder of the bankruptcy court's decision. The
district court held that: (1) the bankruptcy court does not have concurrent jurisdiction
with the NLRB to adjudicate and remedy unfair labor practices; (2) the bankruptcy
court exceeded its authority and violated the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104) by enjoining concerted employee activity arising
out of the dispute between Brada Miller and its employees; and (3) the bankruptcy
court failed to apply the proper legal test when it stayed the NLRB proceedings without
finding that the proceedings threatened the Company's assets.
Brada Miller does not challenge these portions of the district court order on this
appeal.
Id.
The NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice allegations; they cannot be
removed to the bankruptcy court. In re Adams Delivery Service, 24 Bankr. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
The National Labor Relations Board General Counsel has been authorized by the Board to
intervene in bankruptcy proceedings "for the purpose of persuading the court not to set aside
collective bargaining agreements except when necessary to enable the business to continue." Gen.
Counsel Memorandum 78-72 (Nov. 3, 1978).
Several circuits have held that prior union unfair labor practice charges against the employer are
not mooted by a subsequent bankruptcy filing by the employer. The First Circuit recently ruled that
an employer's section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) unfair labor practices (unlawful threats to close unionized
facilities, unlawful discharges, coercive interrogations, improper surveillance, and no-distribution
rules) remained subject to NLRB remedial orders subsequent to the employer filing a Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization petition. Ahrens Aircraft v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1983); see also
NLRB v. Suburban Ford, Inc. 646 F.2d 1244, 1249 n.4 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d
1264, 1266 ti.2 (70) Cir. 1977).
In NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 294, (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that
NLRB enforcement proceedings to remedy unfair labor practices committed prior to the bankruptcy
petition fall within the § 362(6)(4) exception to the § 362(a) automatic stay provision of the 1978
Code, which provides in part:
580	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:539
rejection by the debtor in possession pursuant to section 365(a) of the 1978 Bankruptcy
(a) Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, a petition filed under § 301, 302
or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of —
( I) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title.
(h) The filing of a petition under § 301, 302 or 303 of this title does not operate as
a stay —
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section of the commencement or continuation of
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's
police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1979).
The Fifth Circuit summarized its reasoning:
The crucial issue is whether the NLRB is a governmental unit and whether this action is
one to enforce police or regulatory powers. It is clear that the NLRB is a governmental
unit. This action was undertaken to enforce the federal law regulating the relationship
between employer and employee. We can safely conclude therefore that this is an
exercise of police or regulatory powers which places it within the § 362(b)(4) exemption
to the automatic stay. We note that our decision today would permit the entry of
judgment for injunctive relief and for hack pay.
NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d at 3061. Fare Shippers Interstate Service, Inc., 618 F.2(19, 12
(7th Cir. 1980); accord In re Be] Air Chateau Hospital, Inc., 611 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979).
However, both the Fifth Circuit in Evans Plumbing and other courts in subsequent decisions have
held that the section 362(h) exceptions "do not go so far as to permit enforcement of a money
judgment against the debtor or property of the estate." D. M. Barber, Inc. v. Valverde, 13 Ban kr. 962,
964 (N.H. Tex. 1981). The Board is thus relegated to filing a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding in
order to perhaps eventually satisfy at least a portion of a money judgment.
In Shippers Interstate, the Seventh Circuit provided important clarification on the interrelation-
ship of NLRB authority and the automatic stay provisions of the Code:
[W]here, as Isere, it appears that the assets of the estate are not threatened and the
company is being reorganized rather than liquidated, Bankruptcy Rule 11-44 shall not
apply and regulatory proceedings of the National Labor Relations Board are not
subject to the automatic stay provisions of that bankruptcy rule. This does not preclude
imposition of a stay where a proper showing was made that the regulatory proceedings
threatened the estate assets or that the bankruptcy or other proceedings would result in
the liquidation of the company.
Shippers Interstate, 618 F.2d at 13.
Therefine, the bankruptcy courts have the discretion to enjoin post-bankruptcy petition NLRB
charges of debtor unfair labor practices arising from the rejected agreement. In In re San Juan Hotel
Corp., I 1 1 I...R.R.M. 2877 (1). P.R. 1982), the bankruptcy court properly enjoined the NLRB from
filing for NLRA § 10(j) injunctive relief to obtain reinstatement of strikers protesting earlier labor
contract rejection in bankruptcy. The court relied on the Third Circuit's Bildisco decision, and
summarized the Third Circuit's rationale:
It distinguished between prepetition and post-petition charges of unfair labor practices
and observed that where charges of unfair labor practices arise after the date of a
Chapter II petition, the Board must await the determination of the Bankruptcy Court
on the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement before it may proceed to
consider the post-petition charges. It expressly stated that if the Bankruptcy Judge
determines that the collective bargaining agreement may be rejected, the Board will be
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Code. 233 Following the Kevin SteelIREA two-tier test of the Second Circuit for labor
contract rejection, the district court found that a denial of the motion to reject would
likely have resulted in the collapse of Brada Miller and that the equities therefore weighed
in favor of rejection.236
 The union then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "Congress intended collective bargaining
agreements to he subject to unilateral rejection by the bankruptcy trustee (with the
approval of the court) under section 365." 237
 Despite serious misgivings with the applica-
tion of the new entity and successor employer doctrine analogies to the rejection of the
labor contract obligations of the debtor in possession, 238 the Eleventh Circuit found no
distinction between labor agreements and other executory contracts with regard to
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. 239
After carefully examining the conflict between the Second and Third Circuits regard-
ing the appropriate standards for rejection of the labor contract pursuant to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the BiIdisc0 equity test should govern
bound by that determination, which would preclude any post
-petition unfair labor
practice arising from the rejected agreement.
In re San Juan Hotel Corp„ 11 L.R.R.M. at 2880.
Neither can the union compel the employer to arbitrate disputes arising out of decisions to close
facilities. The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to approve or reject the debtor's business
actions. Local 692 v. Pantry Pride, 109 L.R.R.M. 2007 (1). Md. 1931).
However, if any unfair labor practice charges, which occurred either before or after bankruptcy
petitions, are to he heard, only the NLRB, and not the bankruptcy court, has the necessary expertise.
Thus, while the bankruptcy court may he able to stay NLRB proceedings that threaten the estate,
only the Board can decide unfair labor practice charges. See NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works,
128 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1942): Seeburg Corp. v. NLRB, 11 Bankr. 121, 122 (N.D. 111.  1980) ("The
jurisdiction ma United States District Court in bankruptcy does not embrace the power to treat with
a debtor's unfair labor practices which affect commerce. Nor is such a court's leave to the Board to
proceed in appropriate manner required. By § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board
is expressly empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practices affecting
commerce; and that power is exclusive in the Board and unaffected 'by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may he established by agreement code, law, or oth-
erwise.' ").
Unless the NLRB action actually threatens the assets of the debtor, the bankruptcy court cannot
enjoin the NLRB from assessing back pay awards against the debtor in possession, resulting from the
debtor's unilateral rejection of its labor contract. See In re Tucson Yellow Cab Co., 27 Bankr. 621, 623
(9th Cir. 1983).
The NLRB alone has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue back pay orders, while the bankruptcy
court has the exclusive duty to determine the priority to be accorded such NLRB hack pay orders
under the Code. An NLRB pay order alone does not automatically constitute an enjoinable threat to
the debtor's estate, "even though that order may greatly enhance the amount of priority obligations
payable from the estate,"
Id.
2 '5 Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 893.
236 Id.
2" Id. at 894.
2." Id. at 894-96. See supra notes 147-178 and accompanying text.
Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 896-97. "We do not contemplate that Congress intended the
ultimate fate of a corporation under Chapter X1 to rest so largely in the hands of the Company's
protected employees. There simply exist too many other critical interests, those of other employees,
creditors, and shareholders, the protection of which provides the stimulus for the bankruptcy laws
for this Court to conclude that the collective bargaining agreement was meant to hold a stranglehold
position, totally immune from the flexibility provided by § 365." id.
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the matter before it."° Although the court of appeals recognized the importance of
employee interests at stake,2 4 ' the court stated that employee contract terms and benefits
did not enjoy an absolutely immune position. 242 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with the second tier of the REA test, which requires the debtor in possession to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that forced liquidation would be the inevitable
result if the collective bargaining agreement were not rejected.' 243
 According to the court,
the possibility of liquidation absent labor contract rejection was but one of many equities
to be weighed. :244 The court stated that the interests of employees, creditors,'" and
"° Lower court endorsement of Bildisco has not been unanimous. Some courts continue to
prefer the Second Circuit's Kevin SteelIREA strict two-tier test for rejection. See In re J.R. Elkins, Inc.,
27 Bankr. 862, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re U.S. Truck Co„ 24 Bankr. 853, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1982); The
Elkins court held:
[T]he debtor is on the brink of complete financial collapse and may shortly be forced
into liquidation despite valiant efforts to remain afloat. In order to have a chance at
survival a buyer must be found quickly. Time is of the essence .... The purchaser is
adamant, in its refusal to assume the agreement as it now exists . . . the bottom line is
that the collective bargaining agreement must be rejected if there is to be any hope of
saving the jobs of the debtor's employees.
Elkins, 27 Bankr. at 863.
On balance, most lower courts have followed the Bildisco standards. See In re Commercial Motor
Freight, Inc. of Indiana, 27 Bankr. 293, 297 (S.D. Ind. 1983); In re Blue Ribbon Transportation Co.,
30 Bankr. 783, 785 (D. R.I. 1983); In re Reserve Roofing Florida, Inc., 21 Bankr. 96, 100 (M.D. Fla.
1982); In re Miles Machinery Company, 113 L.R.R.M. 3114, 3119 (E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Hoyt, 27
Bankr. 13, 14 (D. Or. 1982); in re Yellow Limousine Service, Inc., 22 Bankr. 807, 808 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 219 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (stockholders of small debtor
company had to contribute $34,000 to cover wages and benefits; rejected contract had guaranteed
wages even if employees failed to bring in sufficient revenues to meet wages) (following REA). At
least one court has expressly rejected both the Bildisco and REA alternatives, opting instead to regard
non-RLA collective bargaining agreements as equivalent to any other executory contract for section
365 rejection purposes. See In re Concrete Pipe Machinery Co., 28 Bankr. 837, 840 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
Of course, the Supreme Court's affirmance in NLRB v. Bildisco of the Third Circuit's tests effectively
vitiates any further adherence to the Second Circuit's REA standard in the lower courts.
zit Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.24 at 897. "An ordinary commercial contract may be rejected by a
bankruptcy trustee upon a showing that rejection would benefit the estate. (citation omitted).
However, this minimal burden is insufficient to protect the special rights accruing to employees
under the federal labor laws." Id. (citation omitted).
242 Id.
242
 Id. at 899.
244 Id.
242
	 least one bankruptcy court has recently ruled that the union was not a creditor within the
meaning of § 101(9) of the 1978 Code. In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 25 Bankr. 223, 223-24 (E.D. Pa.
1982). Neither did the union have a claim against the debtor within the meaning of section 101(4). Id.
at 224. The union represented eighty-eight pilots of the employer: their wage claims totaled more
than $676,120. M. In the aggregate, this was the second largest claim against the Chapter II debtor.
Id. The union unsuccessfully sought to be appointed to the § 1102(a)(1) committee of unsecured
creditors. Id. at 225. The court concluded that only the individual pilots, but not the union, had a
right of payment against the debtor:
[W]e are bound by Congress' obvious intention to exclude from the present definition
of "creditor" under the Code any language empowering a "duly authorized agent, attorney
or proxy" of an entity that has a claim against the debtor to be considered a creditor .. • .
[T]he Association, being only the authorized agent of the "entity that has a claim against
the debtor" — namely the individual pilots — is not a creditor within the meaning of
section 101(9) of the Code."
In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 25 Bankr. 223, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
This decision did not compromise cases holding that the NLRB is a creditor and can order back
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shareholders, the nature and scope of the debtor in possession's bargaining obligation
after contract rejection, and strike potential were other interrelated factors for courts to
assess.zn In addition, the court explained that tangible, or non-monetary, employee
interests such as seniority must he especially considered.z 47 The court explained that an
important question is whether employees are as able to hear losses as the other creditors
are.''-45
The court observed that, for the most part, employees are markedly different from
commercial creditors. According to the court, employees must usually absorb the loss of
their entire wages, as well as a panoply of important non-wage rights, such as seniority,
vacation, and pension plans. Commercial creditors, the court noted, are typically able to
pass the losses caused by one debtor bankruptcy to their customers. The court reasoned
that the cumulative loss spread among many parties in the market makes the burden felt
by either the commercial creditor itself or arty of its customers negligible. Commercial
creditors, the court noted, can usually draw on a variety of business resources to deal with
the temporary adversity engendered by the collapse of a debtor. I ndividual  employees,
however, must usually fall hack on their more limited personal assets when their employer
fails to meet contractual obligations. For example, the court noted that commercial lines
of credit are not available to the average employee. The employer's collapse, therefore,
has profound adverse personal, as distinguished from primarily commercial, conse-
quences for the individual employee. 245 Finally, the Eleventh Court in Brada Miller Freight
pay awards to be paid by the bankrupt. Congress has designated the NLRB its public agent to enforce
the NLRA. See Nat hanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1952); accord In re Wilson Foods Corp., 31
Bankr. 269, 270 (W.D. Okla. 1983). The bankruptcy court, relying on Nathanson, denied the
debtor-employer's request for injunctive relief against NLRB proceedings after filing the petition.
Thus, despite the Chapter I 1 petition, the bankruptcy court refused to stay the Board's unfair labor
practice investigation. If the board determines Wilson committed unfair labor practices it can fix an
amount owed the employees. As stated in Nathanson that liability can become a liquidated claim
against the bankruptcy estate. If objections are made it then becomes the function of this court to
rule upon allowance. 11 U.S.C. § 502. Any questions of priority would also be determined in this
court. 11 U.S.C. § 507." Wilson Foods, 31 Bankr. at 271.
"6 Braila Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 899. From this catalog of equities, the rights and position of
other creditors has rather uniformly achieved the position of first among equals. See In re Braniff
Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 220-21 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (11.11nsecured creditors will not receive
anything in liquidation. Consequently, their hopes are totally dependent upon a reorganization."). In
most cases, the monetary value of the union member's loss is insignificant when compared with the
loss to all other creditors if no reorganization occurs. The policy supporting reorganization has
always sought equity among creditors. While priorities among claims are legitimate, unfair discrimi-
nation is repugnant to reorganization principles. See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945).
See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1 l23(a)(4), 1129(h)( I), all designed to provide for fair treatment among
creditors' claims.
Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 900.
"" The court of appeals offers a pragmatic example of pronounced discrepancy in the "cost-
spreading" abilities of the parties:
Certainly, a $50,000 loss to a group of employees averaging $20,000 a year in salary
may have a far more devastating impact than a $100,000 loss suffered by a group of
large banks and other major creditors or by the debtor-employer itself. The considera-
tion of this factor seems especially appropriate since it was the discrepancy in economic
power between labor and management that provided the impetus behind the estab-
lishment of the labor law policies we now seek to preserve.
Id.
2" Professors Bordewieck and Countryman cogently highlighted the pronounced differences
between employees and commercial creditors, and emphasized the irretrievable nature of the
employees' losses following labor contract rejection:
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held that the bankruptcy court should look to the pre-bankruptcy relationship of the
employer and the unions"' for evidence of the parties' motives."' If the employer oper-
Normally, a collective bargaining agreement provides employees with rights and obliga-
tions which cannot easily be reduced to monetary terms, such as seniority, grievance,
and arbitration procedures, as well as no-strike and no-lockout clauses. These rights
and obligations are, of course, destroyed when the collective bargaining agreement is
rejected. A claim for monetary damages for breach of the agreement in any event will
not compensate employees for the loss of rights which simply cannot be reduced to
monetary terms . . . The position of employees is quite different from that of most
commercial creditors. Employees rely solely on their employer for wages and benefits;
commercial creditors routinely contract with dozens, if not hundreds or thousands, of
entities. A commercial creditor will not in the usual case be significantly injured by the
loss of benefits it would have realized under the executory contracts it executed with the
debtor.
Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 312.13.
25° Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 900. For example, did the parties attempt to bargain
cost-saving measu res prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings? Other courts have strongly
endorsed this practice as the preferred, proactive coursein re Price Chopper Supermarkets, Inc., 19
Bankr. 462, 466 (S, D. Cal. 1982) ("111n all but the most extreme cases, the debtors in possession, or
Chapter 11 trustees, should be required to move cautiously and bargain in good faith with their
unions, in an attempt to foster a cooperative attitude in working towards a successful reorganization.
This attempt at renegotiation should occur before coming to the court to achieve a unilateral
rejection. Obviously, in cases where the survival of the business itself is at stake, the urgent need to
reject will require immediate action. In such cases, the required bargaining process will, by necessity,
be kept io a minimum.") Cf. In re Braniff Airways, Inc„ 25 Bankr. 216, 218 (W.D. Tex. 1982) ("[A]
prerequisite of extended negotiation with a recalcitrant union should not be imposed when it
destroys all possibility of reorganization.").
In briefs filed hefore the Supreme Court in Bildisco, the NLRB disagreed with the union's rigid
insistence on absolute compliance with the section 8(d) NLRA complex provisions for any labor
contract modification. The Board pointed out that section 8(d) procedures were too time consuming
and lacked the necessary expedition when time was of the essence. Further, the union cannot be
compelled to agree to any proposal. However, the Board firmly endorsed bargaining as the pre-
ferred recourse prior to seeking court approval of contract rejection:
[lit is entirely appropriate for the bankruptcy court to encourage the parties to bargain
prior to approval of rejection. The union party can be expected to agree to modifica-
tions that are necessary to preservation of the business (and thus preservation of jobs).
Such a solution, which could avoid loss of important employee rights that do not impair
the employer's economic viability, as well as loss of employer rights under the agree-
ments, is far more consistent with the national labor policy than total rejection pursuant
to the Bankruptcy Code.
Brief for the NLRB, NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (filed May 6, 1983).
The NLRB's more malleable position is supported by Professors Bordewieck and Countryman.
According to Bordewieck and Countryman, sheer union intransigence, refusal to bargain, and rigid
insistence on adherence to existing contract terms should not be permitted to sabotage both em-
ployee and employer interests:
[lit is foolish for a union to argue that rejection of the collective bargaining agreement
is not justified if in fact the reorganization has a lot to lose if it adopts an incorrect
position and prevails before the bankruptcy court. The debtor has very little to lose if it
adopts an incorrect position and prevails. Accordingly, it would appear that consider-
able weight should be given to a considered union view that rejection is not necessary.
This conclusion would not follow, however, if it appeared that the union was willing for
tactical reasons to sacrifice the particular employees involved and thus did not care
whether the debtor in fact was forced into liquidation. In such a rare case, the bank-
ruptcy court would be fully justified in permitting rejection. The conclusion would also
not apply to a union seeking only to forestall a liquidation by several months (or
perhaps years) in order to preserve short-term employment. If liquidation may be
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ated in bad faith prior to Chapter 11 proceedings, and is abusing the protections of
Chapter 11 to avoid the labor contract rat her than to reorganize, the petition to reject the
labor agreement should he denied.' The Eleventh Circuit found that all of these
avoided by rejection of the collective bargaining agreement, a union seeking to preserve
short-term employment benefits is not acting in the best interests of the employees.
Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 319.
"1 Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 900. The court of appeals suggested some practical criteria to
assess the motivation of the parties:
For example, did the employer seek concessions from the unions prior to its attempt to reject the
contract? If so, how cooperative was the union? The tone of past negotiations between the parties is
also relevant in evaluating their behavior. We stop short of requiring that the parties commence the
bargaining process prior to the granting of a motion to reject, but we leave it to the discretion of the
bankruptcy court to require such bargaining after considering the likelihood of success, the potential
length of the negotiations, and the impact of delay on the debtor-employer.
Id.
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits employer "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or by any terms or condition of employment ... discourage[ment of] membership in
any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958). Assessment of employer motive is always a key
factor in the resolution of section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice allegations. See NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965).
"2 Braila Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 901. "It has long been held that. such an abuse of the
bankruptcy and labor laws will not be tolerated under any circumstances. Therefore, regardless of
the outcome of the balancing of the equities, a bankruptcy court must make an 'explicit showing in
the record that the debtors were not improperly motivated by a desire to rid themselves of the union'
prior to allowing the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. See also Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d.
at 707; Intl Bhcl. of Teamsters v. Quick Charge, Inc., 168 F.2d 513, 515-516 (10th Cir. 1948); In re
Tinti Construction Co., 29 Bankr. 971, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (although court found no anti-union
animus by the employer, and even though business seemed sure to fail without contract rejection,
rejection was not allowed. While empathetic to the employer, court determined the chapter II case
improperly filed for the sole purpose of obtaining rejection of the labor contract, and not in order to
reorganize.); In re Braniff' Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 219 (N.D. Tex. 1982); In re St. Croix Hotel
Corp., 18 Bankr. 375 (D. V.I. 1982); hire Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D, N.Y.
1935); In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 207 (N.D. Ohio 1935) ("the
bankruptcy court may not be used as a temporary refuge from the consequences of labor trouble.").
Cf. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 115 L.R.R.M. 2364 (S.D. Tex. 1984). From 1978 airline
deregulation until filing for Chapter I1 reorganization on September 24, 1983, Continental lost
$521,900,000. Id. at 2365. The unions did not challenge these financial losses by the employer. Id. at
2366. The unions unsuccessfully argued that the airline's sole, or at least primary, purpose for the
Chapter 11 filing was to reject its labor contracts. Id. at 2367 -68. The bankruptcy court rejected the
unions' contentions. Id. The employer's financial losses were incontrovertible, and even if one of the
employer's intentions was to obtain rejection of the labor contracts, this motive alone was certainly
not tantamount to a "bad faith" filing. 115 L.R.R.M. at 2367. The bankruptcy court rejected the
unions' motions to dismiss Continental's Chapter I I petition. See Bordewieck and Countryman, supra
note 52, at 317 ("[T]he court should insure that the union is given a full opportunity to analyze the
arguments and financial data submitted by the debtor or relevant to the issue, so that the union will
be in a position to argue cogently that the modifications sought by the debtor are not in fact necessary
to a successful reorganization, if such an argument can be made. The court should also satisfy itself
that the debtor is not primarily motivated by a desire to eliminate the union.") Further, 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b) permits the bankruptcy court to dismiss any Chapter 11 case, if the petition had been filed in
had faith. See In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr, 549, 553-54 (D. Mass. 1980).
However, despite express employer motives to avoid unionization and contractual seniority
strictures, rather than to reduce wage rates, some courts nevertheless permit contract rejection.
Judicial admonition regarding the employer's anti-union animus as an improper basis for rejection
can be utterly meaningless. The S. Electronics Co. court found the debtor's financial straits partially
attributable to mismanagement. In re S. Electronics Co., 23 Bankr. 348, 362 (ED. Tenn. 1982).
Further, the employer was not concerned with wage rates; rather, the employer insisted improved
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equitable factors must be carefully weighed in each case. Given the appellate court's
elaboration of the Bildisco equity tests and the bankruptcy court's failure to articulate
reasons for authorizing rejection of the labor contracts, the case was remanded for
reconsideration.'="
The Sixth Circuit also subscribed to the more liberal Third Circuit standards for
production and ultimate survival could be insured only by mass discharges of "unproductive"
employees without employee recourse to contractual arbitration, concomitant layoff, mass recall
without regard to seniority, and, in the employer's own words, the total destruction of the Seniority
clause from the current contract . [M]y main desire is to operate in a union free environment."Id.
at 354.
The court expressly recognized these reprehensible employer tactics, not directly related to
economic modification of wage rates, as having "obvious potential for arbitrariness or capriciousness
on the part of an employer." Id, at 360.
Nevertheless, based on only ''meager" evidence of improved productivity, and no direct allega-
tions of onerous wages, the court authorized labor contract rejection. Id. The employer was not
obliged to arbitrate mass discharge grievances. The union was flexible; the employer remained
intransigent throughout. demanding abolition of contractual seniority and no arbitration of earlier
mass discharges of senior employees and recall of junior employees. The court summarized:
In its present precarious financial condition the debtor needs the most productive
workers it can employ and it simply cannot afford any additional expense. Resolution
of the grievances pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
would he burdensome absent an internal settlement, which simply is not going to occur
under these circumstances.
hi. at 361.
In August of 1982, Manville Corporation, despite a book net worth of approximately $1 billion,
filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Bulow, Jackson & Mnookin,
Winners and Losers in the Manville Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., Nov, 4, 1982, at 30, col. 12. Although
Manville, the world's largest asbestos manufacturing company, was "not broke in the usual sense",
Glaberson, The Bankruptcy Laws May be Stretching Too Far, Bus. WK., May 9, 1983, at 33, col. I, the
corporation is currently faced with 16,500 tort claims filed against it by victims of asbestos-related
diseases, and expects that between 30,000 and 130,000 persons will commence similar suits over the
next twenty years. Bulow, Winners and Losers, .supra. at 30, col. 12: see generally Note, The Insurance
Problem in Asbestosis Litigation: A Case for the Manifestation Theory, 57 Sr. JOHN'S 1.. Rev. 485, 510 n.153
(1983) (stressing need for a legislative response to problem of asebestosis victim compensation).
Manville has estimated that the present cost of satisfying all of the claims against it would be in excess
of $2 billion, leaving the company insolvent. Lewin, Business and the Law: Bankruptcy Courts' Scope,
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983, at col. 1; Bulow,supra, at col. 12. Manville's search for protection under the
federal bankruptcy laws, despite the corporation's present healthy cost position, has been met with
harsh criticism, with "[I]als:yerA representing asbestos victims call[ing] it a 'fraud' and a 'perversion' of
the bankruptcy laws." Id. Notably, however, members of the asbestos industry are not the only
solvent petitioners to have recently found their way into the bankruptcy courts, leading many
commentators to question whether the bankruptcy code's units are being pressed too far. See, e.g.,
Glaberson, .supra, at col. 1 (evaluating solvent companies use of bankruptcy laws as a "management
strategy"); Lewin, supra, at col. 1 (commenting on Wilson Corporation's $80 million credit agreement
with Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. announced less than a week after Wilson filed for reorganiza-
tion); Sorenson, Chapter II Filing by Wilson Foods Workers' Lives, Tests Law, Wall St. J., May 23, 1983, §
2, at 29, col. 10 (noting increasing frequency with which companies are using Chapter 11 "to solve
problems other than insolvency"); Wilson's Bock -Door Bid to Cut Labor Costs, Bus. WK., May 9, 1983, at
33, col. 1 (discussing Wilson Food Corp., "which still had net assets of $60 million, [and] is the latest
company to take the bankruptcy route to solve what is not strictly a financial problem).
233 Brada Miller Freight, 702 F.2d at 901 n.37. "We feel compelled to comment that the bank-
ruptcy court's disposition of this case was inadequate regardless of the applicable standard. The court
failed even to articulate that test on which it relied for the particular facts which supported its
ultimate conclusion. The important interests of unionized employees in the continuity of a collective
bargaining agreement may not be sacrificed in such a cursory manner." Id.
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labor contract rejection. In Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets , 254 the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that the proper test is whether rejection would be advantageous to the debtor. 255
• The union in Boi'man's, however, did not contest the plan filed by the employer, Allied
Supermarket0 56 The Sixth Circuit resolved an important question which had previously
been raised in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Joint Hotel Executive Board v. Hotel Circle . 257 In
both cases, the debtor was a member of a multi-employer bargaining association. The
Ninth Circuit left unresolved whether the interest of fellow employers in such a bar-
gaining unit should be considered. In Borman's, the Sixth Circuit expressly ruled that
the interests of fellow employer competitors within the multi-employer bargaining associ-
ation to which the debtor belonged should not be weighed in determining whether to
authorize rejection of the debtor's labor contract, According to the Borman's court,
competitors' interests were insubstantial and did not rise to the level of the interests of the
debtor and the union parties to the labor contract. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held
that another employer's interest in holding the debtor in possession to the terms of a labor
contract negotiated by a multi-employer bargaining unit need not be weighed when
passing upon applications to disaffirm executory labor contracts. 259
Allied Supermarkets, the employer in Borman's, had already obtained the prior
consent of both its affected unions and the creditors' committee to its proposed com-
prehensive business plan under Chapter 11. 259 Rejection of existing labor contracts and
subsequent renegotiation through collective bargaining was a principal element of that
reorganization plan. Significantly, the affected unions either affirmatively concurred with
Or raised no objection to the plan. 25° Borman's, a competing business and member of the
multi-employer bargaining association with Allied, intervened, however, in the bank-
ruptcy court's contract rejection proceeding. 261
 The bankruptcy court approved the
debtor's application to reject the collective agreement, and the district court affirmed. 262
On appeal by Borman's, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the labor contract rejection. The court
explained that Borman's was unable to cite a single case to support its argument that the
interests of a debtor's competitor in holding the debtor to the terms of the labor contract
negotiated by the multi-employer bargaining association are also to be weighed. 283 The
Sixth Circuit found that regardless of the impact on the multi-employer bargaining
'" 706 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1983).
n5 Id. at 189.
255 Id. at 190 n.8. Under the former Chapter X of the 1898 Act, the union, at the discretion of
the bankruptcy court, could participate in the formulation of the plan of reorganization. Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898): ch. 575 § 106, 52 Stat. 883 (amended 1938) (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)). Section 206 of the former Act provided that "the judge may, for cause
shown, permit a labor union or employees' association, representative of the employees of the
debtor, to he heard on the economic soundness of the plan affecting the interests of the employee."
See ch. 575 § 206, 52 Stat. 894 (as amended 1938) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)). See
Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 595-96 (1939) ("One of the most controversial
features of the effort to socialize reorganization proceedings was the attempt to confer upon labor
unions, employees' associations . . . a right to be heard on the economic soundness of any plan.")
The 1978 code lacks an express analog; however 11 U.S.C. § 1121 continues to provide for
creditor input.
257 613 F.2d 210, 219 (9th Cir. 1980).
2" Borman's, 7(16 F.2d 187.
239 Id. at 188.
26° Id.
26I Id.
262 Id,
2" Id. at 189.
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association, the business competitors are certainly not in a contractual employment
relationship.2" The competitors' interests in the debtor's labor contract rejection, in the
court's view, did not rise to a sufficient level to enter into the weighing of equities •
ealculus. 265
In summary, the circuit courts have manifested wide divergence of opinion regard-
ing the appropriate standards to be utilized in deciding whether to authorize labor
contract rejection in bankruptcy. In order to resolve this split, the United States Supreme
Court granted the Union's petition for certiorari in In re Bildisco. 266
 The next section of the
article analyzes the Supreme Court's opinion in that case.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in NLRB v. Bildisco247
On February 22, 1984, the Supreme Court dealt a devastating blow to labor policy by
affirming the Third Circuit's decision.'" The Court unanimously affirmed 269 the lower
court's core ruling,'" holding that the debtor in possession can secure bankruptcy court
approval of the petition to reject the collective bargaining agreement upon a showing that
the labor contract "burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance
in favor of rejecting the labor contract."'" The Court expressly rejected the strict REA
Express standard articulated by the Second Circuit, which required the debtor in posses-
sion to show that liquidation would inevitably occur absent court-authorized rejection. 272
Turning to the second issue, a majority of the court held that the debtor in possession
does not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally rejecting or modifying a collective
bargaining agreement prior to obtaining formal authorization for such action by the
bankruptcy court.'" This section will scrutinize each part of the opinion in detail, with
particular attention to the unanimous basic ruling regarding the appropriate standard for
rejection and the split decision regarding the ancillary unfair labor practice issue.
I. Unanimous Affirmance of the Third Circuit's Standard for Labor Contract
Reject ion 271
The Court began its opinion by expressly stating that collective bargaining agree-
ments covered by the NLRA were executory contracts within the meaning of section
365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code."'" In so ruling, the Court rejected the union's argument
that Congress intended to exempt labor contracts subject to the NLRA from the trustee's
26 ' Id. at 189 11.7.
265
 Id. at 189.
266 Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1188.
267 Id.
2" For thorough discussion of the lower history and facts of the case, see supra notes 198-221
and accompanying text.
2" Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion.
270 Parts I and II of the opinion were unanimous n the core rule.
"' Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1196.
272 Id.
2" Id, at 1197.
224 Id, at 1196. Although Parts 1 and 11 or the opiMon were unanimous, Justice Brennan filed au
opinion joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun dissenting to Part III of the majority
opinion. justice Rehnquist also delivered Part I I t of the opinion. The Chief Justice and justices
Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor, along with Justice Rehnquist, supported the opinion of the Court
throughout.
2" Id. at 1191.
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section 365(a) powers to reject. 276 After this preliminary determination, the Court turned
directly to a consideration of the critical issue: determination of the appropriate standard
by which the bankruptcy courts must judge the petition of the debtor in possession to
reject the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court agreed with the Board's contention that the standard for rejection must be
"stricter than the traditional 'business judgment' standard applied by the courts to au-
thorize rejection of the ordinary executory contract." 277
 Summarizing the positions of the
various circuits that considered the question, the Court concluded that "because of the
special nature of a collective bargaining contract, and the consequent 'law of the shop'
which it creates . . . a somewhat stricter standard should govern labor contracts."278
Despite this conclusion, the Court unequivocally rejected the position of both the Board
and the union that the Second Circuit's strict REA Express standard should prevail. The
Court reviewed the legislative history that referred to both Kevin Steel and REA Express in
the process of enacting the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. The Court concluded that these two
Second Circuit decisions set forth differing standards for rejection, and that the pertinent
legislative history did not indicate a preference for either standard. 279 At most, the Court
stated, the House report, supported "only an inference that Congress approved the use of
a somewhat higher standard than the business judgment rule." 28° Consequently, the
Court rejected the strict REA Express standard because of the strong possibility that it
would interfere with the reorganization process. 281 Instead, the Court adopted the stan-
dard of the Third Circuit in Bildisco and of the Eleventh Circuit in Brada Miller Freight2N2 as
the governing rule. 283 The Court explained that if the labor contract burdens the estate
and a careful balancing of the equities favors rejection, the petition for rejection will be
approved by the bankruptcy court. 284 The Court listed several equitable interests which
276 Specifically, the Court noted:
[N]one of the express limitations on the debtor in possession's general power under §
365(a) apply to collective-bargaining agreements. Section 1167, in turn, expressly
exempts collective-bargaining agreements subject. to the Railway Labor Act, but grants
no similar exemption to agreements subject to the NLRA. Obviously, Congress knew how to
draft an exclusion for collective-bargaining agreements when it wanted to; its failure to do so in
this instance indicates that Congress intended that § 365(a) apply to all collective-bargaining
agreements covered by the ,VLRA (emphasis added).
Id. at 1194-95.
277
 /d. at 1195.
2 " Id,
279 Id. at 1196. The Court stated:
Quite simply, Kevin Steel and REA Express reflect two different formulations of a
standard for rejecting collective-bargaining agreements. Congress cannot be presumed
to have adopted one standard over the other without some affirmative indication of
which it preferred. The reference in the House report to Kevin Steel and REA Express
also cannot be considered a congressional endorsement of the stricter standard im-
posed on rejection of collective bargaining agreements by the Second Circuit in REA
Express, since the report indicates no preference for either formulation.
Id.
2 ''9 Id.
"2 Id.
282
	 supra notes 222 -253 and accompanying text for discussion of the case.
48''
	 104 S.Ct. at 1196. See also supra note,284.
284
	 at 1197. ''The standard which we think Congress intended is a higher one than that of the
'business judgment' rule, but a lesser one than that embodied in the REA Express opinion." Id. at
1196.
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the bankruptcy court must consider, and required that its determination that rejection
was appropriate should be based upon a reasoned finding on the record."5
With the fatal blow delivered to labor policy, the Court paid pro forma attention to the
remaining shreds of the NLRA. The Court recommended, but did not mandate, that
voluntary negotiations toward labor contract modification be initiated prior to the bank-
ruptcy court action on the petition for rejection. 2" The Court did not, hoWever, require
the bankruptcy court to determine whether an impasse had been reached before it took
any action. 287
 The Court suggested merely that reasonable efforts be made to negotiate a
voluntary modification and that those efforts be shown as not likely to produce a prompt
and satisfactory solution of the conflic1. 2" Concluding the unanimous portion of the
opinion, the Court vested bankruptcy courts with broad, though not totally unrestrained,
discretion in order to carefully weigh and balance the pertinent equities, thereby affirm-
ing the Third Circuit's "burdensome to the estate" standard for labor contract rejection. 289
Turning to the question of the unfair labor practice charge, the majority ruled that
the debtor in possession can reject the labor contract before authorization by the bank-
ruptcy court.'-'N 0
 The Court's inquiry into the applicability of the successor employer and
new entity analogy to the debtor in possession was brief. The majority concluded that an
"exhaustive analysis" had "no profit,"291 explaining that for its purposes, "it was sensible to
view the debtor in possession as the same 'entity' which existed before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its
contracts and property in a manner it could not have done absent the bankruptcy
filing."2" All parties agreed that the bankruptcy court could ultimately approve rejection
of the labor contract, albeit by radically different proferred standards. The Board and the
Union, however, unsuccessfully contended that the debtor in possession violated section
8(d) and committed a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice by unilaterally effecting the
abrogation of the collective bargaining agreement without prior court authorization. The
majority refused to defer to the Board's position, believing that the Board's labor exper-
tise did not qualify it to discern congressional intent regarding the Bankruptcy Code. 2"a
Regarding the issue of unilateral labor contract abrogation by the debtor in possession,
the majority concluded that the Board could not enforce the contract terms of the
21b
	 at 1197.
2" Id. at 1200-01.
2 " Id. "Our rejection of the need for full compliance with § 8(d) procedures of necessity means
that any corresponding duty to bargain to impasse under § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) before seeking rejection
must also he subordinated to the exigencies of bankruptcy. Whether impasse has been reached
generally is a judgment call for the Board to make; imposing such a requirement as a condition
precedent to rejection of the labor contract will simply divert the Bankruptcy Court from its
customary area of expertise into a held in which it presumably has little or none" (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1200.
299 Id. at 1196.
2"" Id. at 1197. The Court ruled that:
[T]he Bankruptcy Court must focus on the ultimate goal of Chapter 11 when consider-
ing these equities. The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize free-wheeling considera-
tion of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the success of
the reorganization. The Bankruptcy Court's inquiry is of necessity speculative and it
must have great latitude to consider any type of evidence relevant to this issue.
Id.
2" Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1199.
29 ' Id. at 1197.
292 Id.
2" Id. at 1198 n.9.
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collective bargaining agreement by filing unfair labor practices against the debtor in
possession for violating section 8(d) of the NLRA. 294
Finally, in perhaps the most sweeping portion of Part 111, the majority concluded that
from the filing of a petition in bankruptcy until formal acceptance, "the collective-bar-
gaining agreement is not an enforceable contract within the meaning of § 8(d) . . . . "295
This conclusion, which has potential ramifications transcending the immediate context of
labor rejection in bankruptcy, was based on the majority's rationale that the contract was
rejected by operation of law, and not by any unilateral act of the employer. Under this
reasoning, the Court concluded that the section 8(d) strictures of the NLRA did not
apply. The Court stated that while the debtor in possession remains an employer within
the meaning of the NLRA and is therefore obligated to bargain collectively with the
employees' certified representative over the terms of a new contract pending rejection of
the existing contract or following formal approval of rejection by the bankruptcy court,
the debtor may unilaterally abrogate the collective bargaining agreement prior to formal
court approval of the petition for rejection. 295
2. The Dissent
Justice Brennan wrote an opinion which dissented in part, and was joined by three
other justices."' The dissent began by stating that the majority had failed to cite any
portion of the Bankruptcy Code that rendered section 8(d) of the NLRA inapplicable.
The dissent observed that the majority admitted that in the absence of such a section, the
debtor in possession was obligated to bargain with certified representatives. According to
the dissent, the majority's rationale for exempting the unilateral employer rejection from
unfair labor practice constraints was based on a series of attenuated inferences. 299 The
dissent asserted that by simplistically pedestalizing employer prerogatives, the majority
debilitated national labor policy. Next the dissent summarized the damage wrought by the
attenuated reasoning of the Court. The dissent argued for harmonious equilibrium
between labor and bankruptcy policy considerations stating:
•
There is an unavoidable conflict between the Code and the NLRA with which
the Court has simply failed to grapple. Permitting a debtor in possession
unilaterally to alter a collective-bargaining agreement in order to further the
goals of the Bankruptcy Code seriously undermines the goals of the NLRA.
We thus have the duty to decide the issue before us in a way that accommo-
dates the policies of both federal statutes. That cannot properly be done, in
the Court's fashion, by concentrating on the Bankruptcy Code alone; under
that approach, a holding that Section 8(d) is inapplicable once a bankruptcy
petition has been filed must obviously follow. One could as easily, and with as
little justification, focus on the policies and provisions of the NLRA alone and
conclude that Congress must have intended that § 8(d) remain applicable.
Rather, it is necessary to examine the policies and provisions of both statutes
to answer the question presented to the Court.'"
29' Id. at 1200.
295 Id.
295 Id. at 1201.
297 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part.
Id. at 1201-11.
299 See id. at 1203 (Brennan, J„ dissenting).
299 Id. at 1204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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After balancing the respective statutory provisions and policy considerations, the
dissent "inexorably" concluded that Congress never intended the filing of a bankruptcy
petition to affect the applicability of section 8(d). Consequently, in the dissent's view, a
debtor in possession commits an unfair labor practice when he unilaterally alters the
terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement after a bankruptcy petition has been
filed but prior to rejection of that agreement.' The dissent stated that the Court's ruling
that section 8(d) did not apply was simply erroneous and inconsistent with both NLRA
policies and prior case law interpreting section 8(d). 30 '
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's unsupportable conclusion that a labor
contract ceases to be enforceable within the meaning of section 8(d) upon the filing of the
petition for rejection." 2 According to the dissent., the Court's error stemmed in part from
its imprecise terminology. The pertinent NLRA provision referred only to the contract
being "in effect;" the dissent noted that there was no reference to whether the contract
was "enforceable." The dissent then presented a number of situations in which the
collective bargaining agreement should remain "in effect" 103
 between time filing of the
petition for rejection and formal court authorization." The dissent further observed that
if section 8(d) is preemptorily swept aside, the parties would he deprived of the "cooling
off" statutory time period in which they might otherwise agree to voluntary contract
modification and thus preserve labor management peace."'" Consequently, the dissent
concluded that Congress clearly "intended that § 8(d) remain applicable after a bank-
ruptcy petition has been filed."""
RATIONALE or NLRB v. Bildisco
Once the Court adopted the Third Circuit's "burdensome" standard for labor con-
tract rejection, and rebuffed the REA Express test of the Second Circuit, labor policy was
gravely wounded. Correspondingly, bankruptcy law considerations were unnecessarily
a" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'01 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[The Court's position that § 8(d) is inapplicable once a
bankruptcy petition has been filed is contrary to the goals of the NLRA, and a careful examination of
the words Congress has chosen reveals that they do not clearly compel this result."
Id. at 1205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1206 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3°3 Id. at 1207 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "It is noteworthy that courts considering bank-
ruptcy cases often refer to executory contracts as remaining 'in effect unless or until they are
rejected." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
701 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,ma
	at 1208 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The notice and cooling-off requirements of § 8(d),
which are components of the duty to bargain, are specifically designed to prevent labor strife
resulting from unilateral modifications and terminations of collective bargaining agreements." Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
a" Id. at 1208-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As the Court correctly points out, the primary goal or Chapter 11 is to enable a debtor
to restructure his business so as to be able to continue operating. Unquestionably, the
option to reject an executory contract is essential to this goal. But the option to violate a
collective -bargaining agreement before it is rejected is scarcely vital to insuring success-
ful reorganization. For if a contract is an burdensome that even temporary adherence
will seriously jeopardize the reorganization, the debtor in possession may seek the
Bankruptcy Court's permission to reject that contract. Under the test announced by the
Court today, his request should be granted.
Id. at 1209 (Brennan, J., dissenting)•
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and unwisely given priority. This judicial sanctification of bankruptcy considerations at
the unwarranted expense of labor policy is especially anomalous in light of the constitu-
tionally imperiled status of the bankruptcy courts. The Court's suggestion of voluntary
bargaining toward contract modification prior to bankruptcy court action on the petition
for contract rejection is not the equivalent of judicially mandated prior bargaining. Even
this "suggestion" was substantially compromised by the Court's decision to free the
bankruptcy court from having to determine whether the parties bargained in good faith
prior to reaching their impasse. The Bildisco decision, therefore, makes it clear that
neither prior bargaining nor prior bargaining to impasse is required.
Furthermore, despite its disclaimer to the contrary, the Court granted the bank-
ruptcy courts virtually unlimited discretion to scrutinize, and thus to manipulate, the
equities involved in considering whether to allow the rejection of a collective agreement.
In the past, the bankruptcy courts, at best, have consistently manifested indifference, if'
not open animosity, towards the interests of labor. In particular, these courts have often
demonstrated overt ownership biases. The Supreme Court, by leaving the decision to
reject entirely up to the bankruptcy court's discretion, has now virtually canonized
ownership interests. The unavoidable result of the Court's opinion is that the interests of
the private ownership elites have theoretically and pragmatically been elevated over both
national labor policies and the interests of labor. 307
 Bankruptcy courts can now openly
3" NLRB v. Bildisco is a classic, contemporary case of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority to private entrepreneurial interests, subject only to ill-defined, after-the-fact review by the
bankruptcy court. Neither the Court nor the NLRB nor the union nor their amici perceived this
fundamental core problem. In the 1935 term, the Court definitively struck down the National
Industrial Recovery Act for a similar unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to private
business interests. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935): A.LA. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
As the Court rhetorically posited in Schecter:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative author-
ity to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws
they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade
or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative
bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the
problems of their enterprises? . . . The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of
legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitu-
tional prerogatives and duties of Congress.
Schecter, 295 U.S. at 537.
The Court expanded on these sound principles in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311
(1936): "In the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the
business of another, and especially of a competitor." Yet this was exactly the situation endorsed by
the Court in Bildisco. Private employers are now given judicial carte blanche to abrogate their labor
contracts, free of any enabling statute, and subject only to subsequent pro fOrma review by a
constitutionally imperiled bankruptcy court.
Justice Douglas offered perhaps the most eloquent observations on the pernicious nature of the
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. His thoughts are eerily prescient of the Bildisco
scenario.
There are those who still say that N1RA was FDR's fling with socialism, but it had no
resemblance to any school of socialist thought. N1RA was an attempt to grant to
industry the power to set production quotas and prices. It was a grant of monopolistic
power to private industry, placing the making of rules governing business in the hands
of business itself.
As [Justice] Black had said, this Act thus placed lawmaking in the hands of private
industry . . . New Dealers who blessed this monstrosity cannot be excused. They
certainly knew better. And it is difficult, even after long reflection, to grasp the
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obviate their entrepreneurial prejudices at the expense of labor. The most realistic,
though admittedly wholly bleak, prognosis for the implementation of the Court's reason-
ing in Bildisco is that labor and employee equities will routinely and consistently be
subordinated to the ownership interests in all but the most egregious cases of systemic
abuse by the debtor in 'possession. This result will be readily effected through judicial
mentality . . . in conceiving an industrial system under which the biggest, the most
powerful units in business laid down the rules of price and competition for the group.
The result would obviously be a vicious form of cartel, in which a few companies would
determine the destinies of the smaller entrepreneurs.
The project was declared unconstitutional by a unanimous Court in 1935 .... Any
Supreme Court that ever sat would have so ruled, because lawmaking under the
Constitution is a matter For Congress, not for private parties. That proposal of FDR's
would have made a structural change in capitalism that would have strengthened the
Establishment and taken us a long way down the road to the corporate state.
DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 347 (1974).
As Dean Ely points out in his elegant book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, the nondelegation
doctrine has suffered an unwarranted "death by association" with the substantive due process
doctrine. Although it has been widely regarded as an arcane, dusty remnant of constitutional history,
this is a cavalier view. Bildisco posits the perfect situation for revitalization of a refined contemporary
nondelegation doctrine, to insure appropriate and adequate legislation to structure the actions of the
private ownership elites in labor contract abrogation.
Most recent commentary on nondelegation has been in the administrative law context. Recent
criticism of the administrative process, the "fourth branch of Government," Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting), has been widespread. See BARBER,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 2-4 (1975); Wright, Beyond
Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 579 (1972): Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type
Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972);
Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher -Kings: The Republic, The Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72
NW. U. I-. REV. 443, 456-59 (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 H ARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1681-88 (1975).
Some commentary, however, has focused primarily on the nondelegation issue per se. See, e.g., I
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUSTICE § 3-13, at 198 (2d ed. 1978); 1 B. ME.ziNes, J. STEIN & GRUFF,
ADMI NISTRATIVE  LA W § 3.03 [1], at 3-72 (1983); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 n.16 (1982); Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 713 (1969); Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 307
(1976); Stewart, .cupra at 1694. The factors underlying the arguments disfavoring the doctrine have
been termed "overwhelming," I K. DAVIS, supra, § 3 - 13, at 198. Indeed, the majority of commen-
tators regard the doctrine to he a dead letter, G. ROBINSON, E. CELL HORN & H. BRUIT, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 59 (2d ed. 1980); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra, at 5; Freedman,
supra, at 308; See Note, Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. Rev. 257. 258 (1982). "The
nondelegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. It has not prevented the delegation of legislative
power, nor has it accomplished its later purpose of assuring that delegated power will be guided by
meaningful standards. More importantly, it has failed to provide needed protection against unneces-
sary and uncontrolled discretionary power. The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that the
nondelegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to protect against arbitrary
administrative power." DAVIS, supra, at 713.
However, despite the unforeseeability of a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, Aranson,
Gellhorn & Robinson, supra, at 17, several commentators have recently urged that the doctrine be
resurrected. T. LOWE, THE END OF LIBERALISM 297-98 (1969); G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H.
BRUFT, supra, at 72 ("there may be life in the delegation doctrine yet"); McGowan, Congress, Court, and
Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1130 (1977), Wright, supra, at 582-84. "[T]he
delegation doctrine remains an important potential as a check on the exercise of unbounded,
standardiess discretion by administrative agencies." Wright, supra at 583. Judge Wright asserts that
although "Congress should control discretion by reassuming its rightful role as the architect of
fundamental administrative policy," id. at 581, the primary burden must be borne by the courts,
which must formulate rules limiting discretion and ''reestablish the doctrines which were designed to
May 1984]	 BI HMSO')	 595
manipulation of the congeries of equities. It is likely that some courts will conclude
simplistically that a job at a lower wage is better than no job, anti, thereby deem employee
and labor interests to have been carefully coiisidered. With the core issue of the appropri-
ate standard for contract rejection unanimously resolved in favor of the employer. the
remainder of the HiNisco opinion is dictated by resolution of the appropriate standard
issue. An examination of both the majority and the four-member dissent regarding the
unfair practice issue, however, offers some suggestion that the judicial juggernaut is not
uncompromisingly aligned against labor. Although the employer also prevailed on the
unfair labor practice issue, the dissent offers sonic vestige of faint hope for future judicial.
or, perhaps more likely, legislative rectification of the grotesque imbalance Bildisco has
surely wrought in labor-management relations.
The Court's endorsement of precipitous unilateral contract rejection is fraught wit h
hazards. The debtor in possession may hastily abrogate a labor contract that he would
otherwise, after deliberation and good faith negotiations with the union, wish to preserve.
Preemptory rejection at the outset divests the debtor in possession of the wiser option of
pursuing negotiations. In many instances, it. is likely that. employers will immediately
abrogate, and only later regret, such hasty, ill-advised conduct. The recent history of
significant union concessions upon good faith bargaining toward contract modification
demonstrates the wisdom of refraining From immediate unilateral rejection.'"
The prudent employer will avoid precipitous action, even though the Court has
removed unfair labor practice constraints from immediate unilateral labor contract rejec-
tion prior to the authorization of the petition for rejection by the bankruptcy court. One
major reason for this restraint is that the union is likely to remain as the employee's
representative after reorganization. As a result, the reorganized employer will have to
continue to bargain with the union. Post-reorganization labor relations will be sig-
nificantly enhanced or severely impeded by the employer's prior actions toward the union
during the reorganization. If the employer first pursues good faith negotiations toward
modification rather than invoking immediate contract rejection under the Bildisco deci-
sion, post-reorganization labor relations are likely to be expeditious and relatively har-
monious. In contrast, Draconian contract abrogation by the debtor in possession is sure to
engender some, and perhaps permanent, bitterness and, therefore, poison the labor
compel or encourage other branches of government to assume their parts of the task, - Id. at 581 - 82;
accord C. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra, at 60.
The unconstitutional delegation issue, especially in the context of Bildisco, essentially centers on
the problem of unrestrained law-making by private parties. See, e.g., the classic articles by Professor
Jaffe, An Essay On Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Comm+. L. REV. 561 (1947); Law Making by Private
Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937); see also Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American
Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L. REV. 650 (1975).
For a succinct overview of the nondelegation issue, see TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
5-17 (1978).
Of course, the classic recent thinking on the appropriateness of a refined contemporary non-
delegation doctrine is ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTuusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-134
(1980).
3" [B]ecause unions have a strong incentive to avoid rejection of contracts, they
frequently may be willing to enter into negotiated settlements for the interim period
that will at least forestall rejection. Consequently, in many cases, requiring the debtor in
possession to adhere to the terms of an existing agreement will not lead to early
rejection at all. In sum, because the debtor in possession may apply to the bankruptcy
court for rejection of executory contracts, holding 8(d) applicable to the reorganiza-
tion period will not seriously undermine the chances for a successful reorganization.
Id. at 1210 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
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relations climate which will exist after reorganization. Surprisingly, in Bildisco, the Su-
preme Court failed to address one especially immediate and obvious difficulty stemming
from precipitous unilateral abrogation. Specifically, even if the debtor in possession relies
on Bildisco and abrogates the labor contract immediately upon filing the petition for
rejection, under the Court's opinion this action by the debtor in possession does not
automatically guarantee subsequent court authorization of the petition. After a careful
weighing of the equities, the bankruptcy court. may still conclude that the labor contract
was not sufficiently onerous and burdensome to reorganization and therefore should
presumably not have been rejected. Such a conclusion, however, would probably not
cause the earlier rejection to he an unfair labor practice. The Court's failure to answer this
question in Bildisco is certain to invite future litigation. This uncertainty is yet another
reason militating against precipitous unilateral labor contract abrogation by the employer.
It will be an unfair labor practice, subjecting the employer debtor to retroactive liability, if
the bankruptcy court later fails to approve the contract abrogation.
The major significance of the Court's decision in Bildisco is that it suggests a possible
return to atavistic, pre-Act labor relations. Admittedly, it is unlikely that the decision will
open the bankruptcy floodgates in so far as most major multinational corporations are
concerned. An otherwise solvent and viable employer of any size is unlikely to enter the
rigors of total reorganization merely to escape an unpalatable labor contract. Many
marginal employers, however, unable or unwilling to engage in adequate strategic finan-
cial future planning, and without perceptive labor counsel, may mistakenly read Bildisco
as a carte blanche for labor contract avoidance.
One way in winch labor can partially counter the Bildisco employer prerogatives is by
demanding one year contracts. This system will, of course, significantly increase employer
labor relations costs. Unions would be foolhardy to agree to labor contracts of two or
three years, as is now the norm, with any but the most solvent, large corporations.
Knowing that the employer may file for reorganization and reject the normal three year
contract in less than mid-term with almost two years of previously negotiated provisions
suddenly abolished, labor will surely insist on one-year agreements. One-year contracts,
however, will make labor relations fitful and disjointed and will militate against continuity
and stability.
More ominously, unthinking employer invocation of Bildisco would allow manage-
ment to return to the bleak Hobbesian pre-NLRA "war of all against all." Significantly
increased strike activity and labor violence may well ensue. As the dissent pessimistically,
but realistically, concluded: "Holding Section 8(d) inapplicable ... strikes at the very heart
of the policies underlying that section and the NLRA, and will . . . spawn precisely the
type of industrial strife that NLRA Section 8(d) was designed to avoid." 3"
In view of the fact that it is unlikely that Bildisco will be overruled by the Court in the
foreseeable future, responsible congressional action to legislatively overrule the decision
is the only immediate viable recourse. The prospect for the ultimate success of any such
legislative initiatives, however, is not good. 31 ° Bildisco is cut from the same cloth as several
other recent Supreme Court decisions endorsing unchecked ownership prerogatives. 3 "
309 Id. at 1211 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310 See supra note 48 For an exploration of this recent legislation.
'" Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); NLRB v. MacKay Radio
and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); see also Mare, judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Ad and the
Origin of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937 - 1991, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); ATLESON, VALUES AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983): Gregory, Book Review, 62 TEx. L. REV. 389 (1983).
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The most egregious example of these decisions is First National Maintenance v. NLRB.'
The article will now turn to an analysis of the theoretical foundations for these decisions,
which are so wholly opposed to the established national labor.
 .policies.
IV. Bildisco: THE INELUCTABLE REsuur or First National Maintenance
The Supreme Court's endorsement of the Third Circuit's radical liberalization of the
Second Circuit's REA strict standards for labor contract rejection was dictated by the
Court's controversial decision in 1981 in First National Maintenance v. NLRB.3" Although
FNM has been the most significant judicial endorsement of unencumbered entrepreneu-
rial prerogatives in business operation, the decision was the predictable culmination of a
line of Supreme Court opinions that had incrementally broadened the scope of manager-
ial power.314
 In the landmark decision Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 315 for
example, Justice Stewart stated in a powerful, influential concurrence that Inlothing the
Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively
regarding such managerial decisions, which lies at the core of entrepreneurial control." 3 ' 6
In FNM, the Court utilized this influential Fibreboard language to exempt the employer's
decision whether to terminate one line of its business operation from the prior duty to
bargain.317
FNM provided custodial housekeeping, maintenance and janitorial services to com-
mercial customers throughout the New York City metropolitan area. Each customer
receiving the service paid FNM a fixed fee plus labor costs. FNM maintained separate
personnel to perform the contracted services for each separate customer, rather than
transferring personnel among its separate contracted operations.'"
One of FNM's custodial contracts was with the Greenpai-k Nursing Home. On
November 1, 1976, Greenpark reduced the weekly fee it paid to FNM for custodial
services from $500 to $250. On _June 30, 1977, after months of dissatisfaction, FNM
formally notified Greenpark that FNM would terminate services if Greenpark did not
reinstitute the former weekly payments of $500. When Greenpark did not meet FNM's
terms, FNM terminated custodial services for Greenpark ort August 1, 1977.319 At the
same time, FNM also terminated all of its employees who had performed services under
the FNM contract with Greenpark. None of the employees were transferred into other
FNM operations. The company closed this line of its operation without consulting the
employees' union, with which it had signed a collective bargaining agreement.
3" 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
313
3 ' 4 See supra note 31 1.
315
 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In Fibreboard, the Supreme Court held that the employer's subcontract-
ing decision was a section 8(d) mandatory subject of bargaining under the facts of that case. Id. at
213. The work would continue to be performed in virtually identical fashion and under the same
conditions as previously, since the only real, but crucial, difference was that the employees were to be
replaced by the personnel of the subcontractor. Id. Under those facts, requiring the employer to
bargain over the subcontracting decision would not unduly impede the employer's ability to manage
the business. Id. The subcontracting decision did not impact fundamentally upon the employer's
basic business operation or financial resources. Id. at 213-214.
3 ' 4
 Id. at 223.
3'7
	 infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
3 " 452 U.S. at 668.
319
 Id. at 668-69.
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Reversing both the Board"° and the Second Circuit," the Supreme Court held that
the employer could terminate one line of its business operation without having reached
any compromise agreement with the union. The Court explained that only the impact of
the decision was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In so holding, the Court articulated a
balancing test between the employer's interest"' in expeditiously closing its unprofitable
operations and the union's interest 32" in bargaining over that core decision: "Uhl view of
an employer's need for unencumbered decision making, bargaining over management
decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment
should be required only if' the benefit, fur labor-management relations and the collective
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of business.'' " 1
Given the Court's approach, it was inevitable that the union would lose its challenge.
Significantly, the Court stated than Thulanagement must be free from the constraints of
the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business." 325
The employer's economic decision to close operations partially was, therefore, freed from
the duty to bargain. The Court, in effect, articulated a virtual per se rule for management.:
[W]e conclude that the harm likely to be clone to an employer's need to
operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for
economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might he gained
through the union's participation in the decision, and we hold the decision
itself is not part of Section 801s "terms and conditions. . . ." 326
The Court relegated the union's interests to the purportedly sufficient protections
afforded through post-decision effects bargaining "in a meaningful manner and at a
meaningful time. -" 7
 In endorsing the employer's unilateral action as exempt front any
prior bat -gaining obligation, the Court emphasized that the employer's motivation was
purely economic; there was no antiunion initims. 3" By exempting the employer's eco-
nomically motivated. core business decision to partially close from its duty to bargain,
I"NM radically expanded the unilateral prerogatives of the employer. 3 z 9 It should be
3" First ,Vational Maintenance Corp., 242 N.1...R.R. 462 (1979).
at 627 F.241 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
"2 ' The court summarized the purportedly compelling reasons for allowing the employer to
decide to partially close business operations for economic reasons without imposing a mandatory
duty to bargain regarding that decision:
[The company] may face significant tax t»r securities consequences that hinge on
confidentiality of a plant closing, or a reorganization of the corporate structure. The
publicity incident in the normal process of bargaining may injure the possibility of a
successful transition or increase the economic damage to the business.
452 U.S. at 683 (1981).
" 3
 The Court acknowledged the employees' "legitimate concern over job security." Id. at 682.
Further, although the court recognized that unions may work with the employer and develop viable
alternatives to closing lite operation, this factor was quickly discounted. The Court emphasized what
it Feared as the greater likelihood of union obstructionist and dilatory tactics if the employer's
economic decision to effect partial closing of operations was made a subject of prior mandatory
bargaining. Id. at 68]. "The union's practical purpose in participating ... will be ... to delay or halt
the closing." Id.
3"
 Id. at 679.
3" Id. at 678-79.
326 Id. at 682-83•
327 hi. at 682.
"'" FrsIrsi "had no intention to replace the discharged employees or move operations elsewhere."
Id. at 657.
' 29 Id. at 687-88.
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recognized that. at the time of the Court's decision, the nation was affected with severe
economic recession. This unfavorable business climate, when combined with the FNM
decision, ushered in a virtually unprecedented wave of threatened and actual plant
closings, bankruptcies and reorganizations, and pervasive "concessions" bargaining. 330
The Court's decision in FNM has been severely criticized as distorting the theoretical
equilibrium in relative bargaining power that ideally should 1}e maintained between labor
and management. One commentator, for example, pointedly summarized the dire conse-
quences of the FARM decision upon labor, arguing that unions had been deprived of viable
alternatives, other than judicially sanctioned acquiescence to employer prerogatives.
According to the author:
Unions . . . are left without effective economic weapons with which to force
employers to recognize employee interests, since strikes by non-employees
cannot haunt the employer. .
The /WM decision, by allowing employers more leeway in making busi-
ness decisions, greatly reduces the bargaining power of unions. The FIVAI
decision thus thwarts Congress' purpose of balancing bargaining power, and
complicates application of the employer's section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain over
terms and conditions of employment."'
With the entrepreneurial decision to terminate operations partially freed from the
duty to bargain, the employer was only required to bargain regarding the post-decision
impact, or effect, of the economic decision. While impact bargaining addresses severance,
pensions, seniority and reemployment rights at other facilities, and thus can be sig-
nificant, it does not fundamentally alter the original employer decision to cease opera-
tions. 332 Employees, who have often put their entire adult lives and working careers into
3" For recent examples of significant union concessions, see Lone Star-Steelworkers Wage Conces-
sion Contract, 114 LAB. REL. REP. 41 (BNA) (Sept. 19, 1983) (members of the United Steelworkers
Union accept "one of the steepest pay cuts negotiated in the current round of contract concessions —
an across-the-board reduction of $2.80 per hour"): Concessionsfor Meatpackers, 113 LAB. REL. REP. 188
(BNA) (July 4, 1983) (members of United Food and Commercial Workers vote to accept concessions
significantly reducing wages and benefits after employer filed Ibr bankruptcy); Contract Approvals in
Airline Industry, 112 LAB. REL. REP. 202 (BNA) (March 14, 1983) (concessions agreed to by transport
workers union include elimination of paid meal periods, "increased deductibles under a comprehen-
sive medical insurance plan and slower procession schedules to top rates for new hires"); Wage,
Benefit Cuts For Steel Employees, 112 LAB. REL. REP. 22 (BNA) (Jan. 10, 1983) (steelworkers approve
new contract cutting wages, benefits, vacations and holidays): Holusha, Unions May Wait to Make Up
for Lost Time, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983 at E5, col, 1; Serrin, How Deregulation Allowed Greyhound to
Win Concessions From Strikers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1983 at A22, col. 1: Williams, Wilson Food Fights
Back, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1983 at L31, col. 1 (the corporation originally sought wage reductions from
$10.69 to 6.50 an hour, in its bankruptcy petitions filed in April, 1983. This precipitated strikes by
5,000 employees at seven plants. However, the last. of the striking unions has agreed to a wage
reduction to $8 per hour, plus similar reductions in fringe benefits).
33 ' Note, First National Maintenance Corp, v. NLRB: The Supreme Court Narrows Employers'
Section 8(a)(5) Duty to Bargain, 39 WAsii. AND LEE L. REV. 285, 302 (1982): see also Note, Scope of
Mandatory Bargaining Under the NLRA —The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HAHN'. L. REv. 329. 335
(1981) ("The exclusion of subjects of bargaining from the mandate of section 8(d) ... precludes the
parties from freely allocating their finite bargaining power to protect the interests they deem most
vital. The Court's interest balancing therefore skews the actual terms likely to he incorporated in
collective agreements on the basis of a judicial appraisal of the parties' gains and losses.").
332 One commentator, however, eloquently argued that FNM will nut have such apocalyptic
results. Kohler, Distinctions Without Dyferences: Effects Bargaining In Light of First National Mainte-
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the enterprise, therefore, are deprived of any meaningful control over their basic em-
ployment destinies. Jobs can he eliminated and employees lives intrinsically and perhaps
irreparably debilitated by the employer's bargaining-exempt economic decision. Conse-
quently, FNM engendered a grievous distortion in the labor-management equilibrium.a 33
This analysis presumes, of course, that there indeed originally was actual parity in the
labor-management equation. 334
'lance, 5 IND. REL. L.J. 402, 421 (1983). He posited that effects bargaining is a viable and forceful
union tool, and may often positively influence the economic partial closing decision. Id.
Pragmatically, there may be little if any difference between decision and effects bargaining to an
astute, sophisticated union negotiator. He summarized:
The goal of decision and effects bargaining are essentially identical: to afford the
affected employees' bargaining representative notice sufficiently in advance of the
implementation of' an operational change to permit the union the opportunity, through
bargaining, to preserve jobs and otherwise protect the interests of employees. Further,
their mechanical features are alike. Within their respective spheres, the scope of
bargaining is equally broad, and in both, the union has the right to secure information
under the employer's control which the union needs in order to bargain intelligently.
Finally, and most critically, the duties attach at virtually the same time, i.e., sufficiently
in advance of the implementation of a change as to permit the union a "meaningful
opportunity" to bargain, In the final analysis, the differences between the two duties
seem more of degree than kind. The emphasis in decision bargaining is on an explora-
tion of alternatives which the employer may find attractive enough to forego the
contemplated change. In effects bargaining, the focus is on ways to ameliorate the
impact of the change's execution, particularly through discussions concerning oppor-
tunities for continued employment for affected workers at the employer's other
facilities. The duties then, are actually variations of a theme.
Id.
333 FNM has, however, also received favorable commentary. See, e.g., Harper, Leveling The Road
from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV,
1447, 1450 (1982) ("The FNM decision can be reconciled on its facts with a limited and economically
meaningful principle that only minimally restricts the scope of mandatory bargaining. This decision
would exclude from compulsory bargaining all decisions that determine what products are created and sold,
in what quantities, for which markets, and at what prices. This principle, moreover, need be the only
substantive limitation on legal mandatory bargaining topics." (emphasis in original)); Kohler, supra
note 332, at 422. Note, First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB: No Duty to Bargain Over
Economically Motivated Partial Closing Decision, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 1099, 1126 (1981); Comment, job
Security, Managerial Prerogative, and First National Maintenance, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 509, 512 (1982)
(" . . . mandatory decision -bargaining should become the rare exception, not a process required
whenever management contemplates a decision which adversely affects unit employment. Since free
enterprise is the traditional foundation of our economic system, the high regard for managerial
freedom expressed in First National Maintenance is appropriate in the absence of congressional
guidance."); Note, Labor Law — An Employer's Decision To Terminate Partially A Business Opera-
tion is Not A Mandatory Subject of Bargaining, 56 TuiANE L. Rix. 1065, 1082 (1982).
For other general discussions of FNM, see generally, Fenton, Partial Closing After First National
Maintenance: Legal Refusals to Bargain Collectively, 1981 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 865; Note, Collective Bargaining
Over Plant Relocation Decisions: Let's Make A Deal, 18 NEW ENG. 1.. Rev. 715 (1983); Note, Labor Law:
Narrowing the Scope of the Employer's Duty to Bargain Over Job Termination Decisions — First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 513 (1982); Note, Partial
Closing Of Business 15 Not Mandatory Subject Of Bargaining Under The NLRA: First National Mainte-
nance v. NLRB, 14 U. CONN. L. REV. 435 (1982).
s' Critical legal scholars maintain that any pretense of labor/management parity is a transpa-
rent, cruel sham perpetrated by the ownership interests to dominate labor. These writers have begun
in articulate a new labor jurisprudence, and have largely rejected any hollow maintenance of the
facade of labor management parity, Professor Klare has summarized the principal tenets of' critical
labor jurisprudence:
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The Court in FATM made it clear that it was not deciding whether other management
decisions, "such as plant relocation, sales, and other kinds of subcontracting automation"
were subject to the section 8(d) duty to bargain.'" Asa result, the NLRB's General
Counsel 3"6 and some subsequent decisions337 have narrowly construed FNM, limiting it to
Despite sharp differences on other matters, two common themes run throughout
critical labor jurisprudence. First, we argue that collective bargaining law articulates an
ideology that aims to legitimate and justify unnecessary and destructive hierarchy and
domination in the workplace. The second theme is that collective bargaining law has
evolved an institutional architecture, a set of managerial and legal arrangements, that
reinforces this hierarchy and domination. Viewed as a component of public policy, the
two central goals of the collective bargaining laws are to integrate the labor movement
into the mainstream contours of pressure-group politics and to institutionalize, regulate
and thereby dampen industrial conflict. Viewed as a component of managerial practice,
the collective bargaining laws seek to formalize industrial dispute-resolution and
thereby to reinforce management control over enterprise goals and the direction of the
work process. in fulfilling its public policy and managerial functions, collective bargain-
ing law frequently aims to restrain labor unions from serving as vigorous. uninhibited
representatives of employee interests. Rather it seeks to place the union in the uncom-
fortable position of serving as fiduciaries of an imagined societal interest in industrial
peace and of serving specific managerial and disciplinary functions. 1 believe that a
primary initial achievement of the critical labor jurisprudence is its demonstration that
the doctrine of collective bargaining law has beers systematically fashioned, particularly
at the Supreme Court level, to serve these goals.
Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law. 4 I ND. REL. L.J.
450, 452-453 (1981). See also ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW ( 1983);
K LARE, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law in Tim POI./ TICS OF LAW (D. Kairys, ed. 1982); Lynd,
Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1979); Stone, The
Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
335 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
33° NLRB Gen. Coon. Mem. 81-57 (July 14, 1981) and 81-38 (Nov. 30, 1981). "In order to assess
the impact of First National on pending and future cases ... Regional Offices are requested to submit
information concerning cases that involve the issue of whether an employer has a duty to bargain
over the following decisions if such decisions arguably have an impact on terms and conditions of
employment; plant relocation, sub-contracting, automation, consolidation, sale of business and
partial closure Of business. Wt is recognized that under current Board law, the general rule is that
such decisions are subject to mandatory bargaining .... However, there is language in the Court's
opinion which !nay alter the scope of the region's investigation and any litigation which may follow."
Office of the NLRB General Counsel, Memorandum Regarding First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, I, 1-2 (1981).
337 See Bob's Big Boa Family Restaurants, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982) (The employer decision to
terminate its shrimp processing operation was regarded as only one component of the total business
of food preparation for the employer's restaurants. The shrimp processing work was not a distinct
line of business. Therefore, the employer's decision was seen as one of subcontracting out work and
thus subject to the duty to bargain rather than as a decision bargaining-exempt FNM partial closing.);
Ford Brothers, Inc. 263 N.L.R.B. 92 (1982) (Employer's anti-union animus tainted the management
decision to transfer truck driving duties from its Ohio to its West Virginia facility, and strengthened
the employer's obligation to bargain over the non-FNM exempt relocation decision.); Carbonex Coal
Company, 262 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1982) (The employer closed down part of its mining operation in an
existing mine, and opened a new mine. The Board distinguished this situation from FNM, holding
that the employer had merely moved, rather than closed, its operation. Thus, the decision was still
subject to the duty to bargain); Tocco Division of Park Ohio Industries, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 413 (1981) ("an
employer has an obligation to bargain concerning a decision to relocate unit work.").
All of these prior Board decisions, however, have been substantially compromised by the
NLRB's most recent decision in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 87
(Jan. 23, 1984) (reversing 265 N.L.R.B. 28 (1982)). Reversing its 1982 decision, and now falling
squarely within the FNM rationale of virtually untrammeled employer prerogatives, the Board has
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economic closing decisions. just as one commentator has posited that there is little
practical difference to the sophisticated union negotiator between decision and effects
bargaining, 338
 however, it is at least equally true that the sophisticated employer will often
be subtly able to subsume other management action under the rubric of the TN M
exemption for economic closings front decision bargaining.
Ry exempting the very decision to go out of business from prior bargaining, labor
was improperly subordinated to entrepreneurial interests. Multinational corporations are
actively positioned to capitalize on opportunities in world markets. For economic reasons,
the corporations can decide to transfer operations outside the United States with relative
ease. Labor, however, has no similar, viable tnultinational capability. Unlike the corpora-
tions, the unions are necessarily constrained by the more parochial and immediate
concerns of their constituencies. Even large international unions cannot begin to match
the financial power of" he multinational corporations. Unions properly owe their primary
allegiance to their constituent membership.
In the contemporary period of increasing corporate merger and takeover activity
and international markets and operations expansions, it is increasingly difficult to ascer-
tain the precise nature of the corporation. Whether it is a discreet entity, or rather an
amorphous amalgamation of officers, directors, shareholders, assets, and employees
greater than the sum of its parts is a separate and perhaps insoluble question. For present
purposes, as EN M makes unequivocally cleat - , employees, if they have any part in the
corporate composite, are relegated to only a peripheral and subordinate position vis-a-vis
other competing interests. FIVA/ thus ominously and ineluctably augured the perniciously
liberalized Bildisco standards for labor corn ract rejection. TheF/VM rationale provided the
impetus for the continued erosion of labor law jurisprudence through the sophisticated
manipulation of the bankruptcy statutes. Viewed together, FNM and Bildisco suggest that.
there is little remaining hope for an integrated and coherent. national labor law doctrine.
The present federal labor law policy, so fundamentally subordinated to the power and
prerogative of the employer, makes a hollow and transparent mockery of the original
Congressional intent of labor-management economic equilibrium that had been the
bedrock of the NLRA. 339
 Virtually unfettered economic prerogatives of the ownership
interests now dominate. 34° If labor-management parity were ever an actuality, it has been
now ruled that the employer can unilaterally remove work from its unionized to its non unionized
facilities during the effective term of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Absent a very specific,
express contract term forbidding such action, the employer is free to initiate these fundamental and
unilateral changes without prior union consent and, per FNM, free from the duty to bargain over the
core decision. Id, In Milwaukee Spring, the union refused to make mid-term contract wage and benefit
concessions at the employer's unionized plant. Id. The employer then transfered operations to its
nonunionized facility solely for the FNM-approved reason of economic efficiency through lower
labor costs. Id.
The employer's economic hardship alone has never excused unilateral contract modification.
Phoenix Air Conditioning, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 341, 342 n.6 (1977), enf'd, 580 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1978);
Airport Limousine Service, 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 934 (1977); Oak Cliff-Gorman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B.
1063, 1064 (1973), erf'd, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining In Light Of First National Mainte-
nance, 5 kn. REL. L.J. 402. 425 (1983).
'1' See .supra mites 20-21 and accompanying text.
3"
 Prior to FNM, the Sixth Circuit refused to recognize community property right claims
asserted by the unions. This was a futile effort to prevent economically motivated steel plant'closings
by 1
 United States Steel in Youngstown, Ohio and the inevitable dramatic ramifications of those
actions. In United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th
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shattered. Concomitantly, any remaining aspirations to achieve and maintain indispensa-
ble labor-management balance are quickly fading.
Labor is caught between the dual threat of the FNM prerogative to cease operations
and the Bildisco functional equivalent of abrogating labor contracts through bankruptcy.
This unpalatable dilemma leaves labor without viable alternatives to the specter of
interminable concessions bargaining. It is not the case, however, that the employer
invariably utilizes these available strategies in a purely rapacious, exploitive fashion. On
the contrary, most of the pertinent cases indicate that management was motivated by
legitimate and pressing economic concerns, rather than by overt antiunion animus. That
analysis, of course, presupposes the theoretical validity of the distinction between eco-
nomic and antiunion motivations. In any event, if the increasingly complex corporate
entity indeed has any sense of allegiance, it is clear that it is not fundamentally predis-
posed toward the employees or to any geographic or national political constraints. Em-
ployees and nationalism are relegated to the end of any list, which is seemingly increas-
ingly headed by the self interests of the corporate officers. 34 '
Recognizing the legitimacy of employer economic concerns, the erosion of United
States' markets and efficient manufacturing capabilities in the world market, and the
labor-intensive position of declining heavy manufacturing industries in the high-technol-
ogy age, employers need the necessary capability to make active business decisions
through informed strategic planning. To vitalize employer options at the sole, heavy, and
inordinate expense of labor, however, is unwise. Continued and attenuated, if not entirely
disingenuous, judicial inferences from inexcusable legislative inaction only exacerbate the
fundamental conflict between labor law and bankruptcy law.
The most effective immediate legislation to remedy Bildisco would authorize labor
contract rejection "only in extraordinary cases, when the union involved has unjustifiably
refused to agree to a modification of the agreement necessary to insure a successful
reorganization." 342 Professor Countryman has advocated imposition of such a bargaining
requirement as a precondition to a petition for labor contract rejection. 3" Furthermore,
Cir. 1980), the court of appeals expressly acknowledged the sweeping impact of the corporation's
decision to close the Youngstown plants:
For all of the years United States Steel has been operating in Youngstown, it has been a
dominant factor in the lives of its thousands of employees and their families, and in the
life of the city itself. The contemplated abrupt departure of United States Steel from
Youngstown will, of course, have direct impact on 3,500 workers and their families. It
will doubtless mean a devastating blow to them, to the business community and to the
City of Youngstown itself'. While we cannot read the future of Youngstown from this
record, what the record does indicate clearly is that we deal with an economic tragedy of
major proportion to Youngstown and Ohio's Mahoning Valley.
Id.
Although sympathetic to the employees, the court maintained that any amelioration must be
effected through legislation. Id. at 1280. Citing a history of prior changes in American industry
resulting in plant closing, such as the nineteenth century shift of the textile industry from the New
England milltowns to the South, the court of appeals refused to recognize plaintiff's argument of a
community property interest to prevent the corporate steel plant closure. Id. at 1266.
2-" Note, Golden Parachute Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of a Tender Offer,
57 Sr. Joust's L. REV. 515 (1983).
342 Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 52, at 293. 300.
"3 Id. at 317. According to the authors:
At the very minimum, no bankruptcy court should authorize the rejection of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement until the debtor establishes that it bargained in good faith
with the union with respect to modifications in the collective bargaining agreement
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the bankruptcy courts should make greater use of the expertise of labor arbitrators to
assess the value of less tangible labor contract rights, such as seniority, accrued pension,
vacation, and severance pay claims. Incorporating the time-honored wisdom of labor
arbitrators into the bankruptcy court's difficult decision whether to permit labor contract
rejection is likely to make the ultimate decision far more palatable to the parties. 344
Inevitably, any recommendation will he somewhat dissatisfying. Within the immedi-
ate constraints of the problem and in the short term, therefore, it is imperative to
maintain the integrity of the national policies that vitalize labor and bankruptcy law. By
requiring the employer to bargain with the union in good faith to impasse as the absolute
precondition to petitioning the bankruptcy court for permission to reject the contract, this
goal can be accomplished very effectively. This chronological, sequential approach has
been repeatedly endorsed as most efficacious and harmonious. 345
Of course, there is always a danger that bargaining can be illegitimately manipulated
through interminable delay. Obstructionist tactics, however, are less likely to occur when
the bargaining scenario is necessarily expedited under the supervisory authority of the
bankruptcy court. If allegations of unfair labor practices, such as bad faith bargaining or
refusal to bargain, surface within the context of the negotiations, the Board should be
prepared to resolve such allegations on an expedited, priority basis. Joint court supervi-
sion and NLRB-expedited attention would fOster cooperation between the employer and
the union and would largely moot t he potential for obscurantist, recalcitrant bargaining
strategies.
Intensive bargaining within concentrated time constraints under this preferred
scenario is likely to engender agreement to modified contract terms and thus avoid the
necessity of contract rejection. Although less desirable than the original contract, from the
union's perspective, the parties could then retain a workable basis to undergird the
employment relationship. Under the present system, if the contract is rejected, the parties
are left utterly bereft of any tangible foundation for the employment relationship." 46
The ominous consequence of such expedited bargaining is the potential for the
parties, more likely the employer, to insist intractably on original terms or to otherwise
quickly proclaim impasse to achieve quick contract rejection. This threat, however, could
deemed necessary by the debtor for continuation of the business enterprise, and that
the union refused to agree to these modifications.
Id.
The requirement of bargaining as a precondition to a petition for court authorization of labor
contract rejection had been previously advocated by other commentators. See, e.g., Note, Labor-Bank-
ruptcy Conflict, supra note 143 at 150. ("A bargaining requirement enables courts to preserve the
NLRA's collective bargaining system to the fullest extent possible. If the parties negotiate to an
impasse and are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise, the bankruptcy court could
then permit rejection if necessary to ensure the success of the reorganization .... [goons should,
except in emergency situations, presume that a business will not collapse unless the parties have
bargained to impasse.").
3" See Note, Labor — Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter XI Arrangement
Proceedings — lron Workers Local 455 s'. Kevin Steel Products, Inc. and Brh. of Ry. Clerks v. REA
Express, Inc. 17 B.C. I ND. & COMM. L. REV. 192, 210-212 (1976). There is precedent for sending
disputes stemming from the consequences of contract rejection to labor arbitration. Bohack Corp, v.
Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807. 431 F. Stipp. 646 (E.D. N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1979) (union demands regarding back pay and reinstatement following
contract rejection were sent to arbitration by the court.); Note, Law's Effect supra note 49, at 409.
3" See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
346 See .supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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be effectively neutralized by the courts. In the event of NLRB findings of had faith
bargaining or refusal to bargain on the part oldie employer, the bankruptcy courts would
refuse to authorize contract rejection unless and until the employer cured its bargaining
defects. If the union engaged in bad faith obstructionist tactics, the courts would have the
immediate authority to approve the debtor employer's petition fbr contract rejection.
These judicial prerogatives would dampen any incentives to sabotage the bargaining
process.
If despite good faith bargaining, pre-petition negotiations did not result in a mod-
ification of the entire contract, the bankruptcy court should have the ability to authorize
only partial rejection. This authority would require the court to engage in delicate
balancing evaluations. Presently, indelicate and indiscriminate wholesale rejection is the
only avenue. Partial rejection would be a Iii' more viable and palatable alternative. Upon
partial rejection, the parties would have retained the portions of a modified contract they
were able to salvage through their pre-petition negotiations. Partial rejection would surely
he preferable to the sole present Draconian "solution" of complete rejection. Knowing
that at least part of the original contract can be salvaged would encourage viable pre-peti-
tion negotiations and deter bad faith bargaining. Each party has core interests it would
like to retain from the original contract. Pre-petition bargaining over those interests is
likely to engender the fluid synergy necessary to achieve agreement on a broader negotia-
tion agenda.
Unfortunately, imposing pre-petition bargaining as an absolute condition to seeking
contract rejection and providing the alternative of only partial rejection are far less than
complete solutions to the problems posed by labor contracts in bankruptcy. Viewed from
a broad perspective, the core difficulty that could still frustrate pre-petition bargaining is
the gross imbalance between the institutional power of the multinational corporations and
that of organized labor. Rather than acting on its prerogative to go out of business
completely, it is more likely that the multinational employer will simply transfer opera-
tions outside the United States for "economic" reasons. The domestic operation need not
be unprofitable or only marginally profitable to be subject to transnational relocation.
Rather, maximization of profits may he the governing criterion. Of course, the likelihood
of such transfer is significantly heightened in the event of domestic unprofitability. It is
this FNM rationale that enables the multinational employer to posit such a pernicious
choice to labor: provide concessions ad ii!finiturn upon employer demand, or face the
specter of total unemployment through domestic closure and/or transnational economic
relocation, largely beyond the effective ambit of United States labor laws.
The present recommendations can do little to counter the potential for the exercise
of such sweeping multinational employer prerogatives. This imbalance between the
power of the multinational corporations and their employees must be addressed ulti-
mately by an international labor law. At present, that reform borders on utopian vision,
and not on pragrnatiC capability for foreseeable effectuation. As it beginning, the broad
problem requires a systematic rethinking of the entire labor-ownership calculus into the
next century. This reflection would ultimately lead to an integrated and coherent labor
jurisprudence, displacing the current disjointed and fitful isolated judicial reactions to
individual cases.
In a narrower and more immediate perspective, the small employer faced with the
threat of bankruptcy has legitimate, fundamental interests to protect through reorganiza-
tion. Although not discounting the potential for illegitimate utilization of bankruptcy
provisions by solvent enterprises to avoid unions, that will be the exception to the norm.
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The imposition of the recommended requirement of good faith pre-petition bargaining
to impasse will largely eliminate the threat of such manipulation by ferreting out solvent
employers in the incipient stages of pre-petition bargaining. The legitimate reorganiza-
tion needs of the imperiled employer can be effectively addressed through pre-petition
negotiation of a palatable modified contract. If the contract cannot be entirely restruc-
tured after good faith bargaining to impasse, judicial recourse of partial rejection can be
invoked. Total rejection of the contract, therefore, may become necessary only in a
minority of' future reorganization cases. Fundamental tenets of federal labor policy will be
preserved, while enabling viable reorganization. No inordinate impediments to any of the
interested parties will result. By responsibly legislating the absolute requirement of
pre-petition bargaining into the Bankruptcy Code, Congress can neutralize and rectify
the thoughtless and insidious distortion of core federal labor policy otherwise inevitably
dictated by NLRB v. Bildisco
CONCLUSION
It is now unmistakably clear that Congress must begin to address these myriad,
complex issues through responsible legislation. Perhaps the bankruptcy statutes and labor
statutes can yet be reconciled and harmonized. The non-viable alternative of continued
legislative inaction will mean the collapse of any integrated and meaningful federal labor
policy. The present need for an integrated and coherent national labor law jurisprudence
could not, be more compelling. Instead, however, unwarranted and dangerous exaltation
of employer prerogatives through judicial inventiveness and inexcusable legislative dor-
mancy bode the final disintegration of any hope for coherent labor law doctrine. The
pragmatic consequences are the potential reduction of organized labor into a bleak
Darwinian state, "protected" by a judicially eviscerated and arcane labor statute. Both
Bildisco and FNM cry for responsible legislative action to require bargaining prior to
seeking court approval for contract rejection. Labor-management equilibrium must be
achieved while simultaneously insuring that business has the ability to compete effectively
in world markets. It is the most challenging and indispensable task for our individual and
collective future, as employees, as employers, and as a nation.
Perhaps the labor and bankruptcy statutes pertaining to collective bargaining agree-
ments cannot be fully harmonized. Although preferable, reconciliation of contrary
statutes should not be the central objective of either the courts or the legislature. Semantic
statutory manipulation by any decision maker in any forced, purported reconciliation
would be grossly transparent sophistry, The statutory language cannot be forced into any
uneasy and artificial congruency without addressing fundamental policy considerations.
That type of solution would exalt form at the continuing expense of disintegrating
substantive policy. Rather than engage in mere statutory manipulation, it is imperative
that the Congress entirely rethink the basic objectives of federal labor policy. The recent
bankruptcy-labor conflict is only symptomatic of a far more crucial problem. Many
aspects of labor and employment law jurisprudence are in conflict. 547 Unless rectified,
labor doctrine risks becoming wholly incoherent.
347 For further explication of the author's argument that other major elements of labor and
employment law doctrine are internally contradictory, see, e.g., Gregory, Conflict Between Seniority and
Affirmative Action Principles In Labor Arbitration Awards, and Problems ofJudicial Review, 57 TEMPLE
(forthcoming, summer, 1984) (affirmative action principles have been rigidly subordinated to nar-
row labor interests, to the ultimate detriment of both considerations); Gregory, Union Liability For
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It may well be that the policy considerations that historically grounded the major
federal labor statutes have become archaic and fossilized. The entire national socio-
political-economic calculus has been thoroughly transmogrified over the course of half a
century. As the next century fast approaches, a labor policy articulated during an age of
infant unionization in heavy manufacturing industries serving national markets may no
longer be fully responsive to either labor or management concerns. With fundamental
changes from heavy, highly unionized manufacturing industries into high technology,
non-unionized services already underway, it may well be that the time has come to
formulate and to articulate a new national labor policy.
Policy, if it is anything, is certainly not immutable, If policy is meaningfully to ground
praxis, it must continually and fluidly evolve in contextually appropriate fashion. Thus,
while the immediate ramifications of the 1W.114 and Bildisco decisions may radically distort
labor-management equilibrium, they have also highlighted the timeliness of the more
essential task. These recent decisions, so severely impacting upon labor management
relations, compel reexamination of core federal labor policy. Thus, ironically enough,
these significant decisions may yet ultimately lead toward a new labor law jurisprudence.
Regardless of the contours of newly vitalized federal labor policy that moves into the
next century, some key variables will remain. Given the human condition, the presence of
labor and management, employee and employer, remains assured. There may well be
more cooperation and facilitation between these interests in the future. Pristine, adversa-
rial distinctions may become increasingly difficult to make or to maintain. Concomitantly,
non-unionized employees are already making substantial progress toward greater job
security outside the union environment, through such recent developments as the erosion
of the traditional employment at will doctrine.
Regardless of the ultimate contours of the new labor law jurisprudence, however, it
remains incontrovertible that all persons have the inherent right to be treated with
dignity, respect, and concern. Respect for fundamental human rights and their integra-
tion, implementation, and protection in all work environments must be at the heart of
federal labor policy and of any meaningful jurisprudence.
Bildisco, in the short term, can be legislatively rectified by requiring hard bargaining
prior to seeking contract rejection. Such statutory amelioration, however, would only
begin the indispensable core task toward totally rethinking and formulating meaningful
federal labor policy into the next century.
EDITOR'S NOTE
As this article went to press, Congress passed The Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 that statutorily incorporated several of the recommenda-
tions advocated and explained in detail in this article. The legislative activity pertaining to
the Bildisco decision occurred in the larger context of the two year Congressional struggle
to remedy the constitutional difficulties afflicting the appointment and tenure of the
bankruptcy court judges stemming from the Marathon Oil decision.'" The legislation was
not enacted until House and Senate conferees reached agreement at 3 a.m. on Thursday,
Damages After Bowen v. Postal Service: The Incongruity Between Labor Law and Title VII Jurisprudence, 35
BAYLOR L. REv. 237 (1983) (union damages for breach of the union's duty of fair representation have
assumed Draconian proportions, while unions have often been wholly immunized from damages for
employment discrimination due to a congeries of procedural contortions).
8A8 See supra note 48.
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June 28, 1984 following marathon negotiations. Earlier the Senate and House had passed
bills dealing with the bankruptcy courts, but the Senate version was silent on the Bildisco
case. This difference necessitated the joint conference. On Friday, June 29, the House
passed the compromise legislation by a vote of 394-0; the Senate passed the legislation by
voice vote immediately prior to the Congressional summer and Democratic convention
recess. President Reagan signed the bill on July 10, 1981.
According to the labor contract provisions of the comprehensive new bankruptcy
legislation pertinent to the Bildisco decision, prior bankruptcy court approval will now be
required in order to reject the labor contract. Further, the bankruptcy court must first
determine that the debtor in possession petitioning for court approval for contract
rejection had attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate concessions with the union and that
the union had refused without good reason to make the concessions. The bankruptcy
court must deem the concessions sought necessary to stave off business collapse. Finally,
the bankruptcy court's balance of the general equities must militate clearly in favor of
cancelling the contract.
The new legislation applies only prospectively, however, and will not affect cases
already filed. Further, the bill sets deadlines for the bankruptcy court to make determina-
tions regarding labor contract rejection, and allows employers to abrogate labor contracts
if bankruptcy courts do not observe the deadlines. Although the bill remedies, in part,
some of the more egregious aspects of the Bildisco decision, the efficacy of the new
legislation will he determined by how well the bankruptcy courts apply the equities
balance and observe the statutory time constraints for rendering a decision regarding the
petition to reject. Spokespersons for the AFL-CIO characterized the Bildisco labor con-
tract provisions of the new bankruptcy legislation as "'a victory with a small v' for
labor.""9 In addition, several responsible officials in judicial administration expressed.
concerns regarding the possible unconstitutionality of the new legislation, especially
regarding the automatic extension of the terms of the current bankruptcy court judges
until at least October, 1986. In effect, Congress may have unconstitutionally usurped the
constitutional power of the President to appoint federal judges by presuming to legisla-
tively extend the terms of the current judges without presidential reappointment. 25° Due
to the many reasons elucidated in this article and the concerns now expressed in the
immediate wake of the new bankruptcy legislation, it is very clear that the Bildisco decision
and the Congressional response will have profound impact on pragmatic labor relations
and business reorganization and on labor law jurisprudence for several years in the
future.
349 Keller, Conferees Adopt Plan 7'o Overhaul Bankruptcy Field, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1984, Al, col.
I, D11, col. 1.
3*° Keller, Concerns on Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1984, § 1 at 38, col. 4.
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